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SUMMARY
Completing the development process and getting to first-flight has become
a difficult hurdle for launch vehicles. Program cancellations in the last 30 years
were largely due to cost overruns, schedule slips, and a lack of congressional support.
Since the Space Shuttle retirement in 2011, cancellations have plagued launch vehicle
development programs. A recent example is the cancellation of the Constellation
program in 2010, in favor of the new Space Launch System (SLS). SLS is scheduled
for its first manned flight in 2021, and the United States now faces a 10 year gap
in the ability to independently launch people into space. Despite the demonstrated
consequences of cost overruns, the current NASA budgetary environment is imposing
even more constraints on SLS than previous launch vehicle programs. A shifting
focus to reducing the cost and schedule during the design, development, testing and
evaluation (DDT&E) process is necessary to give these programs the opportunity to
succeed.
Comparing the life cycle progression of NASA programs to their cost and schedule
history illustrates that the largest percentage of growth occurs during NASA Phases
C and D. During these phases the system is undergoing verification, validation, and
testing (VVT) to eliminate defects and gain knowledge about the system. Unplanned
rework cycles that take place during these phases can account for up to 75% of total
development cost. Current industry standard VVT planning is largely subjective with
no method for evaluating the impact of rework. Although a few academic studies have
looked into VVT planning, weaknesses exist in their evaluation of rework cycles and
overall assessment of individual VVT activities. This research aims to address the
gap of estimating the impact of rework during VVT planning to help improve the
xvii
launch vehicle Design, Development, Testing & Evaluation process.
The Rework Impact on Verification, Validation, and Test Strategies (RIVVTS)
methodology was developed to meet this goal by quantitatively capturing the effects
of unplanned rework during VVT for launch vehicle systems and subsystems. Using
the strengths of existing reliability growth techniques, rework cycles are first esti-
mated using FMEA failure distributions. A dependency structure matrix is used to
model the impact of rework cycles using the relationships between VVT activities. To
provide a complete assessment, four metrics were chosen to evaluate a VVT strategy:
reliability, cost, schedule, risk. This approach allows for a quantitative cost, sched-
ule, and reliability projection to be generated. The resulting output distributions are
then used to calculate the risk level of a given VVT strategy using a quadratic impact
function.
The method developed is first tested on a case study, comparing the method out-
put to actual data from the RS-68 engine. The purpose of this example is to illustrate
that this methodology accurately captures the occurrence and impact of rework cycles
seen during VVT. The secondary purpose of the example is to validate the develop-
ment of the cost, schedule, and reliability assumptions for future applications of this
method.
Finally, this method is applied to evaluate alternative VVT strategies for a rele-
vant launch vehicle subsystem. First, the method outputs are compared against the
overall research objectives to confirm that they are met. Then the alternative VVT
strategies are evaluated to determine how the impact of rework can be mitigated. The
results give interesting observations regarding the benefit of comprehensive compo-
nent testing versus early integrated testing. Ultimately, this final application problem
demonstrates the merits of the RIVVTS methodology in evaluating VVT strategies.
RIVVTS provides a risk-informed decision making tool to reduce the impact of rework







The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Authorization Act of
2010 established the development of a heavy lift launch vehicle (LV) to be a part
of the new Space Launch System (SLS) [7]. As a follow on to the Space Shuttle
Program, the human rated SLS will be the first exploration class LV since the Saturn
V over 40 years ago [133]. The design of such a large and complex system requires
the integration of multiple disciplines, many of which have conflicting objectives. To
ensure the optimal design, compromises are necessary to attain a balance among the
performance, reliability, cost, and schedule requirements. In addition to the innate
difficulties of designing such a system, the SLS is placing particular emphasis on
improving the affordability and sustainability of the program [133, 39]. Affordability,
in this context, is defined as the ability to develop and operate the SLS within the
national means to sustain funding for the program [133]. Therefore, it will be critical
to understand the cost and schedule risks as well as the technical risks during the
design, development, test and evaluation (DDT&E) period.
Launch vehicles are inherently expensive to develop and produce, and often do
not reach first flight [27, 132]. The space industry has become a ‘start-stop-restart’
process in the last few decades, filled with programs that never make it out of the
DDT&E phase. As far back as the late 1980s, the length of the required develop-
ment time for these complex systems is too extensive to keep up with changes in
requirements and national priorities. An example of this is the Advanced Launch
System (ALS) which was a joint NASA and Department of Defense (DoD) program
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with the aim of reducing the cost of putting large payloads in orbit [86]. Two years
after the start of the ALS development, reductions in funding and a shift of focus
to lightweight weapons lead to its cancellation in 1989. Following that, the Na-
tional Launch System (NLS) program was created to support the goals described by
the Bush administration’s National Space Policy Directive 4, National Space Launch
Strategy, to develop a new Expendable Launch Vehicle with a focus on improving
reliability, cost, and responsiveness [86]. The NLS program was also canceled after
two years due to poor communication and differing priorities between NASA and the
Air Force. From 1995-2000, NASA focused on the development of Reusable Launch
Vehicles (RLV). Two RLV flight test programs were initiated, X-33 and X-34. The
X-33 was a joint program with Lockheed Martin that was pushing the boundaries
in composite fuel tanks [67]. After suffering technical set backs and failing to meet
its goals, the program was deemed too costly and canceled [86]. The X-34, a joint
program with Orbital Sciences Corporation, was similarly canceled after initial flight
tests determined that additional costs did not justify the potential benefits [86]. Af-
ter funding for the X-33 and X-34 was cut, focus shifted to the new Space Launch
Initiative (SLI). The SLI was a joint industry-government effort from 2000-2004 to
determine the best approach to developing a Space Shuttle replacement [43]. It was
yet another example of a program that did not make it out of the DDT&E phase as
it was canceled in favor of the Orbital Space Plane [43]. OSP was also canceled when
NASAs Exploration System Architecture Study (ESAS), which later evolved into the
Constellation Program, was formed [43]. Figure 1 highlights these short lived space
transportation programs over the last three decades.
This ‘start-stop-restart’ cycle that space transportation programs have endured
does little to improve confidence in NASA’s ability to develop the necessary tech-
nologies for advanced space flight. Program efforts to achieve significant advances
in technology are being stifled in support of a more risk adverse environment, just
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Figure 1: Canceled space transportation programs.
to ensure a program successfully completes the DDT&E phase and makes it through
to a first flight. Looking further into the effects of canceling the Constellation pro-
gram shows that it is more than simply a monetary loss. The Constellation program
was formed in 2005 and consisted of the Ares-I and Ares-V launch vehicles, and the
Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) [138]. The original program schedule
allowed for a two year gap between the retirement of the Space Shuttle in 2010 and
the availability of the Ares-1 and Orion to support the International Space Station
(ISS) in 2012 [109]. In 2009, the schedule slipped to 2015, resulting in a five year gap.
When the program was canceled in 2010 due to poorly phased funding and additional
schedule slips, the U.S. was left without the ability to independently launch people
into space. The current Space Launch System (SLS) is not expected to launch a
manned mission until 2021, resulting in a 10 year gap. This will be the longest gap
in America’s manned space flight presence since the Apollo-Shuttle gap in the late
70s [109]. Until the SLS or a commercial alternative becomes available, NASA will
pay Russia between $50-$70 million per seat to train and transport crew members
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to the ISS [109]. NASA has not had the political inertia to sustain the funding nec-
essary to back their complex programs [86], and their current budget environment
imposes even more constraints on the new SLS program than previous launch vehicle
programs [39]. Creating a sustainable development plan is critical to the long term
success of a program. These additional demands highlight a gap in the ability to
create a sustainable DDT&E plan for these complex systems, and that is the primary
motivation for this research. The following section goes into more detail about the
risks of a DDT&E plan to further scope the goals of this research.
After determining the need for the development of a sustainable DDT&E plan, it
is necessary to identify where improvements to DDT&E planning can be made. The
lifecycle of a project is divided up into phases to help plan and manage development
of the system [131]. Figure 2 illustrates how NASA defines the life cycle phases for its
projects, lettered Pre-Phase A, Phase A, Phase B, Phase C, Phase D, Phase E, and
Phase F. The phase boundaries are defined at natural points for progress assessment
and design reviews to determine if the project should continue to the next phase.
Examples of these key decision points include Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR),
Critical Design Reviews (CDR), and Launch Readiness Reviews (LRR).
Figure 2: NASA lifecycle phases [131].
Many studies have been conducted to improve the quality of early conceptual
design, particularly on expanding the ability to explore more architecture space during
Pre-Phase A and Phase A [22, 26, 91]. These methods focus on the design and
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development portion of the DDT&E phase, while testing and evaluation of large
systems has been shown to represent 40% of the total life cycle cost [21]. In particular,
technical failures uncovered during testing account for a significant portion of the
development schedule, cost, and effort across many industries. A Rocketdyne review
of the F-1 and J-2 advanced engine programs found that 73% of total development
cost was absorbed in eliminating failure modes [64]. Of that 73%, 75% of the effort to
eliminate the failure modes was spent on rework, i.e. re-design, re-manufacturing, and
re-testing. A semiconductor manufacturing company found similar trends, estimating
that unplanned design and manufacturing iterations account for between 33%-66%
of total development time [110]. Software projects also state that 40%-50% of their
efforts are spent avoiding rework [21]. Unplanned rework dominates much of the
development cost and schedule because it is seldom explicitly considered. NASA’s
Discover and New Frontiers Programs found that no analysis is performed during
Phase A and B to determine the amount of redesign or additional testing that might
be necessary during the course of Phase C and D design implementation [67].
A previous study investigated the mass, power, cost, and schedule growth of 20
NASA missions [56]. Figure 3 shows that the majority of cost and schedule overrun
for these projects are not seen until Phase C and Phase D, the implementation phases
or test and evaluation portion of DDT&E [131]. NASA’s Phase C is Final Design
and Fabrication where hardware fabrication is initiated, and engineering test units
that closely resemble actual hardware are tested to establish confidence in the design.
A series of CDRs are conducted during Phase C, at the system-level and subsystem
levels, prior to fabrication [131]. Phase D is the System Assembly, Integration and
Test, Launch, and Check Out. During this phase the complete system goes through
a verification, validation, and testing (VVT) process. VVT is a systems engineering
tool that is meant to increase knowledge about the system and ensure it is high
quality, functionally sound, meet the user’s needs [50].
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Figure 3: Comparison of average system growth over time [56].
Recognized by the major launch vehicle developers and the International Council
on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) as a vital part of the development process, VVT
planning currently relies heavily on subject matter experts and does not consistently
include statements of risk and uncertainty [108, 131, 153]. Generally, a fully com-
prehensive VVT procedure is not realistic due to cost and schedule constraints [136].
The lack of structure in developing an efficient VVT plan has been addressed in the
literature, which is presented in Chapter 2. Many authors have concluded that un-
planned rework efforts can have a significant effect on the success of a development
program, but few methods exist to quantify these effects during VVT. While some
of these methods recognize the importance of rework, few include the impacts of re-
work cycles, and no VVT planning methods provide a direct approach to obtain the
probability that rework will occur.
1.2 Research Focus and Organization
The primary motivation for this research is the difficulty launch vehicle programs have
seen historically in successfully completing DDT&E and making it to first flight. The
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previous section identified the importance of creating a sustainable VVT plan and
considering the impact that rework cycles can have on that process. Therefore the
focus of this thesis is on the development of a methodology for modeling the verifica-
tion, validation, and testing plan for launch vehicle programs that will quantitatively
capture the effects of rework cycles. VVT is an iterative process that takes place to
different degrees during each design phase. This research is strictly focused on the
formal VVT that occurs during Phase C/D, and will simply be referred to as VVT
for the remainder of the document [131, 2].
Chapter 2 provides a review of the different approaches for VVT planning. Each
technique is introduced, and the strengths and weaknesses of how they assess the value
of VVT activities, and how they address the impact of rework cycles is discussed.
Following this section, observations are drawn from these existing techniques and the
objective for this research is defined. Research questions are posed in the remaining
sections of Chapter 2 to introduce the components necessary to build the Rework
Impact on Verification, Validation, and Test Strategies (RIVVTS) methodology and
meet the objective. Using a combination of research questions, literature review,
and experimentation, the components of RIVVTS are formulated in Chapter 3. The
experiments are designed to test the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2. The setup
of each experiment is introduced first, followed by the results and observations of that
experiment, and conclusions are drawn to either support or refute the hypothesis.
Chapter 4 presents a detailed description of each step in this methodology. At
the end of Chapter 4 a case study is presented to validate the output of this method.
Following the case study, Chapter 5 presents an application of this methodology
to alternative VVT strategies for one system. A detailed discussion of the method
outputs are discussed, and the completion of the research objective is verified. The
final chapter concludes the thesis by presenting a summary of the findings from the
literature review, experiments, and application problem. Finally, the contributions
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This chapter contains a literature review of launch vehicle VVT process planning
and is intended to identify the gaps by establishing what the current state-of-the-
art is and how it can be improved. The first section reviews the VVT requirements
and current industry standards in planning a VVT strategy. The next section is
an in-depth review of the academic research that has been done to advance VVT
planning methodologies and addresses some of their shortcomings. Section 2.4 covers
the specific elements of VVT that are necessary for decision making, and discusses
how they have been treated individually in the literature. Sections 2.5-2.8 discuss
those specific elements individually. The last section reviews the current methods
that exist in estimating the rework probabilities and impacts.
2.1 Definitions and Purpose of VVT
As mentioned previously, verification, validation, and testing is a set of activities
and processes that are chosen to increase knowledge of the system and demonstrate
that the system or product meets all requirements. The definitions of verification
and validation differ slightly between organizations, but have a common goal. These
definitions from the major launch vehicle developers and systems engineering organi-
zations are stated below:
Verification
NASA [131] “..process of confirming that deliverable ground and flight hardware
and software are in compliance with design and performance require-
ments.”
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DoD [108] “...process used to demonstrate that the system design meets appli-
cable requirements and is capable of sustaining its operational role
during the life cycle.”
ECSS [4] “...process which demonstrates through the provision of objective
evidence that the product is designed and produced according to its
specifications and is free of defects.”
INCOSE [153] “...addresses whether the system, its elements, its interfaces, and
incremental work products satisfy their requirements.”
Validation
NASA [131] “...process of determining the effectiveness and suitability of the
product for use in mission operations by typical users.”
DoD [108] “...process used to ensure the project has confidence that the as-
built product will perform its intended functionality in its intended
operational environment.
ECSS [4] “...process which demonstrates that the product is able to accom-
plish its intended use in the intended operational environment.”
INCOSE [153] “...confirms that the system, as built, will satisfy the user’s needs.”
The trend in these definitions is that verification deals with satisfying the speci-
fied requirements and ensuring the system was built correctly; and validation deals
with ensuring that the right system was built regardless of what the exact specifica-
tions were in the beginning. Although these two processes address different issues,
they use a common set of activities. The verification and validation methods include
[102, 53, 7]:
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1. Inspection - Visual examination or other non-destructive evaluation to deter-
mine product conformance with characteristics best determined by observation
(e.g. weight, dimensions, color, or other physical characteristics).
2. Analysis - Evaluation of data by generally accepted analytical techniques to
determine the system will meet specified requirements (i.e. modeling and sim-
ulation, systems engineering analysis, or probabilistic calculations). Typically
used when physical testing in the actual environment cannot be achieved or is
cost-prohibitive.
3. Demonstration - Determination of product conformance through the operation
of a test article, relying on observation and no or minimal special test equipment
and instrumentation.
4. Test - Operation of the system under controlled conditions to quantitatively
determine if design or performance requirements are met in applicable envi-
ronments. Testing is the preferred requirement verification method when the
system contains critical failure modes that could result in loss of life or loss of
mission.
Testing can serve multiple purposes and be a subset of both verification and validation.
Primarily, testing is an activity where the system is employed to verify the design,
validate the operational unit, or identify as many defects as possible [61]. Compiling
these definitions, the general purpose of a VVT strategy is to gain knowledge about
the system while eliminating as many manufacturing and design defects as possible
within the allotted time and budget.
VVT planning is the process of determining which activities to use (e.g. analysis,
test, inspection, or demonstration) based on the required system performance, risks,
and cost and schedule impacts. A review of how VVT planning is currently done by
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these organizations is provided in the next section, followed by an in depth review of
the advances made in process planning in the literature.
2.2 Verification, Validation, and Test Planning
To understand how VVT planning is currently done for launch vehicle programs,
a review of NASA, the Department of Defense (DoD), and the European Coopera-
tion for Space Standardization (ECSS) documentation was conducted. In addition,
because VVT is fundamentally a System’s Engineering component, a review of doc-
umentation from the International Council On Systems Engineering (INCOSE) was
also completed. These organizations have published multiple requirements documents
for verification and testing standards. The VVT planning process is largely based on
expert opinion, and therefore no standard planning methodology was found. Another
indication of a lack of uniformity is the publication of VVT standards by individual
NASA centers. What can be assembled from these requirements are common VVT
tools and terminology.
2.2.1 Industry Standards and Requirements Definition
NASA’s System’s Engineering Handbook contains the primary guidelines for pro-
gram verification and validation [131]. The design process at NASA consists of seven
phases, Pre-Phase A and Phases A-F. The verification planning is done in more detail
progressively throughout the design life cycle [131]. Phase D includes the implemen-
tation of verification and validation of the system, including testing the system in
its operational environment. It states that each program’s verification and validation
plan should be tailored to the specific project it supports. The methods used may
depend on payload classification, cost, schedule, risk implications, or many other as-
pects. Due to the individualization of each VVT process, this handbook and other
documents only contain guidelines for developing an effective VVT plan. Another
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handbook with guidelines and requirements is the Marshall Space Flight Center Ver-
ification Handbook, Volumes I and II [2, 1]. Even within the one NASA center, the
verification documentation and processes are not uniform. Each project is allocated
the responsibility of developing a VVT program that considers the cost, schedule, and
risk impacts of their specific project. While the actual verification process activities
do not begin until Phase C, preliminary methods are planned during Phase B.
The DoD documentation on launch vehicle VVT are military standards MIL-
STD-1540, Product Verification Requirements for Launch, Upper Stage, and Space
Vehicles, and MIL-HDBK-340, Test Requirements for Space Vehicles [108, 106]. MIL-
STD-1540 directly addresses launch vehicle verification plan development to demon-
strate that the system design meets its requirements. It contains more specifics than
the NASA documents because it is directly written for space vehicles, but similarly
specifies that the final VVT plan should be tailored to each project [108] according
to various factors. MIL-HDBK-340 details the government requirements for each test
level, e.g. qualification and acceptance tests, at the unit, subsystem, and system-levels
[106].
INCOSE System’s Engineering Handbook also describes the progression of the
VVT process during a project’s development phases [153], as illustrated in Figure
4. As the system transitions from early development phases into final system design
and operations, the V&V requirements also change. It mentions a Verification Cross
Reference Matrix, also referred to as a Verification Requirements Matrix (VRM) by
NASA and the DoD documents [131, 108]. The VRM is a matrix that lists the
system requirements and any required tests for verifying that particular requirement.
INCOSE goes further by giving each requirement a unique identifier to be used to
improve traceability while developing test plans and procedures [153]. Although these
organizations provide different levels of detail regarding the VVT planning process,
and define their life cycle phases differently, the fundamental purpose of VVT is the
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same.
Figure 4: Progression of system verification and validation during design lifecycle
[153].
The only consistency in this documentation is the lack of a developed methodol-
ogy for developing a VVT plan. The current best practice is to use expert judgment
in conjunction with the VRM to create a VVT plan while ‘considering’ cost, schedule,
and performance risk impacts. Rework and retesting are not explicitly addressed in
this documentation. Academic research has assumed the task of researching method-
ologies that will enable a more robust and improved VVT planning process in terms
of cost, schedule, and performance. These studies are discussed in the next section.
2.2.1.1 Observations
A review of the literature search on VVT planning and evaluation techniques, a few
observations about the current state-of-the art can be made. The successive can-
cellation of launch vehicle programs suggests that a more sustainable DDT&E plan
is required, with a focus on reducing cost and schedule overruns during phases C
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and D during development. The primary government launch vehicle developers, i.e.
NASA, DoD, INCOSE, and ESA, each have their own individual set of guidelines
and definitions that address verification and validation, and VVT planning. While
there are similarities and trends, no industry standard VVT development procedure
is currently in use. Uncertainty and risk are recognized as important factors by each
individual organization, but are not consistently evaluated during VVT planning pro-
cess. Each organization addresses uncertainty with different methods and to different
degrees during the development phases. Rework cycles and their impact on the pro-
gram are not explicitly addressed in these documents. The main observation to be
made from the review of industry standard approaches, is the lack of continuity of
the VVT planning and evaluation techniques.
• Launch vehicles require the development of a more sustainable DDT&E plan
• No industry standard VVT development procedure is currently in use
• While uncertainty and risk are recognized as important factors, they are not
consistently evaluated during the VVT planning process
• Rework cycles are not explicitly addressed
2.3 Research Objective
The primary motivation for this research is the gap identified by these observations.
It has been identified that current VVT planning and evaluation techniques do not
adequately account for rework cycles, and the resulting cost and schedule overruns
often lead to program cancellation. Therefore, it is important to evaluate the impact
unplanned rework can have on VVT activities, and determine how VVT planning can
mitigate these effects. These observations lead to the following research objective:
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Research Objective
Reduce cost and schedule overruns by modeling the effects of unplanned
rework on the verification, validation, and testing of launch vehicle systems,
and determining how VVT strategies can mitigate those effects.
The research objective can be achieved through the formulation and implementa-
tion of a structured process, or methodology that meets requirements derived from
the identified weakness of industry standard VVT planning and evaluation. First,
the qualitative nature, and lack of structure, in evaluating VVT activities does not
provide a complete assessment. This leads to the first requirement, which states that
a quantitative means for comparing alternative VVT strategies is desired. The sec-
ond requirement stems from the gap in current approaches to consider the impact of
rework cycles. The cost and schedule overruns that result from the additional design
and testing activities have been recognized as significant hurdles for launch vehicle
programs, but are still excluded from the VVT planning. This leads to the second
requirement, that a quantitative estimate for the explicit impact of rework cycles on
cost and schedule be produced. The final requirements is derived from the complex
nature of launch vehicles. Individual program requirements and testing activities can
often become bogged down in details due to the complexity of the system. Therefore,
this method must scalable and flexible enough to enable its use at the subsystem and
system levels.
Derived Requirements:
1. The method shall produce quantitative means for comparing alternative VVT
strategies.
2. The method shall produce quantitative estimates for the impact of rework cycles
on cost and schedule during VVT.
3. The method shall be scalable and flexible enough to enable use for large complex
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systems.
The methodology that is formulated to meet the research objective and derived
requirements provides the foundation for a risk-informed VVT evaluation framework
that will aide decision makers in selecting the best set of VVT activities according
to specific program goals. This decision support tool for VVT planning is there-
fore developed to follow a generic set of decision-making steps to enable its seamless
integration in the overall decision-making process. For this research, th Georgia In-
stitute of Technology Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) approach
will be used [129]. A graphical overview of the IPPD methodology is presented in
Figure 5. The center column of this umbrella chart represents a generic top-down
decision-support process that can be applied to any type of problem.
Figure 5: Georgia Tech integrated product and process development approach [129].
There are six steps in the IPPD methodology: establish need, define the prob-
lem, establish value, generate feasible alternatives, evaluate alternatives, and make
decision. Chapter 1 established the need for this research by identifying the gaps in
current methods to reduce cost and schedule overruns caused by unplanned rework.
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In defining the problem, the primary objective and requirements for this research
were derived through observations and identified weaknesses in the industry standard
VVT planning and evaluation techniques discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. The first
two steps of this methodology are necessary to understand the expectations of the
RIVVTS methodology and how it can be used to mitigate the effects of unplanned
rework. To establish value, performance measures or metrics of interest need to be
selected. A standard set of metrics allows for a traceable and fair comparison between
alternative VVT strategies. The next two steps are two generate feasible alternative
VVT strategies and evaluate the alternatives using the previously defined value cri-
teria. The final step is to make a decision, or a risk-informed alternative selection
based on the previous evaluation. The first two steps of the IPPD approach were
completed through the development of the research objective and derived require-
ments. Establishing value for this problem leads to the first research question for the
RIVVTS method, which is stated below.
Research Question: 1
What metrics should be used to evaluate the impact of rework on a VVT
plan?
The metrics that are considered to some degree in industry VVT planning are
cost, schedule, and risk, but there is no consensus on how these metrics should be
evaluated or how they are impacted by rework cycles. A literature review of the VVT
planning and evaluation techniques is presented in the next section to determine if
there are other methods that have been developed to account for rework, and further
assess which metrics are needed to evaluate a VVT strategy.
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2.4 Literature Review of VVT Planning Techniques
The research efforts on improving VVT planning can be divided into qualitative or
quantitative techniques. The qualitative methods focus more on standardizing the
process by providing a common format to evaluate VVT activities. The quantitative
techniques, alternatively, use various methods to evaluate the actual cost, schedule,
and performance value of an individual activity. The following section contains a
discussion on the existing methods to help answer research question 1.
2.4.1 Qualitative VVT Planning Techniques
Meussig and Laack present a formal process of what is currently the industry stan-
dard to establish the value of verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A)
of modeling and simulation (M&S) environments [98]. The first step is to system-
atically identify the risk scenarios and quantitatively determine the probability of
occurrence and the severity of impact each scenario will have on the system. Meussig
uses an established impact and probability discretization described in MIL-STD-882C
[107]. The severity of the impact is divided into four categories catastrophic, critical,
marginal, and negligible. The probability of occurrence is similarly divided into five
categories frequent, probable, occasional, remote, and improbable. When combined,
these categories create a Risk Matrix (RM), which is a commonly used risk assessment
tool [107, 131] shown in Figure 6a. This method differs by assigning similar categories
to the benefits of VV&A activities, shown in Figure 6b. Using the risk and benefit
matrices, the best VV&A activities can be selected by SMEs from a well-defined list
of all the available VV&A activities.
Haimes, Kaplan, and Lambert suggest a more structured decision making process
for filtering and ranking the identified risk scenarios [61]. A hierarchical holographic
modeling approach is used to subdivide the system into more manageable sections for
risk identification. Each subtopic then becomes a category of risk scenarios. After
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(a) Risk Matrix. (b) Benefit Matrix.
Figure 6: MIL-STD 882C defined risk matrix and associated benefit matrix [98, 107]
an exhaustive list of risk scenarios is created, Haimes uses multiple steps to rank
and filter the scenarios to a more manageable number. The first phase of filtering
is based on the expert opinion of the risk manager. Then the remaining risks are
categorized according to MIL-STD-882 and arranged in a RM, where the low-priority
risks are filtered out. From here the scenarios are filtered based on military system
priorities and risk management is introduced to determine the most cost-effective
ways to counter the risk scenarios that constitute the most risk to the system.
The last qualitative technique discussed in this section is a methodical approach
to the tracking and documenting of verification activities [99]. To improve the veri-
fication process of space systems, a modular management process was recommended
to be distributed to any and all teams working on the system, from contractors to the
system’s engineering team. This standardization of the process is meant to ensure
that all requirements are sufficiently verified, and nothing is overlooked or underval-
ued. While not necessarily a study intended to find the optimal VVT strategy, it does
elude to the need for a more formal and structured VVT program planning approach.
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2.4.2 Quantitative VVT Planning Techniques
The next few methodologies quantitatively determine the value of different VVT
strategies. One of these methods was an investigation into the optimal mix of par-
allel and sequential testing [85]. Uncertainty analysis is used as a measure of value,
while cost and schedule are minimized. The iterative nature of the design process is
represented by the use of sequential testing, where each test cycle can account for any
learning achieved in the previous cycle. Parallel test cycles, on the other hand, do not
account for any learning and are conducted as planned. If two cycles are unrelated,
then parallel testing is preferred. Each test has a fixed cost and a target uncertainty
reduction value. Full tests yield full uncertainty reduction, while any partial tests
(e.g. scaled prototypes or wind tunnel testing) leave residual uncertainty relative to
the level of testing performed. Loch et al. found that the financial cost and cost of
time available to perform tests had a major impact on the testing strategy, where
expensive tests are best used sequentially and slower tests are more optimal in par-
allel. The use of parallel testing does not take full advantage of the possible learning
between tests, making it less optimal when using partial tests, which are already lim-
iting the maximum uncertainty reduction available. Rework cycles are not addressed
as a form of uncertainty here, but it does highlight the effect that iteration can have
on the VVT strategy.
Thomke and Bell addressed the most effective way to incorporate high fidelity
tests into the product development process [144]. Test costs were modeled as a func-
tion of fidelity, and the cost of rework to correct problems discovered during testing
was modeled as a function of time. The authors developed a metric referred to as
the Economic Test Frequency, which is a function of the test cost, number of cumu-
lated faults discovered, and rework cost, to determine the optimal test frequency and
occurrence for a development program. It was determined that the optimal strategy
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was highly dependent on the correlation of sequential tests, where mostly uncorre-
lated test portfolios benefited from more tests at mixed fidelities, and correlated test
portfolios only needed a small number of higher fidelity tests. Because only sequential
testing was considered, actual test durations were not a factor in determining testing
strategies. While the trends discovered during this study provide useful knowledge
for moving forward, the general application of this method does not lend itself to
more complex systems. Launch vehicles, for instance, will utilize both sequential and
parallel testing, and rework costs can vary from minor to significant based on more
than just the time it is conducted.
Engel and Barad used a probabilistic approach to determine the cost of risks
during VVT [51]. The canonical VVT baseline test strategy is considered an ideal
test scenario with no resource constraints. Varying test strategies with different levels
of partially performed tests are then compared to the canonical example. Using
only sequential testing, any partially performed test is considered increased risk, and
a Monte Carlo simulation is used for a stochastic risk assessment. The value is
determined by the amount of risk reduction achieved. This method is based on
expert opinion of expected cost and duration for each activity, and does not include
rework probabilities.
The concept of risk reduction as a measure of value has also been applied to
the overall product development process [25, 24]. Browning et al. used a risk value
method to track reduction in product performance uncertainty [26]. Multiple tech-
nical performance measures are tracked and treated as random variables to measure
their uncertainty. In addition to uncertainty, the impact of failure to meet the tar-
get performance goals is modeled as a quadratic impact function. Overall product
performance risk is measured as a weighted sum of the technical performance mea-
sure impact failures. In another study, Browning further expands his ideas on adding
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value to the product development process [24]. In a risk reduction exercise, each prod-
uct development activity is assigned a value based on the measure of risk reduction
achieved. These values are used to create a predicted value trajectory for the planned
activities. Browning suggests that eliminating activities where the value trajectory
is flat, indicating significant expenditures with limited risk reduction, is a better ap-
proach to reducing costs during product development. Although this strategy is not
directly applied to VVT processes, the idea to base VVT strategies on performance
improvements could yield insightful results.
The SysTest project, sponsored by INCOSE, developed a generic VVT method-
ology with regard to its impacts on cost, schedule, and performance risk. A series
of papers were published to review the initial outcomes of the project [51, 68, 83].
Hoppe et al., reviewed the results of applying the SysTest methodology across five de-
sign phases for six industrial projects [68]. A questionnaire given to the six projects
evaluated the effectiveness of SysTest based on test and rework costs. Given the
small sample size and inconsistent results, it was difficult to conclude that there
was a substantial improvement. Although rework was a measure of success for this
methodology, rework probabilities were not considered during the VVT strategy de-
velopment. There was also no measure of product quality increase shown in the six
sample projects. The cost avoidance strategy used in SysTest and other methodolo-
gies does not consider the value added by different testing activities [51, 83, 85, 144].
One important distinction between SysTest and the other methodologies described
previously is in the output. While cost and/or schedule are factors in all of the
studies, many only evaluate trends in the cost and schedule impacts based on VVT
strategies. SysTest produces a quantified cost and schedule estimates.
2.4.3 Observations
• Few studies exist that consider both cost and benefit risk for VVT strategies
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• A consistent method for estimating rework probabilities does not exist
• No studies quantitatively address the impact of rework on cost and schedule
The academic literature provides a variety of ways to evaluate VVT or testing
plans. The approaches discussed in Section 2.4, qualitative and quantitative, can be
categorized as either cost or cost vs. benefit. Cost categories found in the literature
include the actual cost of testing, the cost of rework cycles, and the time spent
testing. These techniques only address half of the VVT definition given in Section
2.2.1, regarding the program’s resource constraints. The other half of the definition
is to gain knowledge and eliminate defects from the system. The cost vs. benefit
approaches account for the full VVT definition by including some measure of quality
improvement to the system. The benefit categories for VVT activities are performance
demonstration, reducing rework cycles, and risk reduction. Only a few methods were
identified that fall into this category, and even fewer included the probability of
rework. While there are suggested methods to generate rework probabilities, none of
these studies quantitatively addressed the impact of rework on cost and schedule.
2.4.4 Conjecture for Research Question 1
Research question 1 asks the fundamental question for this research objective. In
trying to select a launch vehicle VVT strategy, the first step is determining where
the value lies in the VVT process and how others have modeled it in the past. A
review of the industry standard practices in VVT process planning found a lack of a
structured methodology, instead depending on expert opinion to individually tailor
the VVT plan. Documentation from the two main U.S. launch vehicle developers and
an international systems engineering organization all emphasized the need to consider
the cost, schedule and risk impacts when planning is being conducted. These three
parameters are then recognized as significant in the process, and need to be considered
when assessing VVT value.
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The academic literature search similarly focused on those parameters to different
degrees, and also suggested that performance value should be included since cost and
schedule should not be the only drivers for VVT strategy selection. The studies that
address process planning fall into a cost vs. benefit proposition. What is considered
a cost to the system and what is considered a benefit is what varies primarily. The
methods are divided into two categories, qualitative and quantitative, to determine a
‘best’ process planning strategy.
The qualitative methods can be dismissed because they do not provide enough
information to differentiate between distinct VVT strategies. However, the cost and
benefit considerations of these approaches are still of interest. These methods focus on
risk identification and SME input for VVT activity selection. The goal is to identify
the biggest risks to the system by estimating the probability of risk occurrence and
the severity of its impact should it occur. A RM is one of the tools used to assess
the risks and down select from an exhaustive list of risks to focus on the high priority
ones. The value, then, is in risk reduction through VVT activities. Cost, schedule,
and rework are not explicitly addressed, and are only considered qualitatively in terms
of risk occurrence impact.
The quantitative methods are more diverse. Again risk or uncertainty reduction is
the most common goal in process planning methodologies. Research into sequential
and parallel testing determined the value of a test based on the number of design
problems uncovered as a function of test fidelity. The later in the testing process
defects were uncovered, the most costly the rework effort, but no information was
given on how to determine the probabilities of defects being uncovered or on the
impacts of rework efforts on activity duration. Correlation between tests was shown
to be an important factor in overall process duration when both parallel and sequen-
tial testing was included. Browning’s work was the first to offer an estimation of
actual cost and schedule duration when considering design iterations during product
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development processes. The goal of the product development process planning was
to reduce the risk in technical performance using a risk value method. Rework was
considered, but only the probability of one task causing rework in another task. The
probability of repeating a task, referred to as internal rework, was implicitly included
in the cost/schedule distribution for that task. For design activities internal rework
implies that a certain portion of the activity is repeated, but testing activities require
a repeat of the full activity. Explicitly addressing internal rework would provide a
more accurate model for VVT activities. SysTest also produced cost and schedule
predictions, but did not consider rework as an uncertainty input.
There have been a wide variety of methods introduced in evaluating VVT strate-
gies. Many have a purely cost driven motivation, while others use an uncertainty
or risk reduction technique. Only two methods produce an actual cost and sched-
ule prediction, but neither fully address rework cycles and how to determine their
probabilities. From this review, it can be seen that the main VVT parameters are
a quality improvement measure (i.e. reduction in rework cycles or improvements
in performance), cost, schedule, and risk. Although few of the methods address all
four of these parameters, they collectively summarize the value of a VVT strategy.
This review of current methods leads to the development of a conjecture to answer
research question 1. The following sections and research questions will investigate
these parameters further and determine what current methods exist for evaluating
them.
Conjecture: 1
If quality, cost, schedule, and risk are used as metrics to evaluate the impact
of rework during VVT, it will provide the most complete assessment of
VVT activities, and will enable a quantitative comparison of alternative
VVT strategies.
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The selection of quality, cost, schedule, and risk creates a foundation for the
overall methodology. These metrics can be defined or evaluated in different ways
depending on the system, and the current state of development. For example, the
most applicable cost estimation technique is heavily dependent on the development
phase and the amount of information available about the system at that time. A
measure of quality, on the other hand, is dependent on the type of system being
developed. The following sections will review existing methods for evaluating each
of these metrics, and determine their applicability to launch vehicle systems during
Phase C and D VVT.
2.5 Quality
The cost vs. benefit methods discussed in Section 2.4 each use a different measure of
quality for the evaluation of VVT activities. Reduction in rework cycles or reduction
in uncertainty can be applied broadly to a variety of systems, but certain performance
measures are more applicable than others for launch vehicle systems. This broad
definition of quality in the literature requires further research to determine the most
appropriate definition for the RIVVTS methodology, and is addressed by the following
research question:
Research Question: 2
What is the most appropriate measure of quality for assessing the impact
of rework on launch vehicle VVT strategies?
The previous VVT strategies touched on two different approaches to measuring
the quality of a system defect elimination and performance. SysTest used the number
of rework cycles as a measure of success for their project, suggesting that the imple-
mentation of the SysTest model improved the quality of the product by reducing the
unnecessary rework. Although this was not shown explicitly in the results, the use
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of rework cycles that were required to eliminate defects were identified as a represen-
tation of quality in their VVT strategy [68]. Thomke and Bell also used number of
defects as a measure of quality in their investigation of the optimum testing strategy.
Their use of fidelity to determine the number of uncovered defects allowed them to
directly assess the impact of individual activities [144].
Browning’s product development process model assigns a value of overall perfor-
mance to each activity by determining whether that activity improves or worsens the
expected performance value and whether that activity reduces or increases the un-
certainty of the expected performance value [26]. These two measures are combined
similar to the risk matrix defined in Section 2.4 and is shown graphically in Figure
7. The combined effect on performance and uncertainty measures is used to rank
the impact an activity will have on performance, which is then tracked throughout
the product development model. An advantage of this method is that it could the-
oretically be used for any performance measure that is most relevant to the system.
Another advantage is that it is designed to explicitly show the effects of a particular
activity on performance, enabling a better comparison between alternative develop-
ment process selections. A disadvantage of this technique is the qualitative nature of
the assessment. A general indication of improvement or decline does not provide a
very detailed level of analysis.
Bjorkman uses a model based systems engineering approach to improve the value
of test and evaluation through uncertainty reduction by tracking relevant technical
performance measures (TPM) [19]. This approach is similar to Browning’s in that it
supports the modeling of individual activity effects on system performance through-
out the process. While a TPM trajectory can be represented as a smooth curve,
performance improvements are more realistically modeled as step functions, where
each VVT activity provides a shift in the curve. In this framework, the added value
is the amount of uncertainty reduction, as opposed to performance improvements, but
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Figure 7: Qualitative activity-based performance effects [26].
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the significance of relating the value to the activities is determined to be beneficial.
TPMs are identified as an important part of the systems engineering process by
NASA and INCOSE [153, 131]. They are used to evaluate progress during the design
and development process and provide a way for project managers to track the success
of a project without relying solely on cost and schedule [153]. The selection of relevant
TPMs is determined by the particular mission as they relate to key mission success
parameters. The following section will give a brief overview of some of the priorities
that NASA has identified for the SLS program.
2.5.1 NASA’s Launch Vehicle Priorities
As seen in section 1, programs have been canceled due to combinations of cost, sched-
ule, and performance failures. Referring back to Figure 3, it was shown that the av-
erage cost growth, even above the programmatic reserves, was 57% and the average
schedule slip was 38%. This growth is typically not seen until after the Critical De-
sign Review (CDR). Bitten suggests that this lag in programmatic cost and schedule
realization could be due to overly optimistic estimates produced in the early design
stages [56]. Other studies of historical NASA missions have been conducted by the
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Bud-
get Office (CBO) [59]. Programmatic failures noted by these organizations include
inadequate definition of technical and management aspects of a program, funding in-
stability, lack of emphasis on technological readiness, program redesign, and budget
constraints. The effects of these programmatic failures can have a devastating effect
on the life of a program. To overcome these common pitfalls during development
the SLS program is prioritizing affordability and scheduling [100]. Reliability is also
becoming increasingly important as significant reliability constraints are being imple-
mented. The Space Shuttle had a demonstrated reliability of over 1 in 100 flights for
loss of crew, and the SLS is now requiring 1 in 1000 flights [55, 29]. Typically U.S
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launch vehicles only see a 85-90% reliability over their lifetime [30, 79].
A full magnitude improvement over historical launch vehicle reliabilities is a con-
siderable task. Other performance measures mentioned in the literature are more
suitable for other systems or during earlier design phases. For example, detectabil-
ity is more suitable for a military system, and thrust levels are verified earlier in
the design process. All launch vehicle subsystems are subject to reliability require-
ments during both assembly and testing. Based on this information, reliability can
be considered a system-level metric that is a key performance parameter for launch
vehicles. A conjecture can be made here to answer research question 2, which leads
to a follow-up research question.
Conjecture: 2
If reliability is used as a quality metric for launch vehicle systems, it will
provide a quantitative representation and accurate measure of quality for
VVT activities.
Research Question: 2a
What is the most appropriate method to track and assess reliability during
VVT?
The following section provides a discussion of existing reliability analysis methods,
and addresses their applicability for this methodology.
2.5.2 Reliability Techniques
Reliability analysis provides tools for assessing the probability that components, parts,
or systems will perform as expected in a given environment and for a given time
without failure. This is particularly important for crewed launch vehicles, where the
most critical failure level is Loss of Crew. The combination of high complexity and
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high reliability requirements for launch vehicle development programs, is typically
managed by dedicated reliability teams whose focus is to identify and eliminate as
many defects as possible. The most common techniques for reliability assessment are
discussed in this section. A thorough review of these and other methods is available
in Dodson’s Reliability Engineering Handbook [44].
2.5.2.1 Fault Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a system level reliability assessment tool. It is used to
determine top-level failure events, i.e. loss of mission or loss of crew, and then identify
all of the smaller contributing events in a trickle-down fashion. Figure 8 provides a
notional example of the visual representation of a FTA diagram. The numbered circles
represent the lower-level events that contribute to higher-level failures, connected by
logical ‘gates’ [149]. The gate with a rounded top, like the one joining events 3, 4, and
5, represents an “AND” gate, where all three contributing events must occur to lead
to the higher-level failure. The pointed gate, like the one joining events 1 and 2, is an
“OR” gate, where in the higher-level failure will occur as a result of either lower-level
event. This is essentially a root-cause analysis of the top-level failure that the FTA is
designed around. It can provide qualitative evaluation of functional relationships and
identify weaknesses in the design. It can also provide quantitative results in the form
of probability of occurrence for the top-level failures [81]. Similar to the graphical
activity network diagrams, FTA diagrams can become intractable for large complex
systems.
2.5.2.2 Reliability Block Diagram
Another graphical reliability method is the Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) [16].
Where FTA is an event-oriented layout, RBD is a physical-oriented layout of the
system. Figure 9 shows a simple RBD example. The blocks represent physical system
components that are strung together according to their physical interaction. In this
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Figure 8: Notional FTA diagram.
example, components A and B work in parallel where if one component fails the
system can continue through the other component in parallel. The probability of a






The component group A/B, and components C and D work together in series. If a
component in series fails, the process is blocked and cannot proceed. The reliability





While FTA computes the probability of failure, RBD computes the probability of
successfully completing the process. However, RBD presents the same weakness as
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other graphical representations, i.e. it can be difficult to create and follow when
dealing with complex systems.
Figure 9: Notional RBD diagram.
2.5.2.3 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), or Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality
Analysis (FMECA), is a qualitative reliability assessment technique. The purpose of
FMEA is to identify all of the potential failure modes in order to improve the reli-
ability and safety of the system. This technique is common practice during launch
vehicle development, and is referred to in both NASA and DoD reliability require-
ments documentation [3, 105]. FMEA begins with the identification of any known or
potential failure modes by a team of subject matter experts. Then the cause and ef-
fect of each failure mode is determined through criticality analysis. Three risk factors
are isolated:
• Occurrence (O) the probability a failure mode will occur
• Severity (S) the impact a failure mode will have on the system if it occurs
• Detection (D) the probability that a failure mode will be detected during
inspection or test
These three factors are used to prioritize the failure modes identified by calculating
a Risk Priority Number (RPN) [44]:
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RPN = O ∗ S ∗D (3)
The failure modes with higher RPN pose the most risk to the system and need to
be reexamined. Corrective actions are then recommended for the failure modes iden-
tified. DoD MIL-STD-1692, Procedures for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and
Criticality Analysis, provides guidelines to systematically perform FMEA. A sample
worksheet, recreated from [105], can be seen in Figure 10 . FMEA has historically
Figure 10: DoD FMEA worksheet [105].
been an important step in preventing failures from occurring and increasing the reli-
ability of the system [84]. However, there are two common criticisms of FMEA. The
first is the significant amount of time that goes into performing FMEA. Complex
systems can have a vast amount of components that require major effort to analyze.
The other criticism is in the value of the RPN metric. The three risk factors that
are used to calculate the RPN are considered equally, with no relative weightings.
This means different combinations of O, S, and D can yield the same RPN, but have
varying level of risk implications [32, 152].
2.5.2.4 Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) is a quantitative reliability analysis that uses
other reliability techniques in its formulation [137]. The fundamental steps of PRA
are listed below:
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1. Identify a list of initiating failure events
2. Create an event sequencing diagram from the initiating events
3. Convert event sequencing diagram into an event tree
4. Calculate probability of initiating event
Each of these steps can be completed with another reliability technique. For example,
identifying the initiating failure events can be done by leveraging FMEA if it has been
completed. Probability distributions are assigned to the initiating events, typically
exponential distributions, which can be used in a Monte Carlo Simluation to find
the probability density function (PDF) of failure probabilities [137]. While NASA
has traditionally preferred qualitative reliability assessments, like FMEA, PRA has
become more common since the Challenger accident [114]. Despite the benefits of
having a quantitative probabilistic reliability assessment, PRA also has drawbacks
stemming from the limitations of the other reliability techniques utilized.
2.5.2.5 Parts Count Method
The Parts Count Method (PCM) is a reliability estimation technique used during
early design when detailed information about the system is limited. The part count
is defined as the number of physically separate parts [57, 116]. The functional rela-
tionships between parts, locations, and attributes are not relevant in this reliability
calculation. The advantage of PCM is the rapid reliability prediction enabled by its
simplicity. For this reason, it is useful for generating comparisons between different
configurations of a system during preliminary design [158].
The failure rate of the system is calculated by multiplying the generic failure rate
of a generic part by a quality factor, and then summing the failure rates for number
of generic parts. The generic failure rates for specific components can be obtained
from failure rate databases, such as the electronic equipment failure rate database
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contained in MIL-HDBK-217F [104]. The quality factor can be applied when quality
level data exists, and defaultd to 1 when it does not [104]. Equation 4 below gives





where λSystem is the overall system failure rate, n is the number of different generic
parts, Ni is the quantity of the i
th generic part, λgi is the failure rate for the i
th generic
part, and πQi is the quality factor for the i
th generic part. The PCM approach could
be used to estimate launch vehicle reliability for architecture comparisons, but the
actual reliability estimates have been shown to be imprecise [116, 158].
These common reliability techniques have all been considered for this research.
While FMEA provides a considerable amount of information on specific risks, its
qualitative nature makes it unsuitable for use as a TPM. FTA, RBD, PRA, and PCM
could be used probabilistically by determining appropriate probability distributions
for the component failures, but they are not typically used to predict reliability over
time.
2.5.2.6 Reliability Growth Models
Another quantitative reliability projection technique is reliability growth models [20].
The idea behind these models is that reliability is increased as defects are uncov-
ered and corrected, also referred to as the test-analyze-and-fix (TAAF) process. The
existing reliability growth models are classified as either continuous or discrete. Con-
tinuous models typically consider mean time between failure (MTBF) data to track
reliability over time. In discrete reliability growth models, the data represents relia-
bility in terms of number of trials, or a Bernoulli process, where the possible outcomes
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Table 4: Practical reliability growth rate parameters [103]
α Reliability Effort Launch Vehicle α
0-0.2 No priority given. Corrective action only taken for crit-
ical modes.
0.2 Routine attention given to reliability improvement. Atlas [12] 0.2
0.3-0.4 Priority. Analysis and corrective action for important
failure modes.
0.4-0.6 Program dedicated to failure elimination. It has top
priority, and corrective action is given for all failures.
are either success or failure [58]. The following paragraphs discuss continuous and dis-
crete reliability growth models that have been successfully applied to launch vehicle
systems or subsystems.
Duane’s model is one of the most widely used continuous reliability growth models
[46]. His formulation for reliability growth is shown below,
λ = KTα (5)
where λ is the total number of failures per total test time, K is a proportionality
constant, T is total test time, and α is the growth rate parameter. In practical use,
Duane asserts that a log-log plot of test hours vs. test failures can graphically provide
α and K. Practical growth rate parameter values were later suggested based on the
reliability effort required to attain a desired growth rate [103], seen in Table 4.
While Duane’s model is used to track reliability across test phases, the Army
Material Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) model was developed by Crow to track
reliability growth within a test phase [23]. Reliability growth is modeled as a non-
homogeneous Poisson processes that results from design fixes being introduced into
the system. The expected cumulative number of failures at time t is given by:
E[N(t)] = θ(t) = λtβ (6)
where λ and β are shape parameters, t is the cumulative test time, and N(t) is the
cumulative number of failures [23]. A discrete version of the AMSAA model was
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Table 5: Morse reliability growth model parameters [97]
Parameter Definition
dk Initial number of defects of type k.
λk Conditional probability a defect is triggered if it is present.
τk Conditional probability a defect leads to loss of mission if it is
present and triggered.
νk Conditional probability a defect is observed if it caused a partial
anomaly.
ϕk Conditional probability a defect is reported if it is triggered and
observable.
γk Conditional probability a defect is eliminated if it is uncovered.
pmin Minimum probability of failure of the system.
later developed by Crow, referred to as the AMSAA-Crow model [38]. The discrete
model substitutes cumulative test time with trial number and is calculated using this
equation:
Rk = 1− λ(Nβk −N
β
k−1)/nk (7)
where k is the configuration number, nk is the number of trials in configuration k,
λ and β are shape parameters, and N0 = 0. The derivation of this model is based
on the assumption that the number of trials is fixed for each configuration, and the
distribution of successes and failures is random. These assumptions imply that, for
each configuration, the full set of planned tests are carried out, regardless of the
number of failures that occur. The result of the test series is then used to determine
design fixes at the end of that phase.
Another discrete approach, introduced by Morse, models launch vehicle reliability
growth as defect elimination by directly identifying the drivers of reliability growth
in new systems [97]. In this model, the failure probability is derived from a set of
probabilities for each identified defect type. The calculation of system reliability
follows the flow chart shown in Figure 11, with the characteristic parameters required
to define the model provided in Table 5 .
Following the diagram flow in Figure 11, reliability is derived using the following
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Figure 11: Morse reliability growth flow chart [97].
equation [97]:




where pmin is the mature probability of failure of the system with D defect types,
δk(N) is the probability that a defect of type k remains in the system at flight or test
number N , pk is conditional probability of system failure from a defect of type k if it
is still present, and dk is the initial number of defects of type k.
While Morse’s reliability growth model is primarily a discrete model, projecting
vehicle reliability versus number of flights, it also offers suggestions on how it could be
applicable during testing phases. The same defect detection mechanisms are present
during testing, implying that the same model equations will hold with small changes
to the input parameters. Those changes are listed below:
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1. Reduce a portion of risk due to the limited number of defects that can be
exposed during ground tests, when fully integrated test flights are not viable.
Risk is the contribution of a defect to the probability of loss of mission (LOM).
2. Improve the probability of defect detection and reporting due to extensive in-
strumentation available during testing:
ρ = νϕ (9)
where ν is the conditional probability that a defect is observed after it occurs,ϕ
is the conditional probability that it is reported after it is observed, and ρ is
the conditional probability that a defect is eliminated after it is observed and
reported.
3. Optionally, increase the probability of triggering some defect types, λk during
certain test types.
Hall’s discrete reliability growth model for one-shot systems has also been shown to
accurately represent launch vehicle systems [62, 158]. The characteristic parameters
to define the Hall model are listed in Table 6, with the five main assumptions used
to derive the model being [62]:
1. A trial results in a dichotomous success/failure outcome, such thatNi,j∼ Bernoulli(pi)
for each failure mode i and each trial j
2. Distribution of the number of failures in T trials for each failure mode is bino-
mial, such that Ni∼ Binomial(T ,pi) for each failure mode i
3. Initial failure mode probabilities of occurrence, p1,...,pk, constitute a realization
of a simple random sample, P1,...,Pk, such that Pi∼ Beta(n,x) for each i=1,...,k.
4. Potential failure modes occur independently of one another and their occurrence
is considered to constitute a failure
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Table 6: Hall reliability growth model parameters [62]
Parameter Definition
k Initial number of failure modes in the system.
T Number of trials during testing phase.
di Fix effectiveness factor.
pi∼Beta(n, x) Failure mode probabilities of occurrence, Beta distribu-
tion shape parameters.
5. There is at least one repeat failure mode
Each trial, or test, is considered an independent Bernoulli trial according to as-




1 if failure mode i is observed on or before trial t
0 otherwise
(10)
Assuming the trials are statistically independent, the expected value of the indicator
function at trial t is:
E[Ii(t)] = 1− (1− pi)t (11)





(1− [1− Ii(t− 1) ∗ di] ∗ pi) (12)
where di is the Fix Effectiveness Factor (FEF) for failure mode i, a measure of how
effective the corrective action was in eliminating the failure mode once it has occurred.
FEF = 1 implies the failure mode was completely eliminated from the system, and
the resulting probability of failure occurrence is 0. FEF = 0 indicates that no
corrective action was taken when the failure mode occurred.
Zwack’s reliability growth model for conceptual launch vehicles utilizes Hall’s
mathematical model [158]. Hall’s model is applied at the subsystem level, and a
fault tree analysis is used to propagate the subsystem reliabilities to the system level
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for the entire launch vehicle. By generating lower level reliability growth curves,
Zwack provides more insight into the reliability of the system than other models, and
enables reliability to be considered in architecture trades at the conceptual design
phase [158]. However, the additional reliability growth curves require more assump-
tions to be generated, i.e. Hall’s FEF, p(i), and the number of failure modes for each
subsystem.
2.5.3 Hypothesis for Research Question 2a
The reliability growth models reviewed in Section 2.5.2.6 have been applied to either
a full launch vehicle or a launch vehicle subsystem, primarily liquid rocket engines.
The first two models — Duane and AMSAA-Crow — were continuous, and have been
used to represent the Space Shuttle Main Engine reliability over its 110,000 sec hot-
fire engine test history [142]. Both models use a growth parameter approach, which
can be derived using data from a similar or surrogate system. AMSAA-Crow also
requires an assumption about the number of test configurations and number of tests
per configurations, which may not be known in advance. Although they show an
accurate prediction of the SSME Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), these models
do not provide any insight on the effect of individual tests on the reliability of the
system.
The other models discussed, Hall, Zwack, and Morse, were discrete reliability
growth models that have been shown to accurately predict launch vehicle reliability.
The primary difference in these models is the assumptions that they are built on.
Morse requires more probability parameters to calculate the reliability of the sys-
tem. These include the number of failure modes, probability of occurrence, detection,
action, and correction. Hall’s model only requires the number of failure modes, prob-
ability of occurrence, and the fix effectiveness factor. The number of failure modes
and probability of occurrence are common to both models. Morse’s probability of
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correction can be equated to Hall’s fix effectiveness factor. An assumption could be
made for the additional Morse parameters of action and correction by considering
that this methodology is modeling activities during testing. It can be assumed that
a significant amount of special test equipment and instrumentation is being used to
detect any anomalies, and that action is always taken due to the increased reliability
requirements of the system. The Morse model detection and action probabilities could
be defaulted to 100% based these assumption, negating the additional parameters.
However, the traceability of this methodology is negatively affected by adding these
assumptions. The complexity of this model is also a drawback. Implementing this
model across testing phases requires the evaluation of each input according to the spe-
cific activities. By requiring fewer inputs, Hall’s model would more easily be adjusted
to varying testing activities. While CONTRAST utilizes Hall’s model, it requires that
the input assumptions be generated for each subsystem that is being considered. The
added complexity of Zwack’s model is not necessary for the RIVVTS methodology
because the subsystems are not changing. Based on this evaluation, Hall’s reliability
growth model was selected for assessing reliability during VVT.
Zwack, Hall, and Morse state that their respective models can be used during
the testing phase, but are primarily used to model launch vehicle test flights where
all failure modes are observable in a fully integrated system. Development testing
for launch vehicles and launch vehicle subsystems does not always allow for fully
integrated tests. Due to the extreme operating environment, lower fidelity testing is
more common because it is less cost-prohibitive, and only a handful of flight tests
are conducted. The fidelity level of development tests gets progressively higher as
the system develops. This implies that each ‘trial’ or test cannot be treated equally.
To enable the use of Hall’s model during development testing, when the fidelity of
VVT activities varies, it will have to be adapted to include a function of test fidelity,
leading to a hypothesis for this research question.
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Hypothesis: 2a
If Hall’s reliability growth model is adapted to include defect elimination
as a function of test fidelity, it will provide reliability projection with quan-
titative insight into individual VVT activities.
2.6 Schedule
Schedule slippage was identified as primary contributor to the cancellation of launch
vehicle development programs in Section 1.1, and was determined to be a necessary
metric for the evaluation of the rework impact on VVT strategies in Section 2.2.
Rework can affect program schedule on multiple levels depending on the severity of
the defect being corrected. Figure 12 illustrates the full potential impact of a single
rework cycle on schedule slippage. Once a fault is detected, the cause of the fault is
traced back to either a design or manufacturing defect. If it is a design defect, the
rework cycle will start with redesign, and then remanufacturing, and finally retesting
the design change for verification of fault correction. Between each of these activities,
any number of delays could occur. For example, required parts could be unavailable
or test facilities could be occupied. Because rework cycles are typically unplanned,
the impact on total development schedule can be significantly impacted [64].
Due to the stochastic nature of failure modes and rework cycles, the technique
used to model VVT schedule must be flexible and have the ability to incorporate
the stochasticity of rework cycles. The overall objective of this research to develop
a quantitative means to compare alternative VVT strategies, imposes the additional
criterion that the method selected produce a quantitative schedule estimate. The
following research question is posed to determine the most appropriate schedule esti-
mating technique for this methodology.
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Figure 12: Total impact of a single rework cycle on schedule slippage.
Research Question: 3
How can the schedule of a VVT strategy be evaluated to include the impacts
of rework cycles?
The following section will review current schedule requirements and development
techniques, including the use of activity network diagrams to represent the sequential
relationships of activities.
2.6.1 Schedule Requirements
NASAs Schedule Management Handbook details what is required to develop the
Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) for a program. The IMS is considered the baseline
schedule and is created using industry best practices [102]. A Logic Network is also
created as a time-phased sequence of project tasks and milestones. The ‘best practice’
referred to here is called the Critical Path Method (CPM). The level of schedule detail
and insight increases throughout the life cycle of a program. During the formulation
phases, typical schedules will only include major milestones and general time phasing
of high-level tasks. As the program flows into the implementation phases, and system
details become formalized, more detailed tasks and milestones are required.
Developing a project schedule starts with determining which tasks are required.
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This task definition is typically derived from a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS),
where each input is broken down into measurable tasks. The level of detail required in
the schedule depends on the current design phase and intended stakeholders. Program
managers, for example, would need less schedule detail than a project manager [102].
These tasks or activities are then logically arranged into a network based on their
relationships and constraints. Basic activity relationships are shown in Figure 13.
Figure 13: Types of activity interdependencies.
The next step is to estimate the duration of each activity. There are several ways
to accomplish this. One way to estimate activity duration is to use historical data,
either strictly using the historical data to compare activity durations of previously
completed similar activities or with parametric analysis. Parametric analysis incorpo-
rates the duration of historical activity data and other related project data to estimate
activity duration, for example system mass, power, cost, etc. Parametric analysis is
a commonly used method to estimate high level tasks during conceptual design, i.e.
development and production. Another method to estimate activity duration using
historical data is the analogy method, where duration is directly associated to rele-
vant historical data and adjusted for complexity or other system metrics. The last
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two methods to mention for activity duration estimation are team brainstorming and
Subject Matter Experts (SME). With these methods, it is important to pull from a
highly experienced work force. Team members that are familiar with the nature of
the project can provide quality duration estimates. It is recommended that three du-
rations be estimated for each activity, a pessimistic, optimistic, and most likely time.
Having a range for the durations enables uncertainty calculation in the schedule. The
last step is to determine the sequencing of the tasks and activities. Relationships
between activities, i.e. finish-to-start, start-to-start, start-to-finish, etc., and activity
constraints, i.e. as soon as possible, must start on date, must start before date, etc.,
are the kind of information required to determine activity sequencing.
Current industry standards rely heavily on subject matter expert opinion and
do not incorporate any activity iterations. The following section will describe the
most commonly used scheduling methods, all of which do not consider unplanned
iterations. The remaining section will introduce methods that do consider iterations,
but are less common in practice.
2.6.2 Non-Iterative Scheduling Methods
The most well-known scheduling method is the Critical Path Method (CPM), which
has been used for project planning since the 1950s [47]. The main elements for
CPM are the same as the basic elements discussed above, e.g. a list of required
activities (WBS), duration for each activity, and activity interdependencies. Using
those elements, CPM calculates the longest path to project completion using the
relationships between the planned activities. It essentially determines which activities
are critical, or are on the longest path, and which can ‘float’, or be delayed, without
extending to total project completion time. An important distinction for CPM is that
the activity durations are fixed and deterministic. Iterations are not modeled with
CPM unless two of the same activities are called out in the WBS initially. While this
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method is widely used due to its direct and easily understood nature, these aspects
limit its usefulness when uncertainty and risk calculations are necessary.
There are many risks that lead to uncertain activity durations, i.e. late deliveries,
changes in project scope or requirements, unplanned rework, resource constraints,
etc. The PERT method, Program Evaluation and Review Technique, was developed
to deal with this imprecise data [88]. Also a widely used technique in industry,
PERT requires three time estimates for each activity, a pessimistic, optimistic, and
most likely. These estimates, usually given by SMEs, are used to determine the
expected value and variance for each activity duration. PERT then calculates a
probability distribution for the likely overall project duration based on the probability
distributions of the activities. The system is visually represented by a series of nodes
and arcs. A sample of a PERT activity network can be seen in Figure 14, where each
arc represents an activity and each node represents an event.
Figure 14: Notional PERT network.
There are a few recognized drawbacks to PERT in the literature. One significant
criticism is in the ability to generate meaningful estimates for the activity durations.
Obtaining estimates for each activity can be time consuming and it may be difficult
to find experts that are familiar with the problem when dealing with novel concepts.
Because the three time estimates are given by SMEs, they are purely subjective and
sensitive to the judgment of the expert. A study by Swanson and Pazer (1971) was
conducted to determine the sensitivity of the expected value and variance for the
project duration to imprecise estimates and determined that the upper and lower
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bounds are ambiguous [141]. Another disadvantage of this method is the visual
nature of the system representation. For complex systems it can quickly become
overly complicated, making it difficult to compare alternative network options.
Another non-iterative technique is the Probabilistic Network Evaluation Tech-
nique (PNET) [12]. PNET evaluates overall project duration based on the number
of failure modes in the network. A notional PNET chart is shown in Figure 15. Each
independent path is represented as a different color, and each represents a possible
failure mode in the network. ‘Failure’ in this context is anytime the project takes
longer to complete than the initial estimate. Similarly to PERT, PNET starts with
a probability distribution for the duration of each individual activity. Using these
distributions, the probability distribution of each complete path duration is calcu-
lated. A correlation matrix is calculated based on the number of common activities
between two paths and their respective standard deviations. This correlation matrix
is used to reduce the number of paths by eliminating ones that are highly correlated
with paths that have a longer duration. From this reduced set, the probability of
the network duration being longer than the target duration, T, is found using the
following equation:
P (t > T ) = 1− p(t1 < T ) ∗ p(t2 < T ) ∗ ... ∗ p(tn < T ), (13)
where p(ti < T ) is the probability that the i
th path will have a duration less than T
[42].
Figure 15: Notional PNET network.
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2.6.3 Iterative Schedule Methods
There are a handful of scheduling methods that do include iterations. One of these
methods is the Graphical Evaluation and Review Technique (GERT), a network anal-
ysis technique which was developed as an extension of PERT [119]. To overcome
the PERT shortcomings, GERT was designed to allow for looping and probabilistic
branching. These features make it more versatile than CPM or PERT. Figure 16
provides an example of a GERT network. Each arc is considered individually with
its own probability of choosing that arc. The sum of probabilities from a single node
is always equal to one. The visual system representation comes with the same disad-
vantage as PERT, in that it quickly becomes overly complicated for complex systems.
Also, the order of each activities remains fixed, limiting its ability to compare alter-
native system process plans. Although it improves upon certain aspects of PERT,
GERT has not been embraced by industry and is not often used [143].
Figure 16: Notional GERT network.
Markov Chains are another method used to represent iteration in a system [11].
Markov Chains uses a state space representation that consists of various states and
the transitions to/from those states. Figure 17 provides a simple example of a Markov
Chain. The states {A,B} represent activities in the process flow, and the arcs rep-
resent the transition between states. The numbers associated with the states are
activity duration, and the fractions associated with the arcs are the transition proba-
bilities. An advantage of this method is the ability to account for stochastic activity
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durations and branching. It is also an established model that is mathematically simple
and well understood. However, like GERT, it can quickly become overly complicated
for complex systems. Another disadvantage is that the activities must be predefined
and cannot be altered once the model is created.
Figure 17: Notional Markov Chain.
The most commonly used tool to model iterations is the design structure matrix
(DSM). The DSM is designed to represent the interactions between the matrix com-
ponents, showing how tasks and information flow affects other tasks [139]. A basic
DSM consists of a square matrix with activities down the left side and identically
across the top, as shown notionally in Figure 12. The matrix entries represent a
dependency between the tasks. This creates a manageable format for representing
complex processes graphically. From this representation, the schedule can be con-
verted into an activity network diagram, like GERT or PERT. Karniel and Reich
published a comprehensive review of DSM-based planning which can be referred to
for more detail [72].
A traditional DSM only establishes the existence of a relationship between tasks.
The upper half of the matrix represents feed-forward dependency, and the lower
half represents feed-back dependency (or vice versa depending on convention). The
program DeMAID (Design Manager’s Aide for Intelligent Decomposition) used this
form of DSM to improve product development by rearranging the tasks to minimize
feedback, a process known as partitioning [125]. This has been shown to reduce the
sensitivity of overall process time to changes in individual activity durations [76], but
52
Figure 18: Notional DSM.
further evaluation has shown that this strategy does not always yield the minimum
project duration [8, 25, 99]. DSM was improved by developing the numeric DSM
(NDSM), where the matrix entries were replaced by numbers representing the level
of relationship between activities [52]. Browning used the DSM off-diagonal entries
as rework probabilities between the activities and utilized the on-diagonal entries as
the activity duration [25]. His methodology was assessing the impact of architecture
selection on the performance, cost, and schedule risk in product development, of
which VVT is just a small piece. Internal rework was assumed to be included in
the on-diagonal activity duration probability distributions, and only inter-activity
rework was considered. Internal rework is more of a concern during VVT due to the
probabilities of test failures causing rework [53]. Including these probabilities in the
VVT activity durations limits the fidelity of the uncertainty measures. The utility
of DSMs to model variations in activity relationships is an advantage for this study.
Smith and Eppinger have shown it can be used to model only sequential activities,
only parallel, or a combination of both [135]. A disadvantage of the DSM is its
inability to represent stochastic activity durations and rework probabilities. Another
disadvantage is its limited use on VVT activities, where most of the research has been
done on overall product development processes.
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2.6.4 Hypothesis for Research Question 3
The first set of schedule management techniques introduced in Section 2.6.2 is the
non-iterative methods, which include CPM, PERT, and PNET. CPM and PERT are
the most commonly schedule management tools used in industry today. CPM allows
for the identification of ‘critical activities in the schedule, and PERT extends that to
include the calculation of an overall project duration probability distribution. PNET,
while being less popular, also includes probabilistic by considering all the possible
failure modes in the network. These methods are well established and understood, but
can be dismissed because they do not allow for iterations and require a predetermined
set of activities.
The graphical techniques introduced are all capable of stochastic assessment, and
differ only on how they represent the system. GERT is a basic iterative model that is
based on the PERT method, but has the ability to model iterations. Markov chains
serve a similar purpose, but use a state space representation of the system. GERT
is generally only used as an academic tool, and has not really gained traction in
industry, while Markov chains is a well established and understood activity network
model. These techniques all share the same weaknesses, however. Their graphical
representation can be difficult to generate for complex systems and quickly becomes
intractable. This limits their flexibility and traceability for use on launch vehicle
systems.
The final schedule management technique that was introduced was the design
structure matrix. DSMs are a matrix representation of the information that is graph-
ically displayed in the other methods, making it much more concise and easily under-
stood. The transition to numerical DSMs by Eppinger further increased its usefulness
and led the way for other studies to adapt the DSM in different ways. Brownings
use of DSM to represent rework probabilities and impacts in the product develop-
ment process is particularly useful. The matrix representation makes DSM more
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flexible and traceable than the other techniques reviewed previously, leading to the
development of hypothesis 3, stated below.
Hypothesis: 3
If a DSM is adapted to explicitly account for the probability of internal re-
work, it will provide a stochastic and quantitative model of rework impacts
that is more accurate for VVT processes than if internal rework is implicitly
included in the activity duration distribution.
2.7 Cost
Cost overrun due to rework cycles was identified as another primary contributor to the
cancellation of launch vehicle development programs in Section 1.1, and determined
to be a necessary metric for the evaluation of the rework impact on VVT strategies in
Section 2.2. Like schedule, rework cost can vary due to when the fault is detected and
the severity level of the fault. As discussed in Section 1.1, up to 75% of development
cost can be spent on eliminating failure modes through unplanned rework. Figure 19
shows the percent of peak funding that is spent during the F-1 engine development as
a function of development time. The amount spent on rework cycles increases through
the first 6 years, where it reaches its peak. The last three years show a decrease in the
amount of total spending attributed to rework, but the cost per rework cycle is not
obvious. Reliability growth models show that failure modes occur more frequently
during early testing, and then slow down as confidence in the design increases. It
is necessary to determine the cost per rework cycles by itemizing the total cost for
eliminating failure modes based on the rate that they occur.
The cost per rework cycle for the F-1 engine development program is illustrated in
Figure 20. The first two years are excluded because the rework cycles that are being
considered occurred during engine-level testing, which did not begin until 2 years
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Figure 19: F-1 engine percent funding used to eliminate rework cycles during devel-
opment.
into the program. Except for the one data point above 80%, the previous assumption
can be confirmed. An exponential fit for this data shows that the cost per rework
increases from 7% to as high as 42% near the end of the development cycle. This is
to be expected because when the engine enters certification tests, any failures require
that the engine start the certification cycle from the beginning.
While the data used in this example is from the F-1 engine, it illustrates a trend
commonly found when dealing with complex systems. The general assumption is that
the cost per rework cycle increases as the design progresses and nears production.
The foundation for this assumption is based on the well-known design curves shown
in Figure 21. This illustrates that the design freedom, or ability to make changes
to a design, decreases rapidly from the start of the design process. The other curve
illustrates that actual design knowledge increases slowly at first, then rapidly increases
in the middle of the process, and gradually levels out towards the end. The early
decrease in design freedom implies that any changes to the system, like those that
would occur during rework cycles, are more and more difficult to implement as the
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Figure 20: Percent of funding used per rework cycle during development.
system progresses in the design process.
Figure 21: Design freedom and design knowledge during development.
When selecting a cost estimating approach for this methodology, it is important
that the method be detailed enough to account for an individual rework cycle, but also
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flexible enough to allow for the stochastic nature of failure modes and rework cycles.
Like the criteria for schedule estimation, the cost estimating approach must produce
a quantitative result to support the overall research objective. The following research
question is posed to determine the most appropriate cost estimating technique for
this methodology.
Research Question: 4
How can the cost of a VVT strategy be quantified to include the impacts
of rework cycles?
Section 2.4 described various approaches to determining the cost of a VVT strat-
egy. Some only considered the direct cost of activities, while some modeled every
VVT risk driver as a system cost. Section 2.7.1 reviews the general cost estimating
methodologies currently being used to determine if existing methods can satisfy the
criteria for this methodology. In addition to traditional methods, reliability-based
cost estimating methods are reviewed in Section 23 due to the choice of reliability as
a measure of quality.
2.7.1 Cost Estimating Methodologies
The three primary cost estimating methods for launch vehicles are parametric, anal-
ogy, and engineering build-up [101]. Figure 22 shows that these methods are used
during different stages of the design process. Parametric and analogy methods are
top-down approaches geared toward generating a gross estimate [147]. Conversely, en-
gineering build-up is a bottom-up approach conducted at the lowest level of available
detail. These main cost estimating methods are described in detail below.
Parametric cost estimation is applied predominantly during the early phases of
the design process when little detail is known. Notably, Pre-Phase A and Phase A
cost estimates are used by NASA to secure funding [101, 131]. The foundation of this
58
Figure 22: Standard cost estimating methods [101].
approach is the mathematical relationships, known as cost estimating relationships
(CERs), developed to relate historical cost data to physical and performance param-
eters that are proven to be cost drivers for the system. Examples of these parameters
include, weight, power, design life, and technical maturity, among others. The im-
plicit assumption here is that the same cost drivers of past systems will continue to
drive cost in the same manner for new systems. Parametric cost estimates can be
versatile and quick once a sufficient amount of relevant data has been collected. The
reliance on historical data gives the method defensibility by increasing objectivity
and eliminating the need for expert opinion. This reliance is also a detriment due
to the time and effort required to initially collect the data. Availability of such data
can also be a challenge, especially when working with novel concepts. Because launch
vehicles, and all space systems, are at the least proprietary and at the most classi-
fied, a sufficient amount of relevant data can be challenging or even impossible to
gather. Another drawback of this method is that parametric relationships lose their
predictive capability when applied to inputs outside of the data ranges used to create
them. This can limit the usefulness of the cost model when a system is applying new
technologies [73, 126]. This is the case for reusable launch vehicles (RLV), as the
majority of LVs are expendable.
Analogy cost estimation is performed by identifying an existing system that is
technically similar to the new system, and adjusting the cost data up or down to
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account for any differences in their complexity or requirements. This method is also
used during early design phases because it does not require full program details. It
relies on historical data to provide a defensible and traceable estimate. If a strong
analogy can be found, then adjustments on the technical parameters related to cost
will be small, further increasing the accuracy of the cost model. However, this method
is contingent on there being a sufficient amount of technical and programmatic detail
available for the analogous system. Lack of relevant historical data is one reason
why it can be difficult to find an appropriate analogy. Another drawback of this
method is that the cost estimate relies on a single data point for predicting the cost
of a new system. This limits the accuracy of the cost model if the cited analogous
system is unsuitable. In this sense, the method is largely subjective. It relies on expert
judgment to determine not only the analogy, but also to make the relative comparison
between the two systems. This can create problems when initial technical or heritage
estimates are too optimistic to maintain throughout the design life cycle, resulting in
cost or schedule overruns [31].
Engineering build-up, also referred to as a grassroots or bottom-up, is performed
by creating cost estimates for the system at the lowest level of detail and rolling
those up to create an overall estimate. These detailed cost estimates come from
the work breakdown structure (WBS) that includes material and labor costs, often
with added overhead costs and fees. This method is typically used during detailed
design because the required detail is not available during early design. Because it
requires so much detail to create, engineering build-up cost models are intuitive and
defensible. Their credibility is provided from the visibility of the WBS. The low
level cost estimates often come from the cost engineer working directly with technical
experts who are familiar with the activities. However, this also makes this method
inherently costly, requiring a significant amount of time and effort to collect all of the
necessary information. The breadth of the WBS also makes it easy to either duplicate
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or omit cost elements from the estimate. Another disadvantage of this method is its
inability to easily adapt to any design changes or answer ‘what if’ questions. Each
time there is design modification or alternative scenario, a new estimate must be built
from the beginning.
Other, less renowned methods include expert opinion, extrapolation, and process-
based estimating [82]. The expert opinion approach solicits opinions from subject
matter experts. While often used, it is generally not preferred because it is prone to
errors due to bias from the expert [126]. Extrapolation uses past program costs to
estimate a future program costs. Learning curves are an example of a technique used
to extrapolate cost. This is only applicable when little has changed from the previous
project. Process-based, or activity-based, costing uses the relationships between pro-
cesses and the resources used to complete that process to build a cost estimate [112].
It is similar to the engineering build-up method in that they both roll up smaller
costs to create an overall cost estimate.
2.7.2 Reliability-Based Cost Estimating Methodologies
Based on the identification of reliability as a system-level performance metric, a review
of reliability-based cost estimates was also conducted. Figure 23 provides a notional
illustration of the cost vs. reliability curve, also referred to as ‘contractor’s cost vs.
reliability’ and ‘dependability vs non-dependability cost’ [20, 69]. This figure shows
that investing in increasing the reliability of a product corresponds to a decrease
in the operation and support cost and vice versa. Another interpretation is that
development cost represents the cost spent to avoid failure, or prevention cost, and
operations and support represent the cost of failure or having to correct mistakes
[118]. This leads to a total cost curve with an optimal total life cycle cost. Classic
examples of this include Juran’s Cost-of-Quality Model and Crosby’s Cost-Of-Quality
Model [37, 71]. Crosby’s model considers quality as conformance costs. Conformance
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costs include appraisal and prevention costs, where non-conformance costs include
the cost of rework or scrapping failed parts. Juran’s model introduces the idea of
benefits to the system, considered intangible or opportunity costs. A weakness of
these qualitative cost models is that they do not allow for differentiation between
VVT strategies. There is no indication of how or when a certain quality or reliability
is reached, so two very different VVT strategies could have the same cost but using
vastly different methods.
Figure 23: Generic cost of quality model.
One example of a quantitative cost model uses generic cost functions to relate cost
and reliability. These can be used when the actual cost function is unknown. They are
used to enable comparisons between alternatives with different reliabilities by using
the same cost function on the alternatives. These functions have four requirements
[10]:
1. The cost must be a monotonically increasing function of reliability.
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2. The cost of high reliability is very high.
3. The cost of low reliability is very low.
4. The derivative of cost (with respect to reliability) is a monotonically increasing
function of reliability.
While other cost functions have been used, one example of applying the generic
cost function is the use of an exponential cost function in the reliability cost model de-
veloped by the ReliaSoft Corporation [93]. In their model the component reliabilities
of a system are optimized to construct the maximum reliability for the minimum cost.
The exponential cost function used for each component contains three parameters,
fi, R(i,min), and R(i,max):






The feasibility parameter, fi, also known as the traditional rate parameter of an expo-
nential distribution, represents the difficulty in increasing the component reliability,
R(i,min) is the initial or current component reliability, and R(i,max) is the maximum
achievable reliability. The feasibility here can depend on the design complexity, tech-
nological limitations, or weighting factors. The lower the feasibility value, the faster
it approaches infinity. ReliaSoft has created a well-developed model for assessing
the cost of increasing reliability. Although this model does not include any perfor-
mance impacts on the reliability or cost, the feasibility parameter is a useful tool in
differentiating the system components.
Another study performed by Krevor optimizes launch vehicle architecture selection
based on performance, reliability, and cost [74]. The goal of Krevor’s environment is
to select the optimal cost and final reliability configuration for a given performance
requirement. Beginning with feasible launch vehicle configurations, the reliability
is tuned by altering the number of engines, increasing the thrust-to-weight ratio and
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adding redundant subsystems. The development and production costs are determined
using an initial NAFCOM (NASA Air Force Cost Model) estimate for the system as
is, and then multiplying the subsystems by their level of redundancy, ri. For example





Although the main focus of Krevor’s methodology is the mature reliability of the
system, a reliability growth technique is included. Using Duane’s reliability growth
model, the reliability for the optimal architectures are compared using the same
growth rate parameter, α, and the same number of flights to maturity [46]. The
only differences between the configurations are the initial and mature reliabilities.
The initial costs for each configuration include the development and theoretical first
unit cost. The cost for each subsequent flight is calculated by adding the cost of the
average production unit.
Another method to link reliability and cost is the Technical Uncertainty Rework
Cycle (TURC) and Production Development Control Lever (Prodecol) developed by
Rocketdyne to help control cost and schedule of their technically innovative product
[64, 65, 66]. This model is an extension of their TURC model, which uses a technical
uncertainty factor (TUF) to estimate the number of rework cycles during develop-
ment. To create the chart in Figure 24, SMEs were asked to reflect on the J-2 and F-1
advanced technology engine programs and estimate the starting TUF. Then the cost
of rework (CRW) required during each program was researched along with the causes
of each rework cycle. The result is the relationship between the TUF and CRW in
the Prodecol chart.
Although this study shows the strong correlation between increasing cost and
rework cycles, the process to create the TURC and Prodecol charts is very labor
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Figure 24: Rocketdyne TURC-Prodecal chart [65].
intensive. It requires sorting through historical documents to obtain all of the re-
work cycles and their causes and costs for an entire program, which are not always
available [65]. Rocketdyne suggests other methods to estimate these values, but they
are subject to bias and the experience limitation of the focus group [66]. Another
limitation of this model is the cost of rework cycles. To calculate the cost of rework
cycles, the total development cost was multiplied by the percent of cost that was used
for corrective actions, and then that total was divided by the number of rework cycles
documented. The benefit to this cost assessment is its simplicity, but in reality all
rework cycles are not created equal. Depending on how late in the phase the defect
is found or how critical the component, some rework cycles can cost much more to
complete [144]. Finally, despite the fact that schedule slips are noted as a consequence
of unplanned rework, this study does not directly address the schedule impact.
2.7.3 Conjecture for Research Question 4
To select the most appropriate method for determining the impact of rework cycles on
cost during VVT, the techniques discussed in Sections 2.7.1 and 2.7.2 are compared
to the criteria introduced in the beginning of this chapter — quantitative, stochastic,
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and flexible. The first three methods that were reviewed in Section 2.7 are the three
standard cost estimating methodologies. Parametric and analogy cost estimating is
typically used in the earlier design phases and rely on relevant historical data. Once
the model is developed, these methods produce estimates rapidly and are flexible
enough to use for rapid design trades. However, their accuracy is contingent on the
quality and quantity of historical data collected. A lack of relevant data for launch
vehicles and VVT processes limit the use of these methods. The engineering build-up,
or grass-roots, method is a more detailed approach that would increase the accuracy
of the cost estimate, but decreases the flexibility compared to parametric and analogy
costing. It could be used to account for the stochasticity in rework cost because the
individual rework cycles can be assessed individually and rolled-up to a final cost
estimate.
The reliability based cost models are less established, but directly assess reliability.
The generic cost functions provide a flexible and rapid approach to cost estimating
based on reliability improvements. While convenient for understanding the effects
of increasing reliability, they only allow for comparisons between different levels of
reliability. They also do not consider how the reliability is attained. For example,
two different VVT strategies could reach the same reliability using vastly different
activities, but still appear to have the same cost. This and the qualitative nature of
the approach make it less suitable to this problem.
Rocketdynes Prodecol method explicitly addresses the impact of rework cycles on
cost. The development of the chart requires extensive effort, but once developed it is
a rapid tool that would be flexible enough to determine how sensitive the system is to
rework efforts. It does provide a quantitative cost estimate, but only for rework cycles.
It does not consider the cost of testing to uncover the need for rework, reducing its
accuracy for the complete VVT process. It also includes two simplifying assumptions
that would not apply to launch vehicles. The first is the use of a linear cost curve,
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which would only be accurate over many rework cycles. The second is using a constant
average cost per rework cycle, when in reality the costs for rework cycles can vary
widely, as discussed at the beginning of this section. The Prodecol method could
be used to provide an estimate of the average cost per rework cycle, and then an
assumption could be made on how rework costs increase throughout VVT based on
historical trends.
After comparing these five cost estimation approaches, a conjecture for research
question 4 can be made. Engineering build-up method would produce the most
accurate cost estimate compared to the other four. Although it is less flexible and
rapid than the others, it can account for the stochasticity of rework cycles by assessing
their costs individually. it has been selected as the most suitable costing approach to
use for this methodology.
Conjecture: 4
Using engineering build-up to calculate cumulative cost will give a quanti-
tative estimate that is more accurate than historical data based methods
and accounts for the stochastic nature of rework cycles.
2.8 Risk
The final VVT evaluation metric identified in Section 2.2 is risk, which yields the
following research question.
Research Question: 5
How can cost, schedule, and reliability risk be quantified?
In Systems Engineering, risk is considered to be the combined effect of the proba-
bility of an undesirable event and the consequence of that event. According to NASA’s
Risk Management Handbook, risk is characterized by the following questions [41]:
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1. What can go wrong?
2. What is the likelihood that it will go wrong?
3. What are the consequences if it does go wrong?
Figures 25 and 26 illustrate the difference between uncertainty and risk in a risk
analysis of alternatives example [41]. In this example, the outcome is analyzed for all
significant possible input decision alternatives. The input variable ranges are defined
based on the uncertain conditions of these alternative scenarios. Given the presence
of uncertainty, any one decision alternative will produce only one outcome in a range
of forecasted outcomes. A distribution of outcomes is characterized by a probability
density function over the performance measures. Figure 26 illustrates the performance
risk portion of the risk analysis of alternatives example [41], or the probability of
not meeting a performance requirement. By incorporating the individual risks and
aggregating their effects, the risk of not meeting the requirement can be quantified.
Figure 25: Performance uncertainty defined in the NASA Risk Management Hand-
book [41].
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Figure 26: Performance risks defined in the NASA Risk Management Handbook [41].
The risk of a single event is quantified by multiplying the uncertainty by its
consequence. Many studies that address either product development processes or
VVT processes directly, quantify ‘risk’, but actually define risk as uncertainty. It is
important to consider both uncertainty and its impacts to accurately estimate risk.
The following sections will address both of these topics.
2.8.1 Uncertainty
Chapter 1 discussed the uncertainty in launch vehicle design over multiple disciplines.
While cost and schedule overrun and performance shortfalls do happen, the degree
to which they happen are uncertain. It is not a launch vehicle specific problem.
For example, schedule slippage is a prevalent issue for construction companies and
shipbuilding is sensitive to mass growth uncertainty [113, 123]. To quantify these
uncertainties and better estimate them, it is necessary to understand where they
come from and how they relate to each other.
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2.8.1.1 Sources of Uncertainty
Morgan and Granger provide a good discussion on sources of uncertainty relating
to policy and how to handle them, including probability distributions and statistical
techniques [96]. They state that a major benefit of addressing uncertainty is that
it requires the planners and experts to focus on the problem and think specifically
about the issues involved with proceeding. Schrader, Riggs, and Smith discuss the
uncertainty involved in technical problem solving and make the distinction between
uncertainty and ambiguity [128]. They specify uncertainty as lack of knowledge about
the value of recognized variables relevant to the problem. In this context uncertainty
is related to a problem with a well-understood model and representation. Ambiguity
arises from a lack of problem definition, where the functional relationships between
variables are not understood and sensitivities have not been determined [128]. Thun-
nissen also recognizes ambiguity as a primary type of uncertainty, but defines it as
a linguistic imprecision where terms are not clearly defined leading to uncertainty
[145]. His framework includes three other primary types of uncertainty for a com-
plex system, e.g. interaction, aleatory, and epistemic. Interaction uncertainty is
defined as unknown or unanticipated interactions between disciplines or subsystems.
Aleatory and epistemic are two of the most commonly used uncertainty categoriza-
tions [90, 115, 123]. Aleatory uncertainty consists of variables that cannot be precisely
known or are inherently random. Examples include the wind speed on launch day or
manufacturing imprecision. These variables can be treated as random variables [69].
Epistemic uncertainty is due to a general lack of knowledge about the system and
can be reduced through testing. While other frameworks exist, a general consensus
on aleatory and epistemic uncertainty can be made. Ambiguity is treated separately
in some instances, but can be considered as epistemic since it comes from a general
lack of knowledge.
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Epistemic uncertainty is often further partitioned into more specific classes of un-
certainty. Thunnissen divided it into model, phenomenological, and behavioral uncer-
tainties [145]. Model uncertainty is related to the accuracy of a mathematical model
used to describe the system and includes uncertainty from approximations or pro-
gramming errors. Phenomenological uncertainty is defined as the lack of knowledge
of particular phenomena behavior of the system. The third classification is behavioral
uncertainty which is uncertainty related to choices made by people or organizations
involved in system development, including design errors or requirements changes.
Robertson uses some of these same sources of epistemic uncertainty, but categorized
them broadly as either exogenous or endogenous before individually addressing them
[123]. Exogenous uncertainty is defined as being out of the control of the program
development office, such as funding availability or requirements changes. Conversely,
endogenous uncertainty is within the control of the program. It includes uncertainty
associated with technical development challenges, test failures, overly optimistic as-
sumptions about heritage, and technology readiness levels [123]. This endogenous
epistemic uncertainty is directly reduced through efficient VVT processes. These
sources of uncertainty can be quantified and modeled in different ways to determine
the overall uncertainty level in a project. The next section discusses some of the
methods that are used to represent and propagate uncertainty to the system level.
2.8.1.2 Quantifying Uncertainty
Overall uncertainty in the system can be quantified using a variety of techniques.
These techniques can vary in accuracy, traceability, and speed. While some are
rooted in historical data that can be difficult to acquire, others require an extensive
framework to implement. The first set of techniques determines a range of uncertainty
based on a deterministic initial prediction. The rest of the methods are probabilistic,
treating the future value as a random variable and using statistical techniques to
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quantify uncertainty.
Deterministic uncertainty analysis techniques are based off a single point estimate
or a set of point estimates. Then the uncertainty is informally evaluated using his-
torical data or expert opinion. Historical analogies are used to determine a range
of uncertainty based on historically similar projects [13]. Based on a projected final
value, the uncertainty is determined by the range of values for historically similar
projects. While simple to implement, this method is sensitive to the availability of
historical data, which can be difficult to obtain for launch vehicles. Additionally, the
selection of ‘similar’ projects can be subjective and hard to define. Another method
that uses a deterministic initial estimate is empirically derived growth factors [13].
This method typically uses a linear regression of initial estimates to final value ra-
tios from similar historical projects to determine the mean and variance of the new
estimate uncertainty. This method has been used by the Air Force to assess weapon
system cost growth [45]. Similar to the historical analogy technique, growth factors
are easy to use, but are entirely dependent on the availability of historical data.
Expert opinions are commonly elicited to determine uncertainty values for a par-
ticular project [41]. This method is used in many organizations and utilizes the
experience of subject matter experts who are familiar with the system. Uncertainty
estimates can be made at the system level or at the subsystem level and rolled up to
the system level [94]. This flexibility enables it to be used at any level of detail. While
the use of experts eliminates the need for historical data, its accuracy can be affected
by the subjectivity of the expert [134]. Cost estimation is particularly susceptible to
overly optimistic assumptions due to program pressures to reduce cost [67].
Probabilistic uncertainty techniques are used to develop a probability distribution
function of the final value. They typically begin with an estimate of the probability
distribution for each input variable, which can be gathered using expert opinion as
discussed previously. The more detailed the problem breakdown can be, the better
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the estimates will be. For example, the engineering build-up cost method discussed
in Section 2.7.1 uses individual cost estimates for each entry in the work break down
structure. The probabilistic techniques differ in their method to aggregate these
individual uncertainties.
Propagation of errors is an analytic version of a sensitivity analysis. It is a sum-
mation of the errors in each input multiplied by the partial derivatives of the function
with respect to that input variable [13]. It is a well-known method that is commonly
used for calculating error and uncertainty related to spatial modeling with geographic
information systems [95]. One advantage of this method is that it does not require
the computational overhead of simulation. However, for complex systems the partial
derivatives can be difficult to evaluate analytically. Another analytic technique is the
method of moments. This method is used in the parametric cost model NAFCOM,
NASA Air Force Cost Model [35]. The total cost estimate is equal to the sum of the
individual cost estimates, so the final cost probability distribution is similarly equal
to the sum of the individual distributions. This method can be used to sum the
means and variances assuming any reasonable distribution [13]. Similar to propaga-
tion of errors, the method of moments does not require simulation and can be easy
to compute for less complex systems with few components.
Simulation is another probabilistic technique that is being used more and more
as the computational effort required to complete it is being reduced. It is especially
suited for problems with no known closed-form solution that cannot be analytically
evaluated. A Monte Carlo Simulation (MCS) generates a random number from each
input variable distribution and computes the final value. This is considered a single
run, which is then repeated thousands of times to generate a probability distribution
of the final value. The probability distribution can also be displayed as a cumulative
distribution illustrating the probability that the variable is less than or equal to that
value. An advantage of using MCS is that it is a common numerical technique that is
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well-understood and accepted. Also, advances in computer simulation have reduced
the computational expense of using this method. One assumption that is often used in
MCS is that the inputs are independent of each other, which may not always be true.
To account for the relationship between input variables, a correlation matrix must be
defined, adding to the complexity of this method. Another disadvantage is that it is
dependent on the accuracy of the input distributions. Another simulation method is a
discrete event simulation (DES) which models the time-based, or dynamic, behavior
of a system. Using mathematical or logical models of the physical system, DES
portrays state changes at precise points in simulated time. Similarly to MCS, it also
can handle probability distributions for the input variables to generate a probability
distribution of the output variables. The advantage of DES is the addition of a
time component that does not exist for MCS, resulting in more information about
the system. Consequently, this additional information requires more effort in the
beginning to develop the model. The various distributions that can be used for
inputs into these simulation models are discussed in the next paragraph.
Cost and schedule distributions tend to have a right hand skew, implying that
they are more likely to go above the expected value than below [34]. Because of
this, a normal distribution will not be used. Three commonly used distributions for
cost and schedule uncertainty are the Beta, Weibull, and Triangular distributions
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where α and β are shape parameters that define the skew and variance of the distri-






Figure 27: Beta probability density function.
The Weibull probability distribution function is shown in Figure 28 and described










0 x < 0
(18)
where k and λ are shape parameters.
The simplest PDF that can represent the cost and schedule skewness, is the Tri-
angular distribution, which is shown in Figure 29 and described by the following
equation [150]:
75
Figure 28: Weibull probability density function.
f(x; a, b, c) =

0 for x < a or x > b
2(x−a)
(b−a)(c−a) for a ≤ x < c
2
b−a for x = c
2(b−x)
(b−a)(b−c) for c < x ≤ b
(19)
where a is the pessimistic estimate, c is the most likely estimate, and b is the optimistic
estimate.
2.8.2 Consequence of Uncertainty
The other half of risk is the consequence of undesirable events occurring. One method
for evaluating these consequences is the risk matrix introduced in Section 2.4. Based
on the previous identification of individual risk scenarios, that method directly mea-
sures the impact of each scenario. Advantages of this method are that it is very
traceable and simple to develop. However, it is limited by the ability of experts to
predict possible risk scenarios.
Another method to determine the consequences of undesirable events is the use
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Figure 29: Triangular probability density function.





where R is the total risk of exceeding the target value, T , f(x0) is the PDF of variable
x, and I is the impact function. Impact functions can be constant, linear, or quadratic
depending on the nature of the problem. Quadratic quality loss functions were first
highlighted by Taguchi, and have been used in similar models [26, 68]. This implies
that the risk experiences quadratic growth as it gets further away from the target,
which would be appropriate for a cost and schedule model.
2.8.3 Conjecture for Research Question 5
The first section for the literature review on risk discussed the general definition of
risk, and identified that both uncertainty and consequences of undesirable outcomes
are necessary to evaluate risk. Section 2.8.1.1 discussed different frameworks for
uncertainty. Although a wide variety of uncertainty sources are described by different
authors, in general, most agree that uncertainty can be broadly classified as epistemic
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uncertainty and aleatory uncertainty. Aleatory uncertainty can only be classified and
always exists within the system. VVT activities are designed to reduce sources of
endogenous epistemic uncertainty.
Section 2.8.1.2 reviews deterministic and probabilistic methods to quantify uncer-
tainty. The deterministic techniques include historical analogy, growth factors, and
expert opinion. For all of these methods, uncertainty is estimated based on a single
deterministic value. While most of these are fast and easy to implement, they depend
heavily on the availability of historical data, which is not always available for novel
systems. Expert opinion can be used for deterministic risk analysis or probabilistic
risk analysis. For the probabilistic approach, the expert provides a distribution for
the individual inputs, compared to providing a distribution for the final value. In
both cases it can be a fast technique, but is not very traceable. While it does elim-
inate the reliance on historical data, it is affected by the biased experiences of the
expert. The two analytic probabilistic techniques reviewed were propagation of errors
and method of moments. These methods are not well suited for complex models and
would not fare well for launch vehicle risk analysis. The remaining probabilistic un-
certainty quantification technique is simulation. It is a fast and traceable technique
that provides a quantitative measure of uncertainty. The ability to represent a time
component with DES, enables the evaluation of stochastic rework cycles and adds
one more level of comparison between alternative VVT strategies, making it the most
suitable choice.
The final discussion for uncertainty quantification is the choice of input probability
distribution functions. For cost and schedule it is necessary to use a distribution with
the ability to represent skew. The three distributions discussed were triangular, beta,
and Weibull. While all of them are used in practice, the triangular distribution is
the simplest of the three with the most intuitive inputs. If the cost and duration
estimates are gathered from experts, it is more reasonable to ask for a pessimistic,
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most likely, and optimistic estimate than for shape parameters. This will increase the
traceability of the uncertainty quantification.
Finally, Section 2.8.2 discusses the evaluation of the impact or consequence of
undesirable outcomes. A quadratic impact function has been used for activity process
modeling, and to assess VVT cost risk. Due to its application in similar problems,
it can be chosen for the proposed research based on the literature review. This
review of uncertainty and uncertainty quantification techniques leads to the following
conjecture:
Conjecture: 5
• Using triangular input distributions, the assumptions required will be
more traceable than if beta and Weibull distributions are used.
• If DES is used for simulation, the results will allow for quantitative
comparisons between VVT strategies and account for stochasticity of
rework cycles.
With the structure in place to model the effects of rework cycles, the remaining
research question addresses how rework cycles can be estimated.
2.9 Rework Probabilities
The VVT methodologies currently in existence lack a consistent method for identify-
ing the rework probabilities during VVT. While many authors acknowledge the effect
rework cycles have on a product development life cycle [51, 64, 68, 110], very little
attention is given to determining their likelihood and impact. This leads to the final
research question:
Research Question: 6
How can the probability of rework cycles be estimated?
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The following section provides a review of the causes for rework and discusses
some of the methods for determining rework probabilities during various phases of
development.
2.9.1 Rework Drivers
Iteration can be a useful and necessary process during product development, but when
unplanned, it often leads to cost and schedule overruns. In order to determine rework
probabilities, it is first important to understand what drives the need for rework.
Arundachawat conducted a literature review to determine the causes of rework during
design phases [15]. The first driver captured from this review is project complexity.
Programs that utilize lessons learned from previous projects by taking advantage of
design heritage for future designs are considered less complex and see fewer rework
cycles. This approach has been taken by NASA SLS, which is designing the launch
vehicle to progress with block upgrades. Programs that take advantage of computer
aided engineering tools to eliminate critical defects are also considered less complex.
Subsystem dependency was also identified as a design rework driver [15]. Rework
effort was found to be reduced when programs managed the sequence of subsystem
design based on relevant subsystem dependencies.
The last two rework drivers identified can be classified as programmatic design
issues. Early communication between design teams was shown to affect the amount
of rework. Teams that were more cooperative and had clearly defined objectives were
able to reduce the amount of rework that arose during development. Lastly, the
presence of resource constraints was also shown to affect rework during design [15].
Complexity was also found to be a rework driver during the later development
phases [64]. Another driver that caused rework during design and manufacturing
was design maturity. Designs that had a higher degree of heritage experienced fewer
unplanned iterations during all development phases. The operating environment and
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addition of advanced technologies were two rework drivers identified during the im-
plementation phases, but not explicitly identified as drivers during design. These
could be related to complexity, but are addressed separately. The last rework driver
identified in the literature is the amount of activity overlap [151]. It was found that
dependent activities create more rework as the overlap between them increases. The
purpose of overlap is to reduce the amount of time required for the project, but it
decreases the amount of information that is available at the start of the later activ-
ities. This idea of information exchange appears in some of the approaches used to
determine the probability of rework effort. These are discussed in the next section.
2.9.2 Approaches to Determine Rework Probabilities
A Rocketdyne study of their F-1 and J-2 engines discussed in Section 1.1 developed
a quantitative measure of technical uncertainty for estimating the number of rework
cycles during the development of technically innovative products [64]. The Technical
Uncertainty Factor (TUF) is a function of design maturity, complexity, technology,
and system environment. TUF is intended to be an improvement over the Technology
Readiness Level (TRL) implemented by NASA which some consider inefficient due
to its lack of cardinal meaning [34]. The four criteria used to determine the TUF
value are similarly categorized, but the ratings assigned to the system are a relative
measure of the respective criteria. A heuristic relationship is then created between
TUF assessments and rework cycles, as seen in Figure 9. In future projects, once a
TUF assessment is made, the TUF-Rework Cycle Chart will give an estimate of the
rework cycles that can be expected during VVT. The simplicity of this approach is
appealing in estimating rework cycles. However, this relationship is only valid for the
Rocketdyne team and would need to be recreated for use by other teams. Creating the
relationship between TUF and expected rework cycles would require extensive effort
and rely heavily on subjective input by SMEs. Another disadvantage of this approach
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is the lack of detail in the uncertainty definition and absence of any time components.
While efforts can be made to reduce the overall number of rework cycles, this method
generalizes the rework cycles, making it impossible to differentiate between the rework
cycles that have a higher impact on the system.
Figure 30: Rocketdyne TUF-Rework cycle chart [64].
An analogous methodology to estimate design rework cycles based on the relative
influence of common drivers was suggested by Arundacahawat et al [14]. After a
survey of three automotive industry projects, six rework drivers were identified and
used to predict the probability of rework occurrence and degree of rework efforts. The
relative influence of the rework drivers to a new product can then be determined, and
analogous rework probabilities and impacts evaluated. The narrow sampling for data
collection limits the applicability of this method, but a unique method to represent the
rework probabilities was also introduced. A design structure matrix (DSM), which
was discussed in Section 2.6.3 was used to model the system components. More
commonly seen in the literature is an activity-based DSM where the system’s activity
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network relationships are represented [72]. Here, it is used to model component
interactions. The component-based DSM entries represent the probability that change
in one component will cause rework in another.
Engel and Barad suggest the use of historical data to determine risk probabilities,
but highlight the lack of relevant historic data related to systems VVT [51]. Another
method for estimating rework probabilities during product development processes
uses a subjective expert assessment [157]. The risk of rework in this method contains
two components, the variability of the input information for a given task and the
sensitivity of the task to that change in information. SMEs are asked to categorize
each task as low, medium, or high. Then these values are mapped and calibrated to
probabilities using project specific proportionality constants. This representation of
rework as two information components is similar to the approach used by Browning
and Eppinger, but no method to determine these components is given in that study
[25]. Another subjective approach used in literature is a straightforward subject
matter expert opinion of rework probabilities. Roemer et al. and Krishnan et al.
use this strategy to reduce cost and schedule for projects with overlapping design
and development phases [75, 124]. The lack of structure to this approach, however,
creates the opportunity for bias.
While discussing reliability analysis techniques, Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), or Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) was introduced
in Section 2.5.2.3. The purpose of FMEA is to identify potential failure modes and
determine the cause and effect of each mode. Three risk factors are defined during
FMEA [105]:
• Occurrence (O) the probability a failure mode will occur
• Severity (S) the impact a failure mode will have on the system if it occurs
• Detection (D) the probability that a failure mode will be detected during
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inspection or test
These three factors are used to prioritize the failure modes identified by calculating
a Risk Priority Number (RPN) [44]:
RPN = O ∗ S ∗D (21)
The RPN is used to categorize failures by their level of criticality. Some analysts
use 3 levels of criticality, from the most critical level 1 to the least critical level 3,
while others further differentiate from 1-10 [44, 146]. In either case, critical 1 failure
modes will lead to top level risk events, like Loss of Crew (LOC) or Loss of Vehicle
(LOV). Lower critical failure modes can lead to damage or reduce performance of the
system. FMEA has historically been an important step in preventing failures from
occurring and increasing the reliability of the system [84].
The information provided by FMEA can be directly applied to rework cycles dur-
ing VVT. The probability of failure modes can be used in the reliability growth model
to predict when rework will occur. The impact of rework cycles can also be deter-
mined by the RPN or criticality level of the failure modes. The Complex systems can
have a vast amount of components that require major effort to analyze. The failure
modes with higher RPN pose the most risk to the system and need to be reexamined.
These critical 1 failure modes can be assumed to result in redesign efforts due to their
increased probability of LOC or LOV. The lower risk failure modes can be assumed
to be resolved with remanufacturing. The percentage of failure modes that fall into
these categories can be used in the DSM to represent the relationship between testing
activities and design or manufacturing activities, enabling differentiation between the
impact of redesign and remanufacturing on reliability, cost, and schedule.
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2.9.3 Hypothesis for Research Question 6
From the literature review, it appears that many of the methods used to estimate
rework cycles are largely subjective and subject to bias by the expert. The expert
opinion method can lack traceability. It has been shown that SMEs are often hesitant
to provide any quantitative predictions and are biased by their own experiences. This
can reduce the accuracy of the probabilities they provide. Basing the estimates on
historical data can be limiting for launch vehicles because there is a lack of relevant
data available. The Rocketdyne TUF method requires either historical data or ex-
pert opinions based on relevant previously completed projects to develop, limiting its
usefulness. The analogy method has similar draw backs due to the lack of available
historical projects to use as the foundation of the estimate for launch vehicles.
Another method that was discussed is the representation of rework as two infor-
mation components. Again, SMEs are used to determine the qualitative assessment
initially, but these estimates are then mapped to quantitative values. This model of
rework is more suitable to design than VVT activities, but the use of SME knowl-
edge to map qualitative opinions to quantitative rework probabilities improves on the
weakness of the expert opinion method. A disadvantage of this method is the lack of
quantitative impacts on cost and schedule.
While conducting the literature review of reliability methods to derive Hypothesis 2,
FMEA/FMECA was discussed. This method was identified as a possible technique
for identifying rework probabilities. FMEA/FMECA data provides a more struc-
tured approach for garnering expert opinions. As a well-established and commonly
used technique, it is less sensitive to data availability than the other methods. It also
is more traceable than simply asking an expert for direct estimates of rework proba-
bilities. Cost and schedule impacts can also be determined based on FMECA data.
For each failure mode identified, the severity and effects are given. The completeness
of this technique makes it ideal for gathering rework probabilities and impacts.
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FMEA appears to provide a more traceable approach to gather rework probabili-
ties and assess their impacts than the other methods and will be the least sensitive to
data availability. Consequently, the following hypothesis for research question 6 can
be formulated.
Hypothesis: 6
If subsystem and system level FMEA is performed, then the resulting data
will provide quantitative rework probabilities that are more traceable than
expert opinion and the data will be more readily available than expert
opinion and all historical data based methods.
2.10 Background Research Summary
The research questions posed in this chapter identify the components necessary to
build a methodology to meet the research objective. Each question addresses a specific
element of the RIVVTS methodology. After the need for a methodology to assess the
impact of rework during VVT was established, the first research question was used
to determine how the value of a VVT strategy can be defined. A review of industry
standard VVT planning approaches and academic studies on improving VVT and
reducing rework cycles led to the formulation of conjecture 1 that selected quality,
cost, schedule, and risk as the four metrics that would provide the most complete
assessment of rework impact on VVT activities and enable a quantitative comparison
between alternatives. Through literature search and additional research questions in
Sections 2.5 - 2.8, hypotheses and conjectures were developed to further define these
metrics and select existing techniques or suggest improvements on existing techniques.
The last research question is posed to address the gap identified in Section 2.4.3 for
estimating the probability of rework cycles. Section 2.9 discusses the primary rework
drivers during development, and reviews existing techniques for estimating rework
probabilities and impacts. Hypothesis 6 was formulated to provide a more traceable
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approach to estimating rework during VVT.
Chapter 3 discusses these research questions and introduces experiments that
have been design to test the hypotheses formulated in this chapter. The setup of each
experiment is introduced first, followed by the results and observations of that exper-
iment, and conclusions are drawn to either support or refute the hypothesis. Using
a combination of literature review and experimentation, the individual components
of this methodology are developed. Following the formulation of these components,




The development of the research objective for this thesis identified the need for im-
provement in the planning and evaluation of VVT activities during Phases C/D. The
previous chapter determined the components needed to model and support trade-offs
between distinct VVT strategies and presented hypotheses for some of these com-
ponents. This chapter discusses the experiments that were designed to test these
hypotheses, and either support or refute them based on the results. The first section
describes the system that has been selected for use in these experiments.
3.1 Launch Vehicle Subsystem Design Problem
A launch vehicle subsystem design problem is used to test the accuracy of the com-
ponents of this methodology during development and enable a comparison of the
model to actual vehicle data. The Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) is identified
for use in the following three experiments. The SSME is an example of a liquid rocket
engine, which makes it an ideal candidate for this methodology because the largest
percentage of historical launch vehicle failures can be attributed to failures of liquid-
rocket propulsion systems, approximately 40-47% [89]. Additionally, the SSME has
a lengthy and well documented development history. An introduction to the SSME
system and its testing history is given in this section.
3.1.1 SSME
The Space Shuttle Main Engine, also known as the RS-25, is the first large, reusable
liquid rocket engine built [17]. It burns liquid oxygen (LOX) and liquid hydrogen
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(LH2) in a staged-combustion cycle. Figure 31 illustrates the simplified power pro-
pellant flow schematic and identifies the major components, which include two tur-
bopumps for the fuel and oxidizer (i.e. low pressure and high pressure), hot gas
manifold, fuel and oxidizer preburners, main combustion chamber, heat exchanger,
and nozzle. The staged combustion cycle partially combusts a portion of the pro-
pellants at a fuel-rich mixture ratio, and then uses that mixture to drive the high
pressure turbopump turbines prior to being completely burned in the main combus-
tion chamber. This cycle was chosen for increased efficiency, but utilizing the high
and low pressure turbopumps also increased complexity. These four turbopumps con-
tained 47.3% of the total 5,807 component parts for the original SSME configuration,
known as the First Manned Orbital Flight configuration [87]. Over the course of its
40-year history, it underwent six major ‘phase’ or ‘block’ changes [148]. The final
engine configuration performance parameters are listed in Table 7.
Table 7: SSME Performance Parameters [17]
Propellants LOX/LH2
Rated power level (RPL) 469,448 lb
Nominal power level (104.5% RPL) 490,847 lb
Full power level (109% RPL) 512,271 lb
Chamber pressure (109% RPL) 2,994 psia
Specific impulse at altitude 452 sec
Weight 7,748 lb
Service life 55 flights
27,000 sec
Total program hot-fire time 3,171 starts
1,095,677 sec
3.1.2 SSME Development
Since the first Space Shuttle flight in 1981, the SSME has been used in clusters of three
to provide propulsion during the entire program. At a cost of $40 million each, a total
of 46 engines were flown. Because of its long flight history, NASA plans to continue
using the SSME to power the SLS core stage [40]. The flight-proven reliability of the
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Figure 31: Simplified SSME Schematic [148].
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SSME can be attributed to its extensive test program [17].
Aerojet Rocketdyne began development of the engine in 1971 when it was awarded
the contract to design, develop, and produce the SSME. Engine testing began in 1975
with a series of short ignition tests. The dual fuel and oxidizer turbopumps required
a sensitive initial control sequence to safely start and shut down the engine [17]. A
summary of the major test failures for the program is shown in Figure 32. Other
engine cutoffs resulted in additional rework and redesign, but the eight problems
shown here were identified as the most critical to ensuring flight safety. Management
instituted a dedicated effort for solving these problems by assigning full-time ‘spe-
cial team’ members to eliminate failure modes. These multi-disciplinary teams were
tasked with identifying the cause of the problem, establishing a path to safely resume
testing, and ultimately redesigning and reworking a solution [17].
Figure 32: Summary of engine test problems during development [17].
The complete failure history of the SSME during testing is shown in Figure 33,
recreated from [138]. The cumulative failures plotted against test numbers show the
reliability growth expected during development as engine improvements are made
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and test-analyze-and-fix cycles correct problems. The growth curve is steeper at
the beginning and flattens out as the number of tests increase. The causes of these
premature engine cutoffs include failure modes of all criticality levels.
Figure 33: Accumulated engine cutoffs verses test number for the SSME development.
When the Space Shuttle’s first flight occurred, the SSME had accumulated 726
hot-fire engine tests and over 110,000 seconds of operation [148]. Table 8 lists the
number of tests conducted and average test duration per test for each group. Thirteen
tests and 5,000 seconds of operation were required to certify the engine, including
both normal and the longer abort mode flight profiles. Should any test fail during
certification, the entire cycle would have to be repeated.
This review of the SSME development history is provided to support the three
experiments presented in the remaining sections of this chapter. Due to its well-
documented test history, it provides an excellent foundation for testing the hypothe-
ses formulated in Chapter 2. Each experiment will address a different aspect of the
SSME test program. The first experiment tests the use of fidelity levels to improve
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Table 8: SSME Test History









the reliability growth projection during VVT by comparing Hall’s discrete reliability
growth model with and without test fidelities. The demonstrated SSME reliability
growth during testing is used to evaluate the result. The second experiment tests the
use of FMEA to provide traceable and accurate probabilities for rework cycles. A
comparison of FMEA to historical-based data and expert opinion is provided to eval-
uate the traceability of each approach. Following this discussion, the SSME FMEA
data is used to test the accuracy of estimating the total number of rework cycles
and the occurrence of rework cycles. The results of this experiment are compared
to the actual SSME rework history to determine the validity of this approach. The
final experiment addresses the weakness of current DSM approaches to estimate over-
all schedule during testing phases. A discrete event simulation is run first with the
probability of internal rework explicitly included in the DSM, and then with the prob-
ability of internal rework implicitly included in the individual activity duration. The
results are compared the SSME development schedule to either support or refute the
hypothesis made in Section 2.6.4. The results of these three experiments are used




After reliability was selected as an appropriate measure of quality in Conjecture 2, re-
search question 2a was posed to determine which analysis technique is most suited for
tracking reliability during VVT. A review of several techniques identified reliability
growth models, specifically Hall’s discrete model for one-shot systems, as a possible
approach for predicting launch vehicle reliability during the testing phases. The as-
sumption that every test is equivalent was identified as a weakness in the Hall model
when applied over the entire testing phase. Hypothesis 2a was formulated in Section
2.5.3 to address this weakness, and is restated below. To test this hypothesis, Exper-
iment 1 addresses two primary considerations for the growth model: 1) the ability
of Hall’s reliability growth model to accurately assess reliability during development
testing, and 2) given that the accuracy of the model is acceptable, the level of insight
provided into individual testing activities.
Hypothesis: 2a
If Hall’s reliability growth model is adapted to include defect elimination
as a function of test fidelity, it will provide reliability projection with quan-
titative insight into individual VVT activities.
The first part of Experiment 1 is set up to run Hall’s reliability growth model
without any modifications for the SSME. The results are compared to the SSME
demonstrated reliability. It is expected that as is, the model will over predict reliabil-
ity due to the varying fidelity level of tests that occur during development. Section
3.2.3 discusses existing approaches that are used to apply Hall’s and other reliability
growth models during testing phases. Typically, these take the form of combining
multiple tests into a single trial to support the assumption made in the model of
identical trials. This approach limits the insight into the individual testing activities
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Table 9: Hall reliability growth model parameters [62]
Parameter Definition
k Initial number of failure modes in the system.
T Number of trials during testing phase.
di Fix effectiveness factor.
pi∼Beta(n, x) Failure mode probabilities of occurrence, Beta distribu-
tion shape parameters.
in favor of modeling the overall test phase. An adaptation to Hall’s model that in-
cludes a test fidelity measure for each test is introduced at the end of Section 3.2.3.
The intent is to allow the model to be used for the full testing phase and maintain in-
sight into individual tests by including the test fidelity level. Three fidelity measures
are tested with Experiment 1b to determine their accuracy in predicting reliability
growth during test phases. The amount of information provided by the approaches
in Experiment 1a, 1b and the existing approaches in Section 3.2.3 is compared to
determine if more insight into testing activities can be gained by including the test
fidelity level during reliability projection.
3.2.1 Experiment 1a Setup
After the SSME was identified for use in the following experiments, the first step is
to set up the Hall reliability growth model and determine appropriate ranges for the
required parameters listed in Table 6, which are restated here. As the first large,
reusable rocket engine, it is modeled as a new design with no historical data. To
avoid any bias in the experiment, the only engine data that are used to compare
model results are the demonstrated reliability data.
The first parameter to be considered is the number of failure modes that lead
to loss of crew, loss of vehicle, or loss of mission — the top level failure for launch
vehicle systems. Without historical data to generate this assumption, Zwack showed
that the simple parts count method, discussed in Section 2.5.2.5, can be used to
estimate number of failure modes [158]. In this context, the major components are
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used as the physically separate parts that contribute to the system level reliability. It
is assumed that each of these components will contain at least 1 catastrophic failure
mode, and can be equated to the number of top level failure modes for the system
[158].
Using the PCM approach, the ten major components listed in Section 3.1.1 rep-
resent ten failure modes. This estimate can be compared to the actual failure mode
count by looking at the detailed FMEA [146]. 190 failure modes are identified in the
report and are assigned a risk factor from 0 to 1.0, shown in Table 10. 7.5% of those
are given risk factors above 0.25, 14 failure modes, meaning they will likely lead to the
loss of the vehicle or loss of engine [146]. Ten of those failure modes are determined
to lead to a probable loss of vehicle. The other four lead to probable engine loss, and
are included for a conservative estimate. That gives a range of 10-14 critical 1 failure
modes. The parts count estimate falls within this range, confirming that it can be
used as a substitute for estimating the number of critical 1 failure modes if FMEA
data were not available.
Table 10: SSME FMEA risk factor definitions [146].
Severity Description
1.000 Loss of vehicle
0.500 Probable loss of vehicle
0.333 Loss of engine
0.250 Probable loss of engine
0.200 Extensive engine damage
0.167 Local engine damage
0.143 Minor damage
0.125 Very minor damage
0.111 Piece part damage
0.100 Part still ok
The next parameter to consider is the probability of occurrence for these failure
modes. The Morse model provides estimates for launch vehicles based on general
history [97]. Three defect groups are identified by their frequency of occurrence: high,
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medium, and low. Table 11 lists the number of defaults, and probability of occurrence
for each frequency based on historical launch vehicle reliability data. The probability
of occurrence is a conditional probability of loss of mission, given that the failure mode
is triggered. Table 11 lists this probability of occurrence calculated by multiplying λk
and τk from Table 5. Based on this assessment of failure probabilities, approximately
half will fall in the low frequency group, a third in the medium frequency group, and
the remainder in the high frequency group. If the SSME is assumed to have 10-14
failure modes as discussed previously, there will be 5-8 low frequency, 3-4 medium
frequency, and 0-2 high frequency.
Table 11: Morse general launch vehicle defect assumptions [97].
Characteristic High Medium Low
Number of defects 0-5 1-12 2-20
Prob. of occurrence 18%-71% .25%-7.5% .05%-1.5%
Hall provides a method to determine the failure probability of occurrence based
on failure data [62, 63]. These probabilities are modeled as a Beta distribution,
with shape parameters α and β. The procedures to estimate these parameters are
established for two cases. The first case is for a known number of failure modes, k,
and the second is for the number of failure modes approaching infinity. Hall uses an
air-to-ground missile system to demonstrate this procedure. A sample of the shape
parameters predicted for these one-shot systems is listed in Table 12.
Table 12: Hall Beta shape parameters for one-shot systems [62].
Beta Parameters (α,β) Mean Maximum
0.19, 23.31 0.008 0.3
0.36, 14.99 0.023 0.4
0.19, 8.03 0.022 0.52
0.22, 8.75 0.024 0.54
If Hall’s method of estimating failure mode probabilities is used with the SSME
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data in Figure 32, these values can be compared to the Morse assumptions to deter-
mine an accurate range for this Experiment. The last two Beta distributions given by
Hall fit well with the Morse failure probabilities. The majority of the failure modes
would fall within the low frequency failures, with a variance that provides 0-1 failure
modes in the high frequency range. Using the Method of Moments Estimate pro-
cedure suggested by Hall for the critical failures of the SSME, E[pi] = .02%. The
assumed number of failures used was x = 14 according to Figure 32, and the number
of trials was based on equivalent full duration tests. To determine equivalent tests,
the total number of test seconds is divided by the designed mission duration, 520 sec-
onds. This aligns well with the Hall and Morse probability of occurrence ranges. The
distribution chosen for this experiment is Beta(0.22, 8.75) to allow for the medium
and high frequency failure modes.
The final Hall model parameter to determine is the Fix Effectiveness Factor. As
discussed in Section 2.5.2, this is the percent reduction in probability of occurrence
of a failure mode, given that the mode has occurred and a fix has been implemented.
This parameter is equal to Morse parameter γk, which represents the probability that
a defect is eliminated from the system given that it has been detected and reported.
In practice, this value is difficult to derive from vehicle data. Hall states that the
fix effectiveness factor is typically assessed by subject matter experts and assigned
during failure prevention review boards [62]. For the purpose of this research, this
value is determined from the literature.
Morse states that the probability of eliminating a failure mode from the system,
γk, is high for launch vehicles. This is due to the large amount of post launch flight
data analysis that is typically performed after a launch. The large expense of flight
tests and the extreme reliability requirements for crewed vehicles demand that any
and all defects that have been detected within the system should be investigated and
mitigated. Morse calls out a range of between 75% and 90% for this value [97]. Hall
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provides a table of fix effectiveness factors from an air-to-ground missile program.
These factors are said to have been developed during a failure prevention and review
board for the program. The table presented by Hall shows a range of 70% to 95% for
this value.
A range for the fix effectiveness factor is determined for Experiment 1 based on
the proposed Hall and Morse models. As previously mentioned about verification and
validation testing, development tests will have a significant amount of instrumenta-
tion and sensors to collect data. Engine development takes up a significant portion
of launch vehicle development costs and is held to the same reliability requirements
because it is a crewed launch vehicle subsystem. Zwack suggests that the fix effec-
tiveness factor is impacted by a long flight history, which allows the designer to assess
the system many times and implement failure mode corrective actions [158]. Due to
the fact that the SSME had a long and detailed test program, a high fix effectiveness
is assumed, and a uniform range of U(90%, 95%) is used for Experiment 1.
All of the necessary parameters for the Hall model have now been defined, and the
model can be implemented for the SSME. The equations given by Hall [62] have been
coded in MATLAB for the initial analysis of Experiment 1. A Monte Carlo simulation
was run under these conditions. To determine the accuracy of this model during
development testing, it is compared to the SSME reliability calculated in reference
[138], where the AMSAA model was used to calculate the Mean Time Between Failure
(MTBF) based on failure modes of criticality 1. For an initial test of this method, it
is run as described, using the total number of SSME development tests as the number
of trials. The reliability is expected to be over estimated under these conditions. This
model assumes that each trial has an equal probability of uncovering all of the failure
modes. However, when considering a test phase that contains tests at different fidelity
levels, each test will not have an equal probability of detecting all of the failure modes.
Table 12 lists the values of each parameter in the initial run of the Hall model.
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Table 13: Reliability growth assumptions for Experiment 1
Parameter SSME Value
Number of Modes 10-14
Probability of Occurrence β(0.22,8.75)
FEF 90%-95%
Number of Tests 726
3.2.2 Experiment 1a Results
The results of the initial Hall run are plotted in Figure 34. To account for uncertainty
in the input assumptions, a Monte Carlo simulation was performed. For each of the
10,000 runs, a random number was drawn from each of the input variable distributions
in Table 13. The resulting output allowed for the calculation of a mean and percentiles
for the model to be used for comparison. From this plot, it is clear that the Hall model
over predicts the SSME reliability during the entire development phase. The result
of this initial run confirms the expectation that using the same probability of failure
occurrences for each flight will result in over prediction of reliability. There are some
methodologies to avoid this, but they lose insight into the effect of individual tests
on reliability. These methods are discussed in the following section, and a follow-on
experiment to determine the best way to model test fidelities for a more accurate
prediction of reliability during testing is presented.
3.2.3 Reliability During Testing
There are three methods to account for different levels of testing during development.
The first is to consider a group of similar tests as a phase and determine reliability
during that phase, and repeat for the number of test phases planned. The main
drawback for this approach is the additional work in predicting reliability growth
parameters for each phase. AMSAA and Duane models, discussed in Section 2.5.2.6,
use a growth parameter. This growth parameter is determined based on the reliability
growth of similar historical systems. While this model is simple enough to implement,
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Figure 34: Hall model growth predictions versus SSME data.
it does not provide any insight into how individual tests are affecting the reliability
of the system. It also does not allow for any changes in the development plan.
The last method to be discussed, is the use of equivalent flights. Zwack uses this
approach during the development of CONTRAST [158]. For engine development,
Zwack determines a number of equivalent flights to contribute to the reliability growth
before it is fully integrated into the launch vehicle. The total number of test seconds
is divided by the duration of a full mission to calculate this value. For the SSME,
this would be Eq. Flight Number = 110, 000s/(520s/flight) = 211 flights. Then the
reliability growth model is evaluated for 211 trials, instead of the full 726 because it
is assumed that there is an equivalent amount of testing effort applied. While this
approach can be used to model reliability growth during testing, it does not provide
any information about individual tests.
Another possibility for defining test fidelity is to consider the system performance.
For the SSME, the complicated start-up sequence due to the dual turbopumps would
imply that more failure modes are uncovered earlier in the cycle. Instead of using a
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linear fidelity model based on the test-duration/full-duration ratio, the fidelity would
show a growth curve similar to reliability growth, with a steeper increase in fidelity
during start-up and then a flatter increase as the test continues. This is supported
by SSME failure occurrence experience, where 60% of failures occur during start-up,
20% occur during the first third of the full duration, and the last 20% occur up to
flight mission completion [156].
Based on this discussion, Hall’s model is adapted to account for lower fidelity
tests. The probability of occurrence for failure modes is determined assuming a full
duration test. Lower fidelity tests will not be able to uncover all of the failure modes.
For example, a computer simulation would not be able to detect manufacturing failure
modes, and component testing would not detect any failure modes due to integration.
The definition of fidelity for this methodology is the percent of failure modes that
are able to be uncovered during a single test, ft. The test fidelity is defined for the
specific system and set of testing activities being modeled.
Mathematically, this is represented in the calculation of Hall’s indicator function,
Equation 11, restated here:
E[Ii(t)] = 1− (1− pi)t.
For the initial evaluation of Hall’s model in Section 3.2.2, the indicator function is
evaluated for each failure mode, i. It is calculated incrementally, until failure mode
i occurs, then the test number of the first occurrence, tn, of that failure mode is set,
Ii(tn) = 1. For example, the indicator function is evaluated at test t1, if the failure
mode does not occur, then the indicator function is evaluated for t2, t3, and so on
until the failure mode occurs (i.e. E[Ii(t1)], E[Ii(t2)], E[Ii(t3)] ). In the original
implementation, every test is considered for every failure mode. So at test t3 the
indicator function for failure mode i would be E[Ii(t3)] = 1 − (1 − pi)3. When this
model is adapted to include test fidelity, a test with only 50% fidelity will only be
considered for 50% of the failure modes.
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A simple example system with 10 failure modes can be used to further illustrate
this concept. The fidelity levels for the first three tests are t1 = 100%, t2 = 50%,
and t3 = 100%. Test t2 can only be evaluated in the indicator function for the first
5 failure modes because it is a 50% fidelity test. At test t2, the indicator function
for failure mode 6, assuming it did not occur in test t1 will be kept at 0, I6(t2) = 0.
At test t3, the indicator function for failure mode 6 will be E[I6(t3)] = 1− (1− p6)2.
Experiment 1b is setup to determine an accurate way to represent test fidelities for
this system.
3.2.4 Experiment 1b Setup
Three fidelity measures are tested with Experiment 1b to determine their accuracy in
predicting reliability growth during test phases. The Hall parameter values used in
Experiment 1a, listed in Table 13, are kept for Experiment 1b. Only the test fidelity
levels, fi, are changed. The first two cases are based on a linear fidelity profile,





where di is the duration, in seconds, of test i, and D = 520s is full mission duration.
The profile of fidelity levels over the length of a full mission is illustrated in Figure 35.
This profile is a similar approach used in generating equivalent flights that was dis-
cussed in Section 3.2.3. When 520 seconds is considered one test flight, this implies
a linear fidelity profile.
Using these values for fidelity, the first case will assume all tests are of an average
length and as such, an average fidelity. For the 726 tests and 110,000 seconds of
SSME development, this means the Hall model is evaluated for 726 tests of 151
seconds duration and 29% fidelity. This is not expected to yield promising results,
because only 1/3 of the failure modes will ever have the opportunity to be uncovered,
and reliability is not expected to show much growth.
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The second model run also uses the linear fidelity profile, but the fidelity levels are
set using the average yearly test durations listed in Table 8, which steadily increase.
This is expected to provide a better reliability prediction capability than the first
case, but will likely still under predict reliability.
The third case will use a different profile of fidelity levels from the first two cases.
Here, the fidelity profile is modeled to emulate a reliability growth curve which takes
the form:
1− e−at (23)
where t is test number and a is a fit coefficient. The profile of fidelity levels over the
length of a full mission is shown in Figure 35. This curve more closely follows the
SSME failure history experience, and is therefore, expected to perform better than
the first two cases.
Figure 35: Linear and ‘1-Exponential’ fidelity level profiles.
Now that the fidelity profiles for the three cases have been defined, the models can
be implemented for the SSME. A Monte Carlo run was performed, providing a mean
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Figure 36: Test profiles with three different fidelity definitions.
and percentiles for each case to be compared to the vehicle data. A root mean square
error was taken across the development testing to quantitatively compare profiles.
This is discussed in more detail in the following section.
Table 14: Fidelity profiles for Experiment 1b.
Case Fidelity Profile Test Durations
1 Linear Average
2 Linear Table 8
3 1-Exp Table 8
3.2.5 Experiment 1b Results
Section 3.1.1 presented a launch vehicle subsystem for use in testing the adaptation of
the Hall growth model for use during development testing with variable test fidelities.
After determining the initial assumptions required for the model in Section 3.2.1,
the three fidelity profiles to be used in Experiment 1b were defined in Section 3.2.4.
These assumptions were used to generate reliability growth models for each case using
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MATLAB. A Monte Carlo simulation was run for each case, and the resulting mean
and percentiles for each case are presented here.
To quantitatively determine the accuracy of these fidelity profiles, the Root Mean







where Ŷi is the SSME data at test i, Yi is the model mean at test i, and N is the
number of tests — 726 in this experiment. The errors for the three fidelity cases are
shown in Table 15. This table shows that Case 3 performs the best in terms of RMSE.
The 1-Exp fidelity profile used in this case has nearly a full magnitude improvement
over Case 1 and 2. Based on this observation, it is expected that Case 3 will more
closely predict the SSME data.
Table 15: Mean square error for Experiment 1b.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
RMSE 0.1327 0.1367 0.0287
The results of the adapted Hall model using average fidelity levels as represented in
Figure 37 show a poor agreement with the actual reliability values. It shows an early
increase in reliability, up to test 10, where it then flattens out and no longer follows
the SSME reliability values. This can be explained by considering the test fidelities.
Each test has an average fidelity of 30%. As fidelity is defined for this engine system,
each test can only uncover the first third of all failure modes. The remaining failure
modes are never detected, and therefore reliability does not increase. This is not a
practical approach to development testing, and as illustrated by the model results it
does not accurately predict reliability.
The results of Case 2 are plotted in Figure 38. The linear fidelity levels increase
over the course of the development testing, and as a result the reliability shows more
growth than Case 1. Early reliability growth is expected to be steep, however, this
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Figure 37: Hall model growth predictions using average fidelity values.
case shows a slower, steadier increase. While the agreement to SSME data is better
than Case 1, it is still not a promising option because the values for reliability are well
below the actual. The gradual increase in reliability indicates that the linear fidelity
profile does not detect failure modes as quickly as the actual system.
Figure 39 shows the results of Case 3, where a 1-Exp fidelity profile is used.
In this case, the model captures the growth trend of the SSME very well. In the
early development tests, 1-400, the mean value follows the steep reliability curve
closely. The model appears to slightly under predict reliability towards the end of the
development program, but this provides a conservative estimate of mature reliability,
which is preferred to a risky over prediction. The low RMSE for this case listed in
Table 15 can easily be understood after plotting the results.
After considering the SSME results from these 3 cases, the appropriate fidelity
profile has become apparent. The adapted Hall model using 1-Exp test fidelities
tracks the actual data very well. For both cases where a linear definition of fidelity
was used, the reliability was grossly under predicted through the entire development
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Figure 38: Hall model growth predictions using linear fidelity values.
Figure 39: Hall model growth predictions using exponential fidelity values.
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testing history. From these results it is clear that the 1-Exp fidelity profile is able to
provide more accurate reliability growth predictions. In terms of accuracy, it is the
most appropriate for this methodology.
3.2.6 Experiment 1 Summary
Experiment 1 tested the adaptation of Hall’s reliability growth model with three dif-
ferent fidelity profiles, to determine which would be used in this method. Experiment
1a first showed the use of Hall’s model over the full development testing history of
the SSME without the use of fidelity levels. The results showed that this model over
predicts reliability because it assumes all tests are weighted equally. Section 3.2.4
describes the three options of fidelity that were tested to adapt the Hall model. The
results showed that Case 3 performed significantly better in terms of accuracy over
Case 1 and 2. Due to the fact that it was able to more accurately predict the ac-
tual SSME reliability, it can be officially chosen for use in this methodology. This
conclusion is in line with the original hypothesis, which identified the adaptation of
Hall’s model to incorporate test fidelity as a method for providing more insight into
VVT activities. Therefore, hypothesis 2 can be accepted based on the results of
Experiment 1.
3.3 Experiment 2
Section 2.9 reviewed the current approaches for estimating rework probabilities. Hy-
pothesis 6, which is restated below, was formulated to address the weaknesses iden-
tified in those techniques. Experiment 2 is designed to test the use of FMEA to
provide traceable and accurate probabilities for rework cycles. This experiment will
address the primary considerations for estimating rework cycles, the traceability and
availability of the data, and determine the accuracy of this approach. First, historical
data and expert opinion approaches for estimating rework cycles are compared to
FMEA data to evaluate the traceability of each approach. Following this discussion,
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the SSME FMEA data is used to test the accuracy of estimating the total number
of rework cycles and the occurrence of rework cycles. The number of rework cycles
is similar to the number of failure modes used in the Hall model, but also includes
modes with lower risk factors, or lower criticality failures. The results of this exper-
iment are compared to the actual SSME rework history to determine the validity of
this approach.
Hypothesis: 6
If subsystem and system level FMEA is performed, then the resulting data
will provide quantitative rework probabilities that are more traceable than
expert opinion and the data will be more readily available than expert
opinion and all historical data based methods.
3.3.1 Experiment 2 Setup
The three approaches to estimating the number of rework cycles are subject matter
expert opinion, similarity to historical systems, and failure mode and effect analysis.
All of these options rely on historical systems to some degree, but are considered
separately. The traceability and availability of data using these methods is discussed
first.
The first option for estimating rework cycles is to use the opinion of a subject mat-
ter expert. This approach uses assumptions about the system based on engineering
judgment. To apply this technique, a SME for the system needs to be identified, and
then the SME estimates the number of expected rework cycles that will occur during
development based on their prior knowledge and experience. The lack of structure
in this approach limits its traceability. There is no established standard for docu-
menting the justification or reasoning behind a SME opinion, nor is there a standard
practice in determining who is qualified to make assumptions about a system. The
traceability of the assumptions used in generating that data is limited to the fact that
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it comes from an accepted expert. The nature of using previous experiences to apply
engineering judgment also introduces bias into the estimate. For these reasons, this
approach is considered less traceable than the direct comparison to historical systems
and FMEA.
The next approach is comparison to a similar system. This method also requires
the use of engineering judgment, but provides an anchor point for comparison. The
first step in utilizing this method is to select an existing system that is similar to
the current system. An ideal candidate would be one that successfully completed
development and was taken into production. After a historical system is identified,
the number of rework cycles that occurred during Phase C/D for that system are
observed. Finally, someone that is knowledgeable about both systems, such as a SME,
predicts the number of rework cycles that will occur during development of the current
system based on similarities and differences between the two programs. Systems
can be compared based on things like design maturity at different life cycle stages,
complexity, commitment to reliability improvements, or programmatic differences (i.e.
management style or funding confidence).
The traceability of this approach is improved slightly over direct SME input due
to the fact that the existing system can be revisited to determine the reasoning behind
the estimate. It is still not ideal, however, because it is not a structured or quantifiable
comparison. Indeed, many of the program descriptors that are used for comparison
are qualitative and subjective in nature. The data availability of this approach is
also a concern, as this method is strongly dependent on the availability of a similar
system. This can be a particular problem for launch vehicle systems and subsystems
because so few are developed and even fewer are produced.
The last option considered for estimating rework cycles is the use of failure mode
and effect analysis data. As discussed in Section 2.5.2, FMEA is an existing reliability
technique that identifies all failure modes in the system and determines their effect
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and criticality level. This information directly relates to the number of expected
rework cycles, making it well suited for this purpose.
The number of failure modes can be determined directly from the FMEA data.
FMEA produces a comprehensive list of failure modes that result in various degrees of
damage. When assessing reliability, as in Experiment 1, only those that lead directly
to loss of mission and loss of crew are included, but even failure modes that result in
minimal engine damage will require rework. A comprehensive FMEA also provides
an assessment of the probability of occurrence. These are either quantitative proba-
bilities or a qualitative assessment that categorizes the failure modes from unlikely to
frequently occurring [44]. The quantitative probability of occurrence for each mode
can be estimated from the qualitative categories.
The traceability of generating an estimate of rework cycles from FMEA is clearly
an improvement over expert opinion or a similarity comparison. The detailed work-
sheets, shown in Figure 10 are very structured and each failure mode is well doc-
umented. Like the other two methods, it can also be based off of historical data.
FMEA worksheets are continually developed and improved upon throughout devel-
opment. Unlike the system comparison method, even if the historical system was
canceled before development was completed, the FMEA data are still be relevant.
In terms of data availability, a comprehensive set of FMEA worksheets may not be
completed when Phase C begins for a new engine with no design heritage.
If a complete FMEA is not available, another approach must be used to estimate
rework cycles. Havskjold argued a relationship between rework cycles and a complex-
ity metric he defined as the Technical Uncertainty Factor (TUF), shown in Figure 30
[64]. This metric is relatively subjective and requires a SME to accurately estimate.
Another possible complexity metric is the number of qualification tests required.
Qualification tests, also referred to as certification tests, are designed to formally ver-
ify compliance with performance requirements and specifications. An engine that has
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a less complex design will require fewer tests to accept that the development program
is producing flight hardware that meets specification, and design heritage gives the
program a significant advantage by allowing “qualification by similarity” to reduce
the number of qualification tests required [5].
The previous discussion determined that FMEA was the preferred method to
estimate the number of rework cycles a system will incur during development in
terms of traceability. The structured and standardized approach provides a quantified
estimate of both rework cycles and probability of occurrence. Hall’s model is designed
primarily to account only for the probability of high-level faults, like loss of mission
and loss of crew. The mathematical model it is based on, however, can be used in
this experiment to determine the accuracy of FMEA data to predict rework cycles.
The adapted indicator function described in Section 3.2.3 is used with the input
assumptions in Table 16 which are derived from the SSME FMEA [146]. To ensure
that the test fidelity levels are appropriate for use on failure modes of all criticality
levels, the Hall model is run with and without test fidelities included. A Monte
Carlo simulation was performed in both cases to account for the uncertainty in the
input distributions and to provide a distribution for when rework cycles occur. The
results are compared to the number of accumulated test failures that occurred during
the SSME development program which are shown in Figure 33 as a function of test
number.
Table 16: Reliability growth assumptions for Experiment 2
Parameter SSME Value
Number of Modes 160-182
Probability of Occurrence β(0.22,8.75)
Number of Tests 726
If detailed FMEA is not available, another complexity metric can be used to
estimate the number of rework cycles. The number of qualification tests, which are
called out in the Verification Requirements Matrix, discussed in Section 2.2.1, have
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been identified as a possible metric to represent the complexity of the engine. To
determine the appropriateness of this metric, the qualification tests and rework cycles
of four liquid rocket engines are compared: SSME, J-2, F-1, and RS-68. The SSME
was introduced in Section 3.1.1, and a brief introduction to the other three engines
is given next. The number of rework cycles is determined based on publicly available
data on the number of engine failures during development [60, 64].
The J-2 was developed by Rocketdyne in the 60’s to power two stages on the Saturn
V launch vehicle in the Apollo program. Five engines were used on the S-II second
stage, and a single engine was used on the S-IV-B third stage. Currently, an updated
version of this engine, the J2-X, is being developed for use on the SLS Earth Departure
Stage [54]. The gas generator engine cycle burned liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen
propellants and was designed for a 500 second full duration flight. During its 6 year
development, 1,700 tests were completed through qualification [54]. The operating
schematic is illustrated in Figure 40, which identifies the primary components: fuel
and oxidizer turbopumps, heat exchanger, gas generator, feed control system, main
combustion chamber, and nozzle.
The F-1 engine was used to power the first stage of the Saturn V launch vehicle
to the moon in 1969. A total of 65 engines were used on 13 Saturn V flights, all
with no failures [36]. Also developed by Rocketdyne, the gas generator cycle used
rocket propellant-1 (RP-1) and liquid oxygen as propellants. Figure 41 shows the
operating cycle that consists of 8 primary subsystems: fuel feed, oxidizer feed, igniter
fuel, gas generator, vehicle pressurization, hydraulic control, electrical, and flight
instrumentation [54]. A single turbompump, powered by the gas generator, is used to
supply the fuel and oxidizer to the thrust chamber. The RP-1 is also used to fuel the
thrust vector control system. During its development, the F-1 went through 1,081
tests through qualification [54]. Only 278 of those tests were for 150+ seconds, full
mission duration tests.
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Figure 40: J-2 operating schematic [18].
Figure 41: F-1 operation schematic [155].
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The last engine that is used in this experiment is the RS-68. Rocketdyne began
development of this engine in 1997, and it was certified for use on the Delta IV
launch vehicle in 2001 [154]. The gas generator cycle, which is still in production
today, uses a liquid oxygen/liquid hydrogen propellant architecture that is based on
conceptual design studies of the NASA Space Transportation Main Engine (STME)
study. The focus of that program was to develop a new liquid rocket engine using
a cost-as-the-independent variable approach, but canceled in 1994. To reduce the
total development cost, the primary intent was to simplify the design by using fewer
unique components and reducing the overall parts count. The final design included
80% fewer parts than that SSME, and was produced with 92% less touch labor [154].
The result of this design was lower risk and higher reliability than a typical new
engine development program. The RS-68 was certified with only 183 tests and 18,945
seconds of operation [154]. A simplified schematic of the RS-68 operations is shown
in Figure 42. The primary components of the engine are two turbopumps, LOX and
LH2, gas generator, LOX tank pressurization system, combustion chamber, nozzle,
and flow control valves [154].
3.3.2 Experiment 2 Results
Figure 43 shows the results of the Hall model without including test fidelity levels.
From this plot, the same over prediction of reliability that was seen in Experiment 1a
is evident. When all tests are assumed to have an equal probability of uncovering all
of the failure modes, they are uncovered more quickly than they occur in the SSME
data. The total value of rework cycles that occur is in agreement with the actual
value, 150-170. This implies that the failure mode probability of occurrence values
are representative of the actual system.
Figure 44 shows a much better agreement for the number of rework cycles and
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Figure 42: RS-68 operating schematic [154].
Figure 43: SSME rework cycle predictions with fidelity.
117
when they occur during development. The fidelity levels that were identified in Ex-
periment 1b results in rework prediction that follows the actual engine data much
more closely. The model does over predict slightly between tests 180-280. This could
be due to the use of yearly average test duration as a measure of fidelity. The actual
test durations could change throughout that year, but this model is not capturing
that. Without being able to obtain the actual length of each individual test, it is
not possible to adjust the fidelity of each test. However, the overall-growth trend
for the failure modes of all criticality levels is captured well, providing more insight
into testing activities than when each trial is considered equally. The total number of
rework cycles that occur is also in agreement with the actual value. This shows that
the test fidelity levels can be utilized to model failure modes of all criticality levels.
Figure 44: Hall model growth predictions using exponential fidelity values.
The last part of this experiment consists of identifying a traceable complexity
metric that can be used to estimate the number of rework cycles when a comprehensive
FMEA is not available. One possible option identified is the number of qualification
tests defined in the RVM. Figure 45 illustrates the relationship between the number
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of qualification tests and number of rework cycles from the four historical engine
programs discussed in Section 3.3.1: the SSME, RS-68, F-1, and J-2. This plot shows
that there is a trend in number of rework cycles and qualification tests. While the
RS-68 stands out, it is still within the general trend. One of the reasons the RS-
68 had a reduced number of rework cycles during Phase C/D was the advance of
computer analysis techniques that allowed the program to eliminate failure modes
before hardware production was initiated [154]. Because it is still in production, the
failure modes and probabilities for that engine are not publicly available for review.
Figure 45: Number of qualification tests versus number of rework cycles for historical
liquid rocket engines.
While there does appear to be a correlation between the number of qualification
tests and the number of rework cycles that occur during engine development, this
does not imply causation. With only four data points for comparison and no previ-
ously established link between rework and qualification tests, there is not evidence
to substantiate the use of qualification tests can be used as a complexity metric.
Based on this assessment, the previously identified Rocketdyne approach is used as a
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secondary method for estimating rework cycles if FMEA is unavailable. The Techni-
cal Uncertainty Factor (TUF), discussed in Section 2.9.2, is a measure of the design
maturity, system complexity, technology level, and environment [64]. Rework cycles
are caused by failure modes, both known and unknown, which directly relate to the
system metrics used to quantify the TUF value.
3.3.3 Experiment 2 Summary
After considering the results from Experiment 2, it is apparent that FMEA data
can provide quantitative rework probabilities that are more traceable than expert
opinion or comparison to historical systems. It was also confirmed that the test
fidelity levels are applicable when failure modes of all criticality levels are considered.
When fidelity is not included in the Hall model, the reliability is over predicted.
This can be seen by the number of rework cycles that are predicted to occur early
on in development testing when compared to the actual SSME data. Using test
fidelity levels to adapt the indicator function in Hall’s model more closely follows
the accumulated test cutoffs from the SSME program history. Due to this improved
performance, FMEA data can be selected for use in this methodology as a method
for estimating rework cycles and their probability of occurrence. The results of this
experiment are in line with the original hypothesis, which identified FMEA as a
method for providing quantitative rework probabilities. Therefore, hypothesis 6 is
valid based on the results of Experiment 2.
An additional analysis was done to determine an appropriate complexity metric
that can be used if FMEA data is unavailable. The number of qualification tests
outlined in the program’s RVM were shown to create a general trend when plotted
against the number of rework cycles for four historical engine programs. While these
two values are correlated, there is not enough evidence to support the use of quali-
fication tests as a complexity metric for estimating rework cycles. The TUF metric
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defined in [64] will be used as a secondary approach if FMEA data are unavailable.
3.4 Experiment 3
The final experiment addresses three aspects of the RIVVTS methodology. The first
is to test Hypothesis 3 that was introduced in Section 2.6.4, and is restated below.
Experiment 3 will also provide support for the use of triangular distributions and
improve the accuracy of activity relationships in the DES which were both identified
in Conjecture 5, discussed in Section 2.8.3. The final goal of this experiment is to
support the cost distribution assumption for the cost of rework as a function of test
number that was discussed in Section 2.7. The two main tasks in Experiment 3 are:
1. To develop the DSM, which includes identifying the testing activities, defining
their fidelities, cost and schedule distributions, and rework probabilities
2. To develop the discrete event simulation in order to propagate the uncertainty
of the input variables to generate a distribution on the outputs.
Hypothesis: 3
If a DSM is adapted to explicitly account for the probability of internal re-
work, it will provide a stochastic and quantitative model of rework impacts
that is more accurate for VVT processes than if internal rework is implicitly
included in the activity duration distribution.
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Conjecture: 5
• Using triangular input distributions, the assumptions required will be
more traceable than if beta and Weibull distributions are used.
• If DES is used for simulation, the results will allow for quantitative
comparisons between VVT strategies and account for stochasticity of
rework cycles.
3.4.1 Experiment 3 Setup
The first step in Experiment 3 is to set up the DSM for the SSME VVT activities.
A truncated version of this DSM is shown in Table 18. The first two rows are design
and manufacturing. The rest of the rows are the 726 hot-fire engine tests. The off
diagonal rows indicate the probability that when a failure mode occurs, if it will
require redesign, rework or retest. These probabilities were determined based on the
failure mode criticality levels in the SSME FMEA data during Experiment 2.
Redesign implies the failure was introduced during product design and the rework
cycle will include a redesign, rework or re-manufacture, and retest. Rework implies
a manufacturing defect of some kind and the rework cycle only requires rework and
retest. There is also the possibility that the failure is unrelated to the test article,
for example a test facilities failure, and the rework cycle will only require a retest.
Between 7-8% of failure modes are assigned a risk factor around 0.250, meaning those
failures would lead to loss of crew, loss of mission, or loss of engine. Failure modes
with a risk factor of 0.100 or less do not cause damage and can be excluded from
consideration. A risk factor between 0.100 and 0.111 means there is possible piece
part damage and may or may not require rework. Consequently, a probability between
70-85% can be assumed for rework, which would include the failure modes with a risk
factor below 0.250 and the upper half of the percentage of failure modes with a risk
factor 0.111 and 0.123. This would mean the remaining 7-23% could be considered
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facility failures. An analysis of the SSME premature engine cutoffs found that 16%
of the cutoffs were the fault of the test facility or controller [146]. The percentage of
SSME facility or controller failures would fall directly into this range.












Table 18: DSM for SSME activities
.
1 2 3 4 ... 728
Design 1 U(.07,.10) U(.07,.10) U(.07,.10)
Mfc. 2 U(.70,.85) U(.70,.85) U(.70,.85)
Test 1 3 U(.07,.23)
Test 2 4 U(.07,.23)
... U(.07,.23)
Test 726 728 U(.07,.23)
The next step is to define the cost, duration, and fidelity for each activity. The
fidelities were determined in Experiment 1 based on the test fidelity levels. Cost
and schedule distributions require a pessimistic, most likely, and optimistic estimate
to generate the triangular distributions discussed in Section 2.8.1.2. The schedule
durations in this experiment are defined by the actual test length plus the time
between tests. The amount of time between tests is a number of days, which will
dominate the actual test time. By looking at the number of tests per year in Table 8,
a distribution can be determined. The first test was conducted in June 1975 and last
test was in March of 1981, just prior to STS-1 on April 12, 1981 [17]. By dividing the
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number of tests per year by the number of days testing occurred during that year,
a range of 3 to 6 days between tests is found. The tests were more often closer to 3
days apart than 6 days, so the triangular distribution can be set to f(x; 3, 4, 6) days.
This time scale is similar to testing schedules for other engine development programs
with at least two dedicated test facilities [154, 120].
Test costs can be estimated by considering the overall cost of the SSME devel-
opment program and the percent of that cost that is associated with testing. The
distribution of development costs for rocket engine programs by discipline is shown
in Figure 46 [60]. The following costs are in 1996 dollars to enable comparison with
reported development costs [64]. Design will include the cost of engineering and
management, approximately 25% of development cost: $2.5B ∗ 0.25 = $625M . Man-
ufacturing cost is between 50% and 55%: $2.5B ∗ [0.5, 0.55] = [1.25, 1.38]M$. Testing
is approximately 20-25% of total development cost, giving the following range for
testing costs:
SSME Cost/Test = ($2.5B ∗ [.20, .25])/726 = $[0.69, 0.86]M. (25)
The actual most likely value for testing costs of liquid rocket engines is not available.
In lieu of this data, the median of the test cost range is chosen as the most likely
estimate to complete the triangular distribution for testing cost. This results in an
estimated test cost range of f(x; 0.69, 0.77, 0.86)$M .
The total cost of rework, or the ‘test-fail-fix’ portion of a development program
has previously been reported as the total cost of testing, engineering, and hardware
that is required during development. A further breakdown of cost distributions dur-
ing development is shown in Table 19. The weakness in this approach, as applied to
the RIVVTS methodology, is the limitation in evaluating alternative testing strate-
gies. By grouping the engineering, hardware, and test costs associated with rework
into a single value, the mitigating effects of alternative VVT strategies cannot be
determined. Rocketdyne’s Prodecol methodology, introduced in Section 2.9.2 used
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Figure 46: Historical development cost distributions recreated from [60].
this assumption in estimating rework cost [64] as follows:
CTotalRework = Total Development Cost ∗ 0.75÷ Number of Rework Cycles
$ / Rework Cycle = (Total Development Cost * 75%) / Number of Rework Cycles
where 75% is a conservative estimate for the percent of rework cost. To allow the
assessment of alternative VVT strategies, the cost of rework is divided into test costs
and rework cost for this methodology. The average cost per rework is calculated with
the same equation using 54% in place of the 75% used by Rocketdyne, based on the
cost breakdown of engineering and hardware cost during the ‘test-fail-fix’ phase given
in Table 19.
The average cost of rework using the previous formulation is $8.2 M in 1996 dollars.
To evaluate the change in rework cost throughout development testing, the F-1 cost
per rework cycle curve is fit using an exponential equation: a ∗ expb∗x, where x is the
percentage of tests completed, a is the fit coefficient that changes the mean value of
the curve and b is the fit coefficient that changes the shape of the cost distribution
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Engineering 2 15 1 7 25
Hardware 3 47 50
Test 9 19 25
2 15 10 73
over time. After establishing the fit from the data in Figure 20, the fit coefficient b
is kept constant, while a is adjusted according to the estimated average rework cost.
The indicator function determines when failure modes occur based on the probability
of occurrence for each failure mode, and this curve determines the cost per rework
cycles at that time.
CPerRework(t) = 3.45 ∗ exp2.52t
The triangular distribution for the duration of tests is determined from historical
data of the SSME program illustrated in Figure 47. This figure shows the average
number of days between tests during the SSME development testing program. The
minimum value is approximately 3 days, the maximum value is 6 days, and the
average of the seven points provided is 4 days. Based on these values, the triangular
distribution for duration is f(x; 3, 4, 6) days. This distribution is used to represent the
duration for Case A, where internal rework is explicitly considered. Case B represents
the duration with internal rework implicitly considered in the distribution. For Case
B, the maximum estimated duration is 12 to represent this implicit possibility of
rework.
Developing the discrete event simulation is the last primary task for this Experi-
ment. Simio is used to develop the DES environment. Simio is a production planning
and scheduling software that is well-suited to this problem. The Simio Standard
Library contains the common objects that are required for a typical simulation, i.e.
entities, resources, servers, nodes and connectors. The standard object behaviors are
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Figure 47: SSME average number of days between tests during development [17].
used in this model, but the option exists to augment objects as necessary. The process
logic is developed specifically for this scenario and is outlined in Figure 48. During
the simulation an internal clock is managed to track the passage of simulated time
and resources used. Each case is replicated 1,000 times using the Simio experiment
tools.
The DES inputs are the fully defined activities (i.e. fidelity, cost, and duration)
and activity relationships (i.e. DSM). The DES logic is outlined in Figure 48. After
the completion of a test, the indicator function is evaluated as described in Section
3.2.3. If a failure mode does not occur based on the failure mode probabilities defined
in Section 3.3.2, there are no state changes in the DES and it continues onto the
next activity. If a failure mode event is triggered, the DSM probabilities are used to
determine the total impact of the failure mode. If the failure mode requires redesign,
it is considered a criticality 1 failure mode that would lead to LOC or LOM and its
impact is included in reliability calculation, cost and schedule. If the failure mode
requires rework or retest, it is not included in the reliability model and will only
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impact cost and schedule.
To determine the more accurate way to represent the impact of internal rework, the
DES is evaluated under two conditions. As mentioned in Section 2.6.3, when DSMs
are used for product design processes, this internal rework is represented in the overall
uncertainty for the cost and duration of that particular activity. For this methodology,
if a test fails and requires retest, the entire test will need to be repeated as opposed to
just a portion of a design process. An example of this would be a premature engine
cutoff due to something unrelated to the actual test article, like a test facilities failure.
For Experiment 3, the discrete event simulation is run with two different distributions
on the activity durations. Only duration is changed because it is assumed that the
results also apply to the cost distribution. The activity duration distribution in Case
A is narrower and does not implicitly include the probability of rework. For this
case, tests are repeated based on the separate probability of retest. The DES is run
1,000 times to determine an output distribution on the schedule. Then, the activity
distributions are rest for Case B, with the possibility of internal rework included in
the individual activity durations A separate probability for retesting is not included
in the second case. The duration distributions and retest probabilities for each case
are listed in Table 20.
Table 20: Internal rework assumptions for Experiment 3
Case Duration Distribution (days) Retest Probability
A f(x; 3, 4, 6) 16%
B f(x; 3, 4, 12) N/A
3.4.2 Experiment 3 Results
Section 2.6.4 identified a DSM as an appropriate method to model activity relation-
ships during VVT. Most often used for product design, the probability of internal























Figure 48: Discrete event simulation logic.
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its use for VVT processes, it was suggested that internal rework be considered inde-
pendently of the activity distributions to generate a more accurate cost and schedule
model. A DES was developed to stochastically determine the impact of internal re-
work in both cases. The fidelity, cost, and duration for each activity and the activity
relationships were defined in Section 3.4.1. 1,000 runs for each case were run, and the
resulting mean and percentiles are presented here.
Figure 49 shows the results of Experiment 3, and the mean and variance for each
case are listed in Table 21. In this plot, it is clear that including the probability of
internal rework, or retest, decreases both the mean and the variance of the schedule
estimation. The actual SSME development test program lasted 6 years, from the
first ignition test in 1975 to the first Space Shuttle flight in 1981 [17]. By limiting the
duration distributions in Case A, and determining retests by probability, the schedule
estimate is more accurate and less uncertain. The mean schedule estimate for Case
A is 6.25 years, and the variance is 8.24e-4 square years. The overly broad duration
distribution for every activity in Case B, results in an over estimation of the schedule.
The mean for Case A is 8.45 years, and the variance is 0.0051 square years.




The total rework cost and test cost results are plotted in Figures 50 and 51,
respectively. Using the rework cost distribution assumed in Section 3.4.1 provides a
mean total rework cost of $1,388 million in 1996 dollars. This value is 2.8% higher
than the $1,350 million projection based on the historical distribution of rework costs
over development phases. The mean total test cost is $561 million in 1996 dollars,
which falls with in the estimated range of $500 to $625 million based on the same
distributions. The test cost is expected to be accurate because it does not vary
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Figure 49: Schedule distributions with and without the probability of internal rework.
stochastically, and the input distributions are based on the historical distribution
range. The result does provide verification that the test cost is modeled accurately
in the discrete event simulation.
The result of the total rework cost is more significant because it does vary stochas-
tically with the occurrence of rework cycles based on the failure mode probability of
occurrence. Experiment 2 confirmed that using Hall’s indicator function accurately
predicted rework cycles when compared to the SSME test history. When used in
conjunction with the assumed rework cost distribution, the resulting rework cost is
within 3% of the estimated rework cost. This confirms the assumption of rework cost
increase as a function of test number identified in Section 3.4.1.
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Figure 50: SSME total rework cost distribution in 1996 dollars.
Figure 51: SSME total rework cost distribution in 1996 dollars.
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The results of Experiment 3 were primarily intended to support hypothesis 3, but
an observation about conjecture 5 and the assumption for rework cost distribution
can also be made. The triangular distribution was chosen for the cost and duration
of VVT activities because generating the assumptions for the distribution is more
traceable than for a Weibull of Beta distribution. The importance of traceable and
accurate assumptions is illustrated in this experiment. When an overly broad distri-
bution is used to generate a schedule estimate, the additional uncertainty is carried
over into the output distributions. It is necessary then, to ensure that reasonable
assumptions can be made to determine inputs. When the distribution for an activity
is unknown or too few data points exist to generate a statistically significant distri-
bution, as is often the case, an expert can be consulted to provide an assessment.
The triangular distribution requires a minimum, maximum, and most likely value.
These are fairly reasonable estimates for a person to make because they are intuitive.
A Beta distribution, on the other hand, requires two measures of central tendency, a
mode and a mean, and two percentiles. Subjective assessments of these values make it
harder to guarantee an accurate result because they are not as intuitive. In practice,
many experts have a difficult time producing this information and their responses
can vary widely. This experiment supports the use of a triangular distribution by
illustrating the importance of using accurate input distributions.
3.4.3 Experiment 3 Summary
Experiment 3 tested the adaptation of a design structure matrix to explicitly include
the probability of internal rework, referred to as retest. After defining the fidelity,
cost, and duration of each activity, the activity relationships were represented with the
DSM. A discrete event simulation was created to run the model for two cases. The
first with narrower distributions and an explicit retest probability, and the second
with a broad duration distribution on each activity and no probability of retest.
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The result showed that the second case provided a more accurate and less uncertain
schedule estimate than the first case. The inclusion of retest probabilities is a more
realistic model of how testing activities would occur and gives more insight into the
actual processes. This conclusion is in line with the original hypothesis, and this
adaptation of the DSM to explicitly consider internal rework can be selected for use
in this methodology.
3.5 Method Development Summary
The experiments presented in this chapter addressed specific components of RIVVTS
methodology by testing the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 2. The first experiment
compared the use of Hall’s reliability growth model in four different set ups to the
demonstrated SSME reliability growth during development testing.
1. No fidelity levels
2. Average fidelity levels
3. Linear fidelity levels
4. ‘1-Exp’ fidelity levels
The results in Section 3.2.2 demonstrated the over prediction of reliability using Hall’s
model over testing phases when no fidelity levels were included. Section 3.2.5 showed
a similar result with the average and linear fidelity definitions. The ‘1-Exp’ fidelity
level was able to predict reliability more accurately, which is attributed to its physical
representation of failure mode occurrence. Ultimately, hypothesis 2a was accepted
based on these results.
Experiment 2 tested the use of FMEA to provide traceable and accurate prob-
abilities of rework cycles. Using the indicator function from Hall’s methodology to
track rework cycles during development testing proved to be an accurate approach
when the fidelity levels identified in Experiment 1 were included. The model results
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closely followed the accumulated test cutoffs from the SSME program history. This
result allowed hypothesis 6 to be accepted. A secondary approach to estimating the
number of rework cycles was also considered, in case FMEA data were not available
during VVT planning. The number of qualification tests were considered as a more
traceable metric for complexity than the Rocketdyne TUF value. To determine the
validity of this metric, the number of qualification tests for four liquid rocket engine
test programs were plotted against the number of rework cycles those programs in-
curred. While the result was interesting, the relationship was not strong enough to
support the use of qualification tests as a metric for program complexity. The TUF
metric was, instead, chosen as a secondary approach for estimating rework cycles due
to the established relationship between rework cycles and technical uncertainty of a
program.
Experiment 3 tested the adaptation of a design structure matrix to explicitly
include the probability of internal rework, referred to as retest. After defining the
fidelity, cost, and duration of each activity, the activity relationships were represented
with the DSM. The result confirmed that the explicit probability of internal rework
provided a more accurate schedule estimate. When the probability of internal rework
was implicitly included in the individual activity duration distribution, the schedule
was over estimated. The result of this experiment allowed hypothesis 3 to be accepted.
The results of these three experiments, and the conjectures formulated in Chapter
2 are used to solidify the components of the RIVVTS methodology. Chapter 4 pro-
vides a detailed discussion of the complete method and describes how the components
work together to evaluate the impact of rework on VVT. A case study is conducted to




Chapter 3 presented three experiments to define specific steps within this methodol-
ogy. A combination of research questions and literature review presented in Chapter
2, along with observations from the three experiments in Chapter 3 help define the
steps of the methodology presented herein. This chapter discusses in detail each of
these steps and how they work together to help meet the overall research objective.
This methodology is divided up into five primary elements discussed in more detail













The first element of this methodology is to define the system that is being analyzed.
A system can be characterized at different levels. INCOSE defines these levels as
a system, subsystem, assembly, subassembly, or component [153]. The levels create
a hierarchical decomposition of the system from the detailed part level to the top
system level. For this methodology, any of these levels can be included as long as
the test fidelity can be accurately determined to that level of detail. The SSME used
for comparison in the Chapter 3 is an example of a launch vehicle subsystem. The
functional assemblies include the propellant feed assembly, and the pressurization
assembly, among others [17]. The parts count method used to identify critical 1
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failure modes (i.e. high and low pressure turbopumps) in Section 3.1.2 were examples
of components. The analyst must define the system and functionally decompose
it to the appropriate level, which can be determined by the VVT activities being
considered.
Based on the system selected, a list of VVT activities need to be identified and
defined. The verification requirements matrix and designed test plan for that system
should be used to identify the baseline set of activities. To understand the impact of
rework on different test plans, alternative sets of VVT activities should be selected
for comparison. The next step is to define each activity being considered. For this
methodology, a fully defined activity requires a fidelity level based on the estimated
percent of failure modes that can be uncovered during that specific activity, and a
pessimistic, optimistic, and most likely estimate for cost and schedule to generate
triangular distributions.
The most reliable way to assess fidelity levels is by previous failure mode occur-
rence experience of the system. For new systems, the previous failure mode occur-
rences of similar systems can be used and adjusted based on an analogy approach.
If a similar system does not exist, expert opinion or a physical decomposition of the
system could be used. An example would be defining the fidelity based on the number
of individual components that are used during a given test — either a percentage of
the components, or using the individual component failure contributions if they are
known. The last approach is utilized in the sample problem presented in this chapter.
Cost and schedule distributions can also be elicited from experts, comparison to his-























After the VVT activities are defined, the analyst must assess the system to generate
the data required to project the impact of rework. The system data are used to define
the VVT activity relationships and to estimate the number of rework cycles that will
occur during development.
Two sets of probabilities are required to define the system. The first set is the
probability of failure mode occurrences required for the indicator function and relia-
bility growth model, shown below:
pi = p1, ..., pk for k failure modes (26)
The second set of probabilities are conditional probabilities that determine the
type of rework cycle given that a failure mode has occurred. These probabilities,
listed below, are used in the DSM to represent the relationship between testing and
development activities — design and manufacture.
P (redesign) = P (c = 1) = pc1
P (remanufacture) = P (c = 2) = pc2
P (retest) = P (c = 3) or else = pc3
(27)
Finally, the probability for a specific rework cycle is given by the following equa-
tion:
P (RWCc) = (pi)(pc) (28)
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where pi is the probability of occurrence for failure mode i, and pc is the conditional
probability of redesign (pc1), remanufacture (pc2), or retest (pc3) given that a failure
mode has occurred.
The method to generate this data depends on the design heritage of the system
and its elements. Systems with extensive flight history and derivative systems, for ex-
ample, could utilize prior development, test, and production experience. FMEA data
are ideal for estimating the number of rework cycles and the activity relationships. A
complete FMEA can also provide the probability of occurrence (p1, ..., pk for k rework
cycles) assumptions for the reliability growth model used in this methodology.
If FMEA does not exist, two methods can be used in conjunction to generate the
required data. The failure modes that directly lead to loss of crew, loss of mission,
or loss of vehicle, can be assessed using the part count method based on the phys-
ical decomposition of the system. The total number of failure modes can then be
estimated based on the Technical Uncertainty Factor (TUF), which was identified
in Section 3.3.2 as a secondary approach should FMEA data be unavailable. The
TUF assessment of a system was shown to be a good indicator for the number of
failure modes of all criticality levels. The probability of occurrence assumptions can
be determined based on previous test data or can be developed based on information
in the literature. An example of this is the derivation of failure probabilities used in
Experiment 1.
The activity relationships used in the DSM can be derived using the number
of critical 1 failure modes and the total number of failure modes. If the FMEA is
available, the percentage of critical 1 failure modes can be used as the probability
of redesign. The percentage of the remaining failure modes, not including the ones
that do not cause any damage, gives the probability of rework, and the remaining
percentage is assigned to retest. In the absence of FMEA data, dividing the number
of critical 1 failure modes by the number of total failure modes estimated using the
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TUF metric can be used for the probability of redesign. The probability of retest can
be determined based on previous systems’ testing failures or expert opinion, and the
remaining failures will result in rework. Because the actual distributions of redesign,
rework, and retest are unknown, these probabilities should be expressed as a uniform













Generate data to estimate rework
• Total number of rework cycles
• Probability of failure mode occurrence








4.3 Rework Impact Projection
The next step in this methodology is to run a discrete event simulation to assess the
impact of rework on reliability, cost, and schedule projections. At the beginning of
each case, a random number is drawn from the Beta distributions for the probability
of occurrence for each rework cycle. At each step in the DSM, the state of the system
is evaluated. The indicator function, given in Equation 11, is used to determine
if a failure mode occurs during the current state using the array of probabilities
generated at the beginning of the case. If a Failure Mode Event is flagged, based on the
probability of occurrence and current fidelity level, then the probability of redesign,
rework, or retest is assessed using a random draw from the uniform distributions.
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The system evaluates the column of the current activity from row 1 in the DSM. The
row at which the rework cycle occurs determines how far back the system must go to
correct that failure mode. If the failure mode requires redesign, based on the DSM
probabilities, a Reliability Event is flagged. This event is used to track the number of
critical 1 failure modes, their probability of occurrence and the first test in which they
occur for calculating reliability. When the rework cycle is completed, the system flags
a return event to continue onto the next VVT activity in the DSM. The cumulative
cost and schedule are tracked during the simulation. When the model is evaluating
an activity, a random number for cost and duration is drawn from the respective
distributions. The cost of a rework cycle is dependent upon how far along the system
is in the overall VVT plan. The assumption for cost distribution of rework cycles
during development is described in Section 2.7.
At the end of each case, the adapted Hall growth model is called. This is done at
the end of the simulation because the number of critical 1 failure modes that occur will
not be determined until the end of the simulation due to the probability of redesign.
Each critical 1 failure mode that was flagged during the simulation has two properties:
the probability of occurrence that was drawn randomly from the Beta distribution
and the test number where it occurred for the first time. The reliability model inputs
include the number of primary failure modes, their associated properties, the number
of tests, and the fidelity of each test. The reliability growth model is evaluated at
each test, where the indicator function for each failure mode is assigned I = 1 if the
failure mode occurred before that test, and I = 0 if it did not. The fix effectiveness
factor is determined by randomly drawing a number from its uniform distribution.
The result of one case is a reliability growth curve, cumulative rework cycles,
cost, and schedule estimate. The simulation is repeated 1,000 times to generate
distributions for each of these outputs. The number of repetitions is the number of
random draws taken from the failure mode probability distributions, and the activity
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cost/duration distributions. This parameter will have an effect on the overall run
time of the model and the granularity of the output. A large enough number must
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The next step in this methodology is to assess the risk for the selected VVT activities
and to evaluate the testing strategy. The risk is assessed using the quadratic impact
function chosen in Section 2.8.3. Risk assessment outputs a single value based on the
simulation outputs for mature reliability, cost, and schedule. In the rework impact
projection step, the discrete event simulation generates distributions for these values
that are used to calculate the risk that these metrics do not meet the required baseline.
The baseline for cost and schedule can be determined using NAFCOM or SEER —
industry standard cost estimating tools. It is assumed that the baseline cost accounts
for 2.5 years of engine-level testing at two dedicated testing facilities conducting 30
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tests each per year. The cumulative distribution functions of the cost and schedule
outputs from the simulation are used to determine the risk of exceeding that baseline.
The mature reliability goal for the system is used as the reliability baseline. Unlike
cost and schedule, the reliability risk is calculated based on the probability of not
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After the risk has been assessed for a given VVT strategy, a number of alternative
strategies can be evaluated for comparison. The primary research objective for this
methodology is to produce a quantitative estimate of the impact of rework cycles
on alternative VVT strategies to assist in the decision making process. The rework
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impact projection and risk assessment steps provide metrics that allow alternative
VVT strategies to be compared to one another. The following section discusses the
implementation of this methodology in order to demonstrate the approach on an
actual system. Chapter 5 will present a full application of this method to further













Generate data to estimate rework
• Total number of rework cycles
• Probability of failure mode occurrence
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The method is applied to the RS-68 liquid rocket engine, which was introduced in
Section 3.3.1. This example serves to validate the capability of this methodology to
accurately predict the impact of rework cycles on VVT activities. The RS-68 was
chosen because it was developed relatively recently, but has a complete development
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testing history that can be used for comparison.
4.6.1 System Definition
The first step of this methodology is to define the system. A brief description of the
RS-68 liquid rocket engine was given in Section 3.3.1. Certified in 2001, the RS-68
is used on the Delta IV launch vehicle and is still in production today [154]. The
engine burns liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen in a gas generator cycle that can
oscillate between power settings of 101% or 58% during different mission profiles.
The turbopumps are driven by a single shaft with direct drive turbines. The turbines
are powered in parallel by high-pressure hot gases from the gas generator. The thrust
chamber assembly consists of a combustion chamber and ablative nozzle designed to
dissipate heat as the engine is running. Thrust vector and roll control is performed
by gimbaling the thrust chamber assembly and the fuel turbine exhaust roll control
nozzle [154]. The engine’s operating characteristics are listed in Table 22 and the
schematic is shown in Figure 42.
Table 22: RS-68 Operating Characteristics [154].
Full Power Min Power
Thrust, vac (KN) 3,341 1,922
Thrust, s/l (KN) 2,918 1,499
Chamber pressure (MPa) 9.79 5.62
Propellants LOX/LH2
Engine mixture ratio 6.0
Isp vac (sec) 409
Isp s/l (sec) 357
The development program was ‘designed to cost’ in an attempt to reduce the
non-recurring costs associated with the typical rework cycles seen in other engine
programs. A concentrated effort was made to reduce risk prior to engine-level test-
ing. The testing began with 71 component-level tests that progressively increased in
fidelity by adding components. This incremental testing approach started with gas
generator component testing, then advanced to the turbopump assembly, and finally
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powerpack (gas generator and turbupump subassembly) testing. The number of tests
completed at each stage are shown in Table 23. These are the VVT activities that
are used for this example problem.
Table 23: RS-68 development test program [154].
Test Level Number of Tests
Component Gas Generator 62
Component Turbopump 11
Component Power Pack 6
Prototype Engine 7
Engine 176
After identifying the activities that have been selected to verify and validate the
design, each activity needs to be further defined. This can be done on an individual
basis, or in groups if they can be categorized. Only one VVT strategy is analyzed to
validate this model against the actual RS-68 test history.
The first 71 tests were component tests. To define the fidelity of those tests, the
historical contribution of components to US liquid rocket propulsion failures is re-
viewed in Table 24 [89]. A significant percent of the failures, 34.2%, cannot be directly
attributed to a single component. The largest component contributors to propulsion
failures are the fuel feed and control subsystem, and the hydraulic/pneumatic con-
trol subsystem which contribute to around 15% each. The pressurization, electrical
control, and oxidizer feed and control are the next largest, contributing around 10%.
The remaining subsystems contribute less than 5% each. The components tested
first can all be attributed to the fuel and oxidizer feed and control assemblies. The
maximum fidelity for these components tests is then the sum of those two component
contributions from Table 24, 22.5%.
The remaining 183 tests are engine-level tests. The fidelity can be determined
based on the duration of the test. The percent of failure modes that can be uncovered
as a function of operating duration could not be found in the literature. This is likely
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Table 24: Component Contribution to US Liquid Rocket Propulsion Failure [89].
Subsystem Percent Contribution
Fuel feed and control 15.0%





Electrical Control 8.3 %
Hydraulic/pneumatic control 16.7%
Thrust vector control 0.8%
Engine structure 0.8%
Others 34.2%
because the engine is still in operation, and some data has not been released. Like the
SSME, the J-2 engine shows a similar early growth in the number of failure modes
that can be uncovered during the early operating environment, which was observed
to accurately represent engine fidelity in Experiment 1 in Section 3.2.5. The failure
experience for the J-2 is used to estimate the RS-68 test fidelities because they are
both gas-generator cycle engines, while the SSME is a staged combustion engine.
The failure experience for the J-2 given in [156] is plotted versus the actual engine
test duration. To adapt this profile for the case study, the data are replotted versus
normalized mission duration and scaled to the RS-68 mission duration of 250 seconds.
The resulting RS-68 fidelity profile is provided in Figure 52. The RS-68 test groups
and associated fidelities are listed in Table 25 [154, 156, 140].
The rework and test costs are combined for the case study to enable comparisons
to the reported cost data in [154]. The Rocketdyne Prodecol method was applied to
the RS-68 to estimate the number of rework cycles and the average cost per rework
cycle prior to development. From this assessment, the rework cost curve fit discussed
in Section 3.4.1 is adjusted to the estimated $5 million per rework cycle in 2001 year
dollars. No distribution was provided to estimate testing costs. This does not affect
the case study because only one testing strategy is evaluated, and the divided test
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Figure 52: RS-68 fidelity profile versus test duration.
Table 25: RS-68 test durations and fidelity levels [154, 156, 140].




Engine 78 28 0.58
Engine 18 136 0.8
Engine 28 139 0.8
Engine 24 163 0.84
Engine 15 173 0.88
Engine 20 195 0.91
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and rework costs would be summed for comparison regardless. The rework cost is
calculated as follows:
CPerRework(t) = 2.1 exp 2.523t
The triangular distribution for the activity duration is determined using the pub-
licly available data on the RS-68 engine development history time line illustrated in
Figure 53. From this time line, the average number of days between system-level
engine tests is 6 days, the least number of days between tests is 4 days, and the
most days between tests is 9. The resulting distribution is f(x; 4, 6, 9) days. The test
schedule for component-level tests is approximately twice as frequent as engine-level
tests, resulting in a distribution of f(x; 2, 3, 4.5) days for component-level tests [154].
Figure 53: RS-68 engine development history [154].
4.6.2 System Assessment
The next step in this methodology is to assess the system and estimate the number
of critical 1 failure modes, total number of rework cycles, and the activity relation-
ships. As mentioned in the previous section, this engine is still in production and a
comprehensive FMEA has not been released. The parts count approach is utilized to









Without the full FMEA, the relationship between the technical uncertainty factor
assessment and number of rework cycles for historical engines can be used to determine
the total number of rework cycles. The RS-68 was assessed using the TUF metric,
and 30 rework cycles were estimated based on the risk level using the Rocketdyne
Prodecol chart [154, 64]. Based on this assessment, the probability of redesign (pc=1)
can be determined: 7/30 = 23%. To account for uncertainty, a range of 20-25% for
redesign is used. The historical range for test failures is used because no actual data
is available. The SSME showed 16% of premature engine cutoffs were attributed to
test facility failures, so a slightly lower range is used to the RS-68 because of the
emphasis on reducing complexity and improving the test facility [154]. A range of
5-10% is used for this example, and the remaining percentages are the probability
of rework, 65-75%. The RS-68 test program had 32 test malfunctions, and only 20
engine failures [154]. The other 12 malfunctions are attributed to facility failures,
approximately 7% of the 183 tests. This is consistent with the 5-10% used for the
case study.
The other inputs required for the reliability growth model are the probability of
failure occurrence and the fix effectiveness factor. Again, without a comprehensive
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FMEA, these values have to be based on similar systems or found in the literature.
Woods assumed a mature reliability of 0.9982 based on a system comparison to the
SSME [154]. The assessment was based on total parts count, design complexity,
fabrication processes, and operating environment. This is slightly higher than the
SSME reliability at first flight of 0.9952 [17]. The reliability at first flight is close
enough that the same system-level probability of occurrence used for the SSME in
Experiment 1 can be used for the RS-68, Beta(0.22, 8.75). This can be verified by
considering the test and failure history of the RS-68. Summing the fidelity levels
defined in Figure 52 gives a weighted number of equivalent flights. For the 254
tests at the fidelity levels listed in Table 25, the equivalent number of flights is 146.
The mean demonstrated probability of failure for the system is calculated as follows:
numberoffailuremodes/equivalentflights = 26/146 = 0.1844. Assuming the indi-
vidual failure mode probability of occurrences are randomly selected from the beta
distribution in Table 26, the reliability of the system is calculated using the following
equation:
Rsystem = (1− psystem) = (1− (p1 + ...+ pk)) (29)
where psystem is the probability of failure at the system level, pi is the probability
of failure for each critical 1 failure mode k [158]. While the summation of these
probabilities isn’t strictly correct, it is a ‘rare event’ approximation that be made for
these independent top level failure modes. The number of failure modes ranges from
5 to 7 based on the probability of redesign determined during system assessment. To
estimate the system-level probability of failure, first an integer is randomly selected
from a uniform distribution of primary failure modes, k, then k random probabilities
are drawn from the beta distribution and summed. This is repeated 10,000 to gen-
erate a distribution for the system-level probability of failure. The resulting mean
of this exercise is 0.1772, which is 4% less than the demonstrated reliability of the
system during development testing. This difference is negligible, and the assumed
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beta(0.22.8.75) distribution can be accepted.
The last input assumption that needs to be determined for the reliability pro-
jection is Hall’s Fix Effectiveness Factor. Expert opinion was identified as the ideal
way to estimate this value in Section 2.5.2.6. In Experiment 1 a uniform distribution
between 90-95% was used based on the increased focus to eliminate defects during
development testing. This value is kept for the RS-68 because the same focus on
reliability can be assumed for its development program. In addition, because this
value is difficult to estimate, keeping it the same will reduce any bias in the results.
Table 26: RS-68 reliability growth assumptions.
Parameter Value
Number of Rework Cycles 25-35
Probability of Occurrence β(0.22,8.75)
FEF 90%-95%
Number of Tests 254
The RS-68 engine and test program are fully defined in Sections 4.6.1 and 4.6.2.
The next step in this methodology is to use the information gathered in the first two
steps and determine the impact of rework cycles on the reliability, cost and schedule
for the program. Once output distributions for these metrics are generated using the
techniques defined in Chapter 3, the final step is a risk assessment to determine the
program risk with respect to the target goals.
4.6.3 Rework Impact Projection
The discrete event simulation model inputs are defined during the system definition
and assessment. The DSM represents how the model entity traverses the simulation
according to the flow chart illustrated in Figure 48. The cost, schedule, and reliability
input distributions are used to evaluate the system at each state during the simulation.
The events are test failure, redesign, remanufacture, and retest. The probability of
the test failure event being triggered is determined by the Hall indicator function
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and the fidelity level of the current activity state. If the event is triggered, then
the DSM probabilities determine which level of fault correction will occur: redesign,
remanufacture, or retest. After the fault correction is complete, the system continues
on to the next activity and the state is evaluated again.
The DES was run 10,000 times to generate distributions on the model outputs.
These distributions enable the calculation of output means, percentiles, and risk levels
that are assessed in the next section. Figure 54 shows the results of the cumulative
number of rework cycles predicted by the model during developmental testing com-
pared to the actual premature cutoffs due to engine anomalies [154, 138]. The actual
RS-68 data do not begin until engine-level testing, but the number of failures that
occurred during component testing are reported. The red line represents the actual
data that start after the 6 failures that occurred during the 71 component-level tests.
The model follows the actual RS-68 engine cutoffs fairly closely. The component tests
capture as many as 8 failure modes, which is more than the actual component tests
uncovered, but this can be attributed to the range of rework cycles used as input. A
range of rework cycles is used to model the uncertainty in rework prediction. The
simulation gave a final number of rework cycles ranging from 20-35. The number of
rework cycles that occurred, 26, falls directly in this range. This indicates that the
model was able to capture the actual cumulative rework cycles for the RS-68 engine
using test fidelity levels.
Figure 55 illustrates the results of the reliability prediction from the DES, which in-
clude the mean, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile. No RS-68 demonstrated reliabil-
ity data has been released except for the mature reliability assessment of 0.9982 [154].
The resulting mature reliability prediction provided by the model is P5 = 0.9685,
P50 = 0.991,and P95 = 0.9991. The 0.9982 reliability assessment falls within this
range. Another verification of the model accuracy is the number of redesign or crit-
icality 1 failure modes that are predicted. The parts count method determined 7
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Figure 54: RS-68 cumulative rework cycles versus test number.
primary failure modes and the model shows an agreement with between 6-9 redesign
cycles and an average of 6.9, or approximately 7. This suggests that the DSM per-
centages used to calculate reliability are accurately estimating the reliability growth
during development testing for the RS-68 engine.
The final results from the DES are cost and schedule estimates. Figure 56 shows
a histogram of the total rework costs. The rework costs from the F-1 engine were
normalized to represent the rework cost as a function of the percent total development
time. This exponential curve fit was then adjusted to scale for the RS-68 program
costs of $355 million in 2001 dollars [154]. The actual program reported a total
of $156 million for the fix-fail cycles. This is 1.3% lower than the average of $158
million resulting from the simulation, which is negligible. This is the only cost value,
other than total program cost, provided by the RS-68. This alignment of the cost
prediction for rework cycles confirms the cost distribution used for rework cycles
accurately predicts the total rework cost during development.
Figure 57 shows a histogram for the total testing schedule for the RS-68. Including
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Figure 55: RS-68 reliability growth versus test number.
Figure 56: RS-68 total rework cost in 2001 dollars.
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component testing, the engine was certified for first flight in 4.5 years. This is 2%
lower than the average simulation schedule of 4.6 years. The result of the schedule
duration including the probability of internal rework accurately predicts the total
development time for this program.
Figure 57: RS-68 schedule.
4.6.4 Risk Assessment and Strategy Comparison
The final steps in this methodology is to use the quadratic risk impact function to
determine the overall risk in reliability, cost, and schedule for the RS-68 engine. The
risk impact function is used to calculate the risk that a target value is not met and
applying a quadratic risk growth as the estimate moves away from the target. For
cost and schedule, the risk is going over the target values. The risk for reliability
is to not meet the target value. Figures 58 to 60 illustrate the reliability, cost, and
schedule risk for this program, respectively. On their own, the risk values do not hold
much meaning. Their primary purpose is to allow comparisons of PDFs for different
VVT strategies. They are shown here to illustrate the meaning behind the risk value.
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Figure 58: RS-68 reliability risk, RR.
Figure 59: RS-68 cost risk, RC .
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Figure 60: RS-68 schedule risk, RS.
4.6.5 Case Study Conclusions
The RS-68 case study was set up as a validation exercise for this methodology. The
primary goal was to demonstrate the ability of the method to accurately predict the
impact of rework cycles on reliability, cost, and schedule, and to assess the risk of a
VVT strategy. The example was also used to further support the conclusions drawn
from the experimental observations in Chapter 3.
First, the case study illustrated the accuracy of this methodology to predict the
occurrence of rework cycles. Figure 54 shows the cumulative rework cycles predicted
by this method compared to the actual RS-68 rework cycles during development.
The simulated results match the actual data very well. By using test fidelity levels
in conjunction with the reliability indicator function, the level of insight into the
effects of individual tests is increased. The accuracy of the model to predict rework
cycles also validates the probability of occurrence assumption for the reliability growth
model.
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Because FMEA data for this system were not publicly available, alternative meth-
ods were used to estimate the number of total rework cycles and the percentage of
critical 1 failure modes. The number of rework cycles is estimated based on the Rock-
etdyne Technical Uncertainty Factor metric. For this case study, the total number of
rework cycles was known. The percent of failure modes that result in redesign was es-
timated based on the parts count approach, where the number of primary components
was used as a substitute for the number of failure modes that would lead to LOC or
LOV. When using this percentage in the DSM, the average number of redesign cycles
simulated was used as the number of failure modes input in the reliability growth
model.
The final conclusion from the case study was the confirmation in assumptions and
techniques used to estimate rework cost and development schedule. When compared
to the actual cost of rework reported from the RS-68 program, the exponential growth
of rework costs used in this methodology very closely predicted the actual rework.
Similarly, the schedule penalty applied to rework also accurately predicted the total
testing duration. This further supports the conclusions drawn from Experiment 3.
The RS-68 case study illustrated the utility of this methodology and verified its
ability to accurately assess the impact of rework cycles on the reliability, cost, and
schedule of VVT activities. This method will now be applied to different VVT strate-
gies for one system to confirm that the overall research objective has been met. The




Chapters 3 and 4 presented the development of this methodology through experimen-
tation and observations made from the literature review in Chapter 2. The exper-
iments were designed to test the research questions posed in Chapter 2 and either
accept or reject the associated hypotheses. An additional experiment is necessary to
verify that the overall research objective has been met and demonstrate the RIVVTS
methodology. The research objective and derived requirements are restated below:
Research Objective
Reduce cost and schedule overruns by modeling the effects of unplanned
rework on the verification, validation, and testing of launch vehicle systems,
and determining how VVT strategies can mitigate those effects.
The research objective can be achieved through the formulation and implementation
of a structured process or methodology that meets the following requirements:
Derived Requirements:
1. The method shall produce quantitative means for comparing alternative VVT
strategies.
2. The method shall produce quantitative estimates for the impact of rework cycles
on cost and schedule during VVT.
3. The method shall be scalable and flexible enough to enable use for large complex
systems.
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In order to test the completion of the research objective, this methodology is
applied to a real world system and alternative VVT strategies are compared to deter-
mine the impact of unplanned rework during VVT. The baseline VVT strategy used
for this problem is the Space Shuttle Main Engine, which was introduced in Section
3.1.1. Its well-documented test history makes it ideal for this application problem.
Although originally developed in the 70’s, the current SSME configuration is still
in use today. The SLS plans to modify RS-25D engines for the core stage on early
flights, and transition to a cheaper, expendable version at a later date [133]. For this
reason, the SSME was determined to still be a relevant example system for the appli-
cation of this method. First, a review of historical liquid rocket engine test programs
is discussed in the following section to determine how different VVT strategies are
created.
5.1 Liquid Rocket Engine Test Strategies
The objectives of a testing program vary depending on experience, analytical ca-
pabilities, and the technological maturity of the program, measured by Technology
Readiness Level (TRL). Low TRL level programs, i.e. TRL 1-3, are focused on gath-
ering sufficient test data for proof-of-concept hardware to support the development
of a more sophisticated test article. Mid TRL level programs, i.e. TRL 4-6, use pro-
totype hardware and engineering test units that closely resemble actual hardware [1].
Once the program reaches high TRL levels, i.e. TRL 7-9, testing of engine compo-
nents and systems is done with emphasis on quality and rigor applied to both the test
facilities and test hardware. For Phase C/D VVT, it is assumed that only upper-mid
to high TRLs are considered, e.g. TRL 6-9.
An overview of the potential testing elements for a new engine development pro-
gram are illustrated in Figure 61 [120]. Each element reduces risk and generates data
to support the next testing phase — from prototype testing, to development testing,
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qualification testing, and finally integrated system testing. The confidence gained by
incrementally increasing the testing fidelity validates the commitment of additional
resources for full-scale hardware to be built and tested. Subscale component tests
likely include testing of subscale combustion devices, such as pumps, preburners, or
the thrust chamber. After subscale testing is completed on hardware with the desired
attributes, the resulting data are used to reduce risk for the full scale component
tests. Complex components, such as turbopump assembly and combustion devices,
can only undergo development testing due to the high level of system interaction at
the engine-level. These components cannot be qualified on an individual basis because
the component-level testing environment cannot adequately represent the intended
operating conditions [5]. From full-scale component testing, prototype engines are
built and tested. The full scale engine development and qualification tests are used
to demonstrate that the engine can operate under flight representative conditions.
The ‘test-as-you-fly’ philosophy suggests that the test program should encompass as
much of the flight envelope as possible, including worst-case scenarios [5]. Flight
readiness is often determined based on both the development and qualification test
efforts due to the complexity of liquid rocket engines. Upon completion of flight en-
gine qualification tests, also referred to as certification tests, an integrated systems
flight stage qualification test can be performed. Each unique flight engine must be
acceptance tested before it is committed to a flight vehicle.
Designing an engine test program is largely subjective. General guidelines have
been created to help successfully develop, test, qualify, and accept liquid rocket en-
gines for launch vehicles [5]. The primary cost drivers for these programs are the
number of engine samples and total number of tests performed. NASA-STD 2015,
a technical standard for liquid-fueled space propulsion engines, requires six qualifica-
tion units for pump-fed engines and a minimum of one for pressure-fed engines [6].
Standards like this one describe qualification and acceptance test guidelines for space
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Figure 61: Notional test program elements recreated from [120].
systems, but are difficult to apply to testing.
The necessary number of tests can be difficult to ascertain. The test program must
be comprehensive enough to ensure that all performance requirements and functional
objectives have been met, but is also subject to programmatic influences. Two ap-
proaches have been suggested to determine the total number of tests: statistically
relevant based and functional objective based [5]. The first approach uses statisti-
cal analysis to determine the minimum number of tests that must be performed to
statistically demonstrate engine reliability based on an assumed failure distribution.
Weibull failure distributions with different shape parameters are used to model the
occurrence of random and wear-out failure modes [9]. Reliability is shown to increase
faster for wear-out failure modes with longer duration testing, and for random fail-
ure modes with more test units. The number of additional test units required to
demonstrate statistically high reliability for random failure modes of launch vehicles,
however, often exceeds budget requirements [5]. The second approach is to verify
that all functional objectives have been met efficiently and with minimum testing. In
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doing so, it is still necessary to test the engine within the full flight envelope, both
nominal and off-nominal conditions [5]. The specific test plan and functional objec-
tives will vary based on the type of engine. A complete list of functional objectives,
and the recommended development and qualification tests to verify them, are given
in Appendix A.
Early hot-fire test programs used a formal reliability demonstration approach to
qualification, e.g. F-1 and J-2. During these programs, each engine accumulated
thousands of starts and improved reliability directly through test-fail-fix cycles [48].
The SSME opted to use design verification specifications as a foundation for test
program development [17]. The goal of each test was not to simply demonstrate
reliability, but to verify that the design had met a specific requirement. This approach
was intended to reduce the cost of testing [92]. The prohibitively high cost of hot-
fire engine tests has continued to drive the evolution of liquid rocket engine test
programs. The RS-68 was successfully certified in 183 tests, the least number of tests
to qualification to-date [154]. This can be attributed to the advancement of computer
analysis techniques that identify failure modes prior to hardware fabrication and their
design-to-cost, objective based variable test/time approach [154].
A summary of the J-2, F-1, SSME, and RS-68 test programs is provided in
Table 27. The testing philosophy evolution that occurred between these projects
can be seen by the total number of tests, and total seconds of operation during de-
velopment and qualification. The formal reliability demonstration approach of earlier
engines required a significantly larger number of tests than later programs. The de-
sign verification specifications of the SSME reduced the total number of tests despite
being a human-rated, reusable engine. The RS-68 further reduced the number of
tests and test seconds by learning from past programs and focusing on risk reduction
during design. The objective-based approach used during testing allowed multiple
objectives to be accomplished in a single test, essentially increasing the fidelity of a
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given test [154]. The trend that can be seen in these programs is the push to reduce
rework cycles and increase the fidelity of tests earlier in the development process.








Tests Seconds Tests Seconds
J-2 GG 6 450 1,700 160,000 30 3,807
F-1 GG 8 165 2,805 252,958 20 2,255
SSME SC 9 520 726 110,253 13 5,000
RS-68 GG 4 250 183 18,945 12
5.2 Baseline Strategy
To determine how a VVT strategy affects the reliability, cost, and schedule risk of
a program, alternative strategies are compared to the SSME baseline. Parts of the
SSME baseline were introduced in Chapter 3, but a complete definition of the system
is discussed in this section to provide the baseline for this application.
5.2.1 System Definition
The first step in defining the baseline is to define the system. Section 3.1.1 provided
a discussion on the operating characteristics and major components of the SSME.
Section 3.1.2 discussed the development test program details. The total number of
development tests, including qualification tests, is 726. For this application, the tests
are grouped by year and their fidelity is defined by the average duration. The number
of tests per year, average duration, and fidelity are restated in Table 28.
5.2.2 System Assessment
The next step in the process is to assess the system and determine the reliability
growth model assumptions and activity relationships. The availability of a compre-
hensive FMEA for the SSME provides most of this information in detail, enabling a
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Table 28: SSME Test History









well defined baseline for this application. The reliability growth model requires three
parameters: number of failure modes, probability of occurrence, and fix effectiveness
factor. The number of critical 1 failure modes was determined to be 7-8% of the total
failure modes based on the number of high risk failure modes identified in the FMEA
that would lead to LOC or LOV. The probability of occurrence beta distribution used
in Experiment 1 is used for these failure modes. The results of Experiment 1 and
2 demonstrated the accuracy of this assumption for predicting rework cycles during
SSME development history. These values are listed in Table 29.
These probabilities could be extracted directly from FMEA, if provided. Assump-
tion 3 for the Hall model, listed in Section 2.5.2, states that the initial failure mode
probabilities of occurrence constitute a realization of a simple random sample such
that Pi∼Beta(n, x). To represent the FMEA probabilities as a beta distribution,
maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate the shape parameters x and n.
More current FMEA worksheets directly provide these probabilities or likelihoods of
failure modes. The SSME FMEA, however, provides a frequency of failure factor
based on the number of Unsatisfactory Condition Reports (UCR) [146]. A separate
study of SSME and J-2 engine failure data found that no empirical relation between
the number of UCRs and the number of premature engine cutoffs exists [33]. The
number of UCRs is instead driven by the number of inspections or tests that oc-
curred. For this reason, the assumed beta distribution given by Hall is used in this
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application.
Table 29: Reliability growth assumptions for application baseline
Parameter Value
Number of Failure Modes 160-182
Probability of Occurrence β(0.22,8.75)
FEF 90%-95%
Number of Tests 726
The activity relationships can also be extracted from the FMEA data. The total
number of failure modes was determined to be between 160 and 182 based on the
number of failure modes that would cause at least some damage. As stated previously,
the probability of those failure modes requiring redesign is 7-8%, i.e. the same number
of high risk failure modes used to calculate reliability growth. The percentage of those
failure modes that fall into the criticality 2 category is 70-85%. The remaining 7-23%
are considered the probability of retest. The SSME DSM used for this application
problem is provided in Figure 30.
Table 30: DSM for application baseline
1 2 3 4 ... 728
Design 1 U(.07,.10) U(.07,.10) U(.07,.10)
Mfc. 2 U(.70,.85) U(.70,.85) U(.70,.85)
Test 1 3 U(.05,.18)
Test 2 4 U(.05,.18)
... U(.05,.18)
Test 726 728 U(.05,.18)
After the baseline VVT strategy is fully defined, alternative strategies are identi-
fied for the SSME. Section 5.3.1 discusses the system definition and assessment of the
VVT alternatives for this application problem. The rework impact projection and





The RIVVTS methodology is used to evaluate each of the individual fidelity profiles.
The first step of system definition is not required because the alternative strategies
use the same system as the baseline VVT strategy. While this is necessary to enable
a fair comparison of the rework impact on different VVT activities, defining the VVT
activities for each strategy is still required.
The alternative VVT strategies are generated by deviating from the baseline strat-
egy. A curve fit was created using the test fidelity profile of the baseline using a
f(t) = 1− exp(a ∗ t) fit in MATLAB, where f(t) is the fidelity for test t = 1, ..., 726,
and fit coefficient a = 0.0059. The fit coefficient determines the shape of the fidelity
profile. For example, a lower coefficient would increase reliability at a less steep slope
and a higher coefficient would increase the fidelity earlier with a steeper slope. A
range of a values are used to generate the alternative testing strategies. Figure 62
illustrates the test fidelity profiles, where ai = mia for each alternative i = 1, ..., 35.
The multiplier, mi, ranges from 0.30 to 2 in 0.1 increments, resulting in 35 alternative
test profiles. For the baseline strategy a = 1. The minimum value for the multiplier
was selected as the test profiles begin to become less distinguishable from one another
as the multiplier approaches zero. At the minimum value of 0.3, the VVT strategies
are still distinguishable from one another. The maximum value was selected because
it is the first strategy that reaches over 1,000 tests, which is assumed to be excessive
for modern test programs as determined by the review of historical test strategies in
Section 5.1.
To determine the total number of tests for a given profile, Tai , an Effective Test
Effort (EFE) is calculated for the baseline test program. EFE is calculated by inte-
grating the area under the curve of the test profile, which is defined by the fidelity
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Figure 62: Alternative test fidelity profiles for SSME testing.





where T is the total number of tests for the baseline case, and f(t) is the fidelity
at each test t. This value gives an indication of the level of effort that was applied
throughout testing, or a weighted equivalent flight calculation that accounts for the
nonlinear nature of fidelity during mission duration that was observed in Experiment
1b. The alternative fidelity profile is then integrated from 1 to t until the baseline
EFE is reached, and then Tai = t for profile ai. The 35 profiles plotted in Figure
62 range in total number of tests from 640 to 1029. After the fidelity level of each
activity in each of the alternative VVT strategies is defined using this method, the
cost and duration of the activities is determined.
The generic testing strategies developed for this application problem require as-
sumptions to be made for cost and duration based on historical testing costs. A review
of historical rocket propulsion testing determined the following to be the primary cost
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drivers for a test program [92, 121]:
1. Engine thrust class
2. Facility upgrade requirements
3. Project-specific modifications to the test facility
4. Number of tests and test duration
A comparison of various propulsion testing projects showed a positive correlation
between test project cost and the engine thrust level [121]. This does not apply to
this analysis because only a single engine is being considered. Similarly, the non-
recurring costs associated with the second and third drivers are equivalent to any
testing strategy for a given engine. The recurring cost of testing is addressed in
the last item. Increasing the number of tests allows the non-recurring costs to be
amortized over a greater number of tests, resulting in a lower cost per test when more
tests are conducted. The test duration increases cost due to the length of time the
test facility is used.
The use of generic testing strategies leads to two assumptions in regards to test-
ing cost and schedule. In this context, lower fidelity tests could represent different
component-level tests, short duration engine-level tests, or single-objective tests. Ad-
ditionally, not enough information is provided to assess the cost of component-level
tests. To enable a fair comparison between the alternative strategies, the first as-
sumption is that test costs will vary with fidelity level in relation to the test cost
distribution used in Experiment 3, Section 3.4.1. The equation for test cost is shown
below:
Test Costi = f
2
i ci (31)
where fi is the fidelity level of test i, and ci∼triangular(0.50, 0.55, 0.63)$M in $1996.
The fidelity squared term is included to represent the project testing cost driver
associated with recurring costs.
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The second assumption is related to the duration input for testing activities. The
testing schedule for the RS-68 program indicates that component-level tests occur
roughly twice as frequently compared to engine-level tests. This is illustrated in the
program gantt chart of the development testing phase [154]. An assumption for this
application problem is made based on the RS-68 test history. VVT activities with a
fidelity less than 0.225 are given a duration discount based on the component testing
rate experienced during the RS-68 development program. The fidelity value is also
selected based on the RS-68 case study, where component-level tests reached a fidelity
of 0.225. Activity duration is represented as follows:
Test Durationi =

fi <= 0.225 ∼triangular(3, 4, 6) ∗ 0.5 days
fi > 0.225 ∼triangular(3, 4, 6) days
(32)
5.3.2 System Assessment
In the system assessment, any required parameters that define the system are also held
constant. This includes the number of failure modes and the failure mode probability
of occurrence. The fix effectiveness factor is also kept the same since it is assumed
that the same approach to eliminating failure modes and increasing reliability is used
for any testing strategy for the same system. The only parameter that changes is the
total number of tests. This value is determined using the effective test effort, and is
different for each alternative. The reliability growth assumptions for the alternative
strategies are listed in Table 31. The DSM probabilities used in evaluating the baseline
are used for the alternative strategies.
The final two steps of the RIVVTS methodology, rework impact projection and
risk assessment, are presented in the following section. The results of these two steps
are compared to the baseline strategy and conclusions are drawn on the effect of VVT
strategies to mitigate the impact of rework cycles.
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Table 31: Reliability growth assumptions for alternative VVT strategies.
Parameter Value
Number of Failure Modes 160-182
Probability of Occurrence β(0.22,8.75)
FEF 90%-95%
Number of Tests vary
5.4 Results
The results of the RIVVTS evaluation of alternative VVT strategies are provided
in Figures 63-68. In each of these figures, the x-axis is labeled test number. This
value is the total number of tests required for each alternative VVT strategy to reach
the baseline Effective Test Effort, Equation 30. The total test number for a given
alternative is common to all figures.
Figure 63 provides the mean reliability projections for all of the strategies. From
this plot, it is clear that using the EFE to determine the total number of tests ensures
that every alternative meets the same reliability target, within 3%. The reliability
risk is presented in Figure 64 and demonstrates the similar reliability risk for each
alternative when compared to the baseline. This result is expected due to the tight
range of mature reliability estimates.
Figures 65 and 66 represent the total rework cost and total test cost, respectively,
for each of the 35 alternatives. The total cost of rework increases at the total number
of tests increases. The baseline rework cost for the SSME is $1.35 B in 1996 dollars.
The shaded region indicates the 5% and 95% confidence levels of rework cost for
the alternatives. As the total test number increases towards the baseline, the cost
of rework increases rapidly. This continues until approximately 800 tests, when the
cost of rework continues to increase with the test number, but at a less rapid pace.
The uncertainty of rework also increases with test number. The uncertainty range at
the lowest test number is 35% smaller than at the highest test number. This result
implies that the fewer number of tests required, the less total rework cost is incurred
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Figure 63: Mature reliability estimate for alternative VVT strategies.
Figure 64: Reliability risk for alternative VVT strategies.
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and this cost can be estimated with a greater level of certainty.
The alternative strategies that require a greater number of total tests, corre-
spondingly include a greater number of lower fidelity tests, which can be seen from
the alternative test profiles in Figure 62. This is relevant when considering the rate
at which rework cycles are uncovered. Based on the assumption established in Sec-
tion 2.7, that rework cycles cost more the later they occur, slower progressing test
programs will not perform as well in terms of rework cost. The F-1 and J-2 engines
are examples of this testing strategy, completing extensive component testing and a
large number of single-objective engine-level tests [92].
Figure 65: Total rework cost for alternative VVT strategies.
Figure 66 provides the total test cost for each alternative. The alternatives that
requirer fewer total tests have a higher total test cost. This is expected based on the
test cost assumption stated in Section 5.3.1. The more high fidelity tests in a given
test program, the higher the overall test cost. The lower fidelity tests are assumed to
cost less, and therefore, the slower progressing test programs will have a lower overall
test cost. The uncertainty on the test cost is low and consistent regardless of the total
174
number of tests. The magnitude of test costs is significantly lower than the total cost
of rework for all of the alternatives. The impact of rework cost on the program is
in line with the historical cost distribution that was provided in Figure 46. The test
cost is typically 25% of the total development cost, almost half of the hardware costs
[154]. From this assessment, the rework cost is expected to drive the cost risk.
Figure 66: Total test cost for alternative VVT strategies.
The total duration for the alternative VVT strategies is provided in Figure 67,
and is plotted with the 5% and 95% percentiles. The test program duration increases
with total number of tests, as expected. The shorter duration, lower fidelity tests do
not provide enough of a schedule discount to overcome the higher number of tests
for the slower progressing test strategies. While the schedule prediction results are
not particularly interesting, the schedule risk results provide additional information
when compared to the cost risk.
The cost and schedule risks are plotted in Figure 68 versus the total test number.
The shape of the cost risk curve confirms the expectation that rework cost drives
the overall cost risk of the system. As the total number of tests required begins to
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Figure 67: Total duration for alternative VVT strategies.
exceed the baseline, the cost risk increases suddenly. Towards the end of the curve,
the last five or six scenarios, the cost risk begins to level out. The rework cost of
those alternatives also begins to level out, but the testing cost actually decreases.
Consequently, the cost risk increases less rapidly towards the slower progressing test
program alternatives and decreases slightly for the four alternative strategies with the
most tests. The total cost risk for the four strategies with the most tests decreases due
to the continuing decrease in test cost and lack of corresponding increase in rework
cost. By evaluating multiple alternative VVT strategies, a conclusion can also be
drawn on how VVT strategies can mitigate the impact of rework cycles. The total
cost and total cost risk curves indicate that fewer total tests with higher fidelities can
reduce the cost of unplanned rework. By increasing the fidelity of tests when possible,
the program incurs less rework cost.
The schedule risk axis is on the right axis of Figure 68. The schedule risk also
increases as total test number increases, but to a different degree than the cost risk.
The linear relationship between schedule and test number allows the quadratic risk
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impact function relationship to become evident in the schedule risk plot. While cost
risk begins to increase suddenly around the baseline value and level off towards the
longer test programs, the schedule risk does not increase until approximately test
number 850, where it begins to rapidly increase and continues to rapidly increase
towards the longer test programs. The schedule risk is based on the total duration
for the baseline case. The strategies with fewer tests than the baseline do not incur
schedule risk because they do not exceed the total baseline duration. This comparison
implies that cost risk due to rework is a bigger driver in liquid rocket engine test
programs than both test cost and schedule.
Figure 68: Cost and schedule risk for alternative VVT strategies.
The previous results for the alternative VVT strategies consider the individual
outputs of the RIVVTS methodology. The final step of the generic decision-making
process discussed in Section 2.3 is to select a VVT strategy. The ‘best’ VVT strategy
can depend on the overall risk profile for the program and the program priorities.
For example, some programs are more sensitive to cost than schedule, and can accept
additional tests to reduce overall test cost. Figure 69 provides an easier way to
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compare the RIVVTS output metrics by arranging them in a scatter plot matrix.
The scatter plot matrix is used to assess the relationship between multiple variables
simultaneously.
Reliability and reliability risk are excluded due to their uniformity for the alter-
native strategies. From this matrix, it can be shown that test cost is the only metric
with a negative correlation to the other metrics. Since early test planning is typically
based on only test cost and test schedule, a trade-off between increasing schedule and
increasing test cost could be made. If a program is being pressured to produce results
quickly, the VVT strategies with fewer total tests can be chosen up to the point where
the test cost becomes prohibitively high. Similarly, if cost is the primary driver of
VVT planning, the VVT strategies with more tests at lower fidelity have a lower test
cost, but require more time to complete.
While rework cost drives the overall program risk, as discussed previously, it is not
considered during test planning because it results from unplanned rework [64]. This
indicates that early VVT planning is performed with insufficient information regard-
ing the impact of rework cycles. Figure 70 illustrates the benefit of incorporating the
cost of rework during VVT planning. The highlighted point represents the strategy
with the fewest total number of tests. The total test cost for this strategy is the
highest, due to the increased number of high fidelity tests included in the strategy.
However, it has the lowest overall cost and schedule. It can be seen here that a short
test program with more high fidelity testing can mitigate the impact of unplanned
rework on the program. By including the impact of rework on a VVT strategy, the
scatter plot matrix allows for an additional metric to be used for strategy comparisons
and ultimately, the selection of a ‘best’ VVT strategy.
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Figure 69: Scatter plot matrix for cost, schedule, reliability, and risk of alternative
VVT strategies.
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Figure 70: Scatter plot matrix for cost, schedule, reliability, and risk of alternative
VVT strategies.
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5.5 Application Problem Summary
The application problem was designed to confirm that the research objectives were
met and to demonstrate the potential benefits of the RIVVTS methodology in re-
ducing the impact of unplanned rework cycles during VVT. Section 5.5.1 provides
a summary of the results from Section 5.4, and Section 5.5.2 reviews the overall re-
search objective requirements to confirm that they have been met by the application
problem.
5.5.1 Summary of Results
The SSME was selected as the system for this problem due to its long test history
which allowed for a detailed baseline to be used for comparison. The alternative
strategies were generated by first creating a curve fit of the actual SSME test fidelity
profile, and then perturbing that by small increments using a fit coefficient, which
equals one for the baseline. Fit coefficients less than one created VVT strategies
that consisted of more lower fidelity tests, and longer overall test programs. These
test strategies can be compared to the F-1 and J-2 engine programs that had a
comprehensive component test program and a high number of engine-level tests aimed
at reliability demonstration. Fit coefficients greater than one created VVT strategies
that required fewer overall tests, and increased test fidelity earlier in the test program.
These strategies can be compared to the RS-68 test program that utilized multiple-
objective tests and was able to certify the engine in a historically low number of
tests.
A total of 35 alternative test strategies were modeled for this application problem
using the RIVVTS methodology. These alternatives were compared based on the
estimated mature reliability, rework cost, test cost, and overall program schedule.
The mature reliability projection was relatively stable, all of the alternatives were
within 1% of the target value. This was expected due to the total number of tests
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being determined by the effective test effort. The total cost of rework increased rapidly
as the total number of tests increased, and continued to increase at a slower rate after
approximately 850 total tests. The uncertainty of rework cost also increased as the
test programs got longer, with the shortest test program uncertainty range being 35%
smaller than the uncertainty range for the longest program.
The cost of rework was determined to be the primary driver of risk because it
was the most sensitive to the total number of tests and the time at which rework
occurred. By using lower fidelity tests, failure modes took longer to uncover and
therefore, rework cycles to fix them were more costly. A greater number of tests also
resulted in an increase in schedule risk, but this increase was not observed until the
last 6 alternatives, wherein the total number of tests was greater than 850.
5.5.2 Research Objective Requirements
The application problem presented in this chapter was designed for two primary
purposes: first, to verify that the overall research objective and criteria are met,
and second, to demonstrate the possible benefits of the RIVVTS methodology on a
relevant launch vehicle subsystem. To verify that the research objective has been
met, the application problem outputs are compared to each criteria, and then to the
overall research objective.
The first criterion states that the method must produce quantitative means for
comparing alternative VVT strategies. This criteria can be confirmed by observing
the application problem results in Section 5.4. The use of four metrics to assess the
value of a single VVT strategy provides four distinct quantitative means for decision-
makers to compare strategies depending on the program priorities. A criterion for
quantitative outputs was included for all four metrics, having been derived from the
overall objective, to ensure this result.
Figures 63 - 68 illustrates the quantitative result of mature reliability, reliability
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risk, total rework cost, total test cost, total program schedule, and cost/schedule risk
for each VVT alternative strategy. Each point in Figure 63 provides the average ma-
ture reliability prediction which accompanies a complete reliability growth prediction
over the full test program. Similarly, the total rework cost plotted in Figure 65 can
be calculated as a cumulative cost over the length of the test program for additional
information. Figure 68 illustrates a quantitative trade that can be made by compar-
ing cost and schedule risk. By observing these outputs, it can be confirmed that the
first overall research criterion is met.
Figures 65 and 67 can also be used to confirm that the second overall criterion
is met. It states that a quantitative estimate for the impact of rework on cost and
schedule be provided by the RIVVTS methodology. These figures demonstrate the
ability of the engineering build-up cost methodology and DSM schedule representation
to provide realistic and quantitative estimates for the impact of rework during VVT.
The final requirement is that the method be scalable and flexible enough to use for
large complex systems. The application problem included testing strategies that range
from 600 to over 1,000 tests at different fidelity levels. This range demonstrates the
flexibility and scalability of the RIVVTS methodology. The run-time for changing the
discrete event simulation model was evaluated to address the issue of flexibility. While
a single simulation run only takes 2-4 seconds for a given test strategy, changing the
model to a different test strategy takes between 15 minutes to an hour, depending
on the number of activities being modeled. A Simio add-on allows an automated
transition between strategies. The full test problem included 1,000 runs each for 35
alternative strategies. At approximately 3 seconds per run and 30 minutes between
alternatives, the test problem was completed in less than 2 days. This physical
evaluation of the RIVVTS model demonstrates its adaptability to a wide range of
fidelities and activities.
The results of the application problem can therefore be used to verify that the
183
original requirements for the research objective have been met. The application prob-
lem provides quantitative metrics to select between VVT alternatives, two of these
metrics include quantitative estimates for the impact of rework during VVT, and the




6.1 Summary of Findings
The goal of this research was to develop a methodology for evaluating the impact of
rework cycles on the verification, validation, and testing of launch vehicle systems. In
Chapter 1 the difficulty of achieving first-flight for launch vehicle programs in recent
history was discussed. Excessive cost overruns and schedule slippages have resulted in
program cancellations and left the U.S. without the ability to independently launch
people into space since 2011. The unplanned rework that occurs during VVT was
shown to be a significant contributor to these overruns, but has not been explic-
itly considered during VVT planning. This observation led to the overall research
objective for this thesis with is restated below.
Research Objective
Reduce cost and schedule overruns by modeling the effects of unplanned
rework on the verification, validation, and testing of launch vehicle systems,
and determining how VVT strategies can mitigate those effects.
The first research question posed in Section 2.3 addressed the foundation of this
methodology by asking what are the necessary components to provide a complete
assessment of the value of a VVT strategy. In Section 2.4 the academic efforts to
improve VVT planning and the current industry standard approach were discussed
and categorized into cost or cost versus benefit approaches. The cost versus benefit
approaches were determined to provide a more comprehensive value according to the
formal definition of VVT stated in Section 2.2.1. To provide a complete assessment,
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four metrics were chosen to evaluate a VVT strategy: quality, cost, schedule, and risk.
The literature review and background research conducted to determine the necessary
output of this methodology led to the following conjecture:
Conjecture: 1
If quality, cost, schedule, and risk are used as metrics to evaluate the impact
of rework during VVT, it will provide the most complete assessment of
VVT activities, and will enable a quantitative comparison of alternative
VVT strategies.
After selecting the four metrics for evaluating a VVT strategy in conjecture 1,
existing techniques for evaluating each metric were reviewed and discussed to further
develop those components of the overall methodology. The measure of benefit pro-
vided by VVT — referred to as quality — was inconsistently defined in the existing
VVT planning approaches. Technical performance measures, risk reduction, rework
reduction and other measures of quality were discussed in Section 2.5. Section 2.5.1
discussed the current priorities for NASA’s SLS development program to provide
context in determining an appropriate quality measure for this research. NASA’s
current focus on improving the reliability of SLS by an order of magnitude over pre-
vious launch vehicles led to the formulation of conjecture 2.
Conjecture: 2
If reliability is used as a quality metric for launch vehicle systems, it will
provide a quantitative representation and accurate measure of quality for
VVT activities.
The selection of reliability as a measure of quality for launch vehicle VVT strate-
gies led to a review of the following commonly used reliability analysis techniques in
Section 2.5.2: fault tree analysis, reliability block diagrams, failure mode and effect
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analysis, and reliability growth models. The merits of these techniques were discussed,
and ultimately, discrete reliability growth projection was chosen to evaluate reliabil-
ity during development testing phases. A number of models that had already been
proven to accurately estimate launch vehicle reliability growth were then reviewed,
and Hall’s discrete reliability growth model was selected for use in this methodology.
Experiment 1a was designed to test the accuracy of Hall’s model during VVT. The
assumption that all trials or tests were equivalent was found to be a weakness when
using Hall’s approach across the full testing phase, where tests of different fidelity
levels were conducted. An adaptation of Hall’s model was suggested in Section 3.2.3,
in which the fidelity of each test would be defined by the percentage of failure modes
that could be uncovered during a given test. Experiment 1b was conducted to test
the use of different fidelity levels to determine if an appropriate fidelity measure could
be identified and used to improve upon Hall’s model for use during VVT. Three fi-
delity definitions were used as comparison, based on identified approaches to defining
equivalent flights in the literature. The results substantiated hypothesis 2a.
Hypothesis: 2a
If Hall’s reliability growth model is adapted to include defect elimination
as a function of test fidelity, it will provide reliability projection with quan-
titative insight into individual VVT activities.
After it was determined that the adapted discrete reliability growth model could
be used to accurately project reliability during VVT, additional research questions
were posed to further define the remaining evaluation metrics. Section 2.6 reviewed
common schedule projection techniques and discussed their strengths and weaknesses
as applied to this problem. For VVT schedules, a DSM was identified as a concise
way to represent activity relationships and allow for the stochastic nature of rework
cycles to be modeled. A weakness in the current use of DSMs to represent rework
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was identified in the implicit evaluation of internal rework within an activity. Exper-
iment 2 was designed to address this weakness, and verify that the use of internal
rework probabilities would result in a more accurate schedule estimate. The results
of Experiment 2 substantiated hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis: 3
If a DSM is adapted to explicitly account for the probability of internal re-
work, it will provide a stochastic and quantitative model of rework impacts
that is more accurate for VVT processes than if internal rework is implicitly
included in the activity duration distribution.
The cost of VVT activities is a necessary consideration when choosing a VVT
strategy. Additionally, the cost of rework during VVT was identified as a significant
contributor to the cancellation of launch vehicle programs in recent history. There-
fore, a cost metric is included in VVT strategy assessment. Current cost estimating
techniques and reliability-based cost estimating techniques were reviewed for use in
this methodology. The reliability-based methods were generic in general, and the
Rocketdyne method did not account for the stochasticity of rework cycle occurrence.
The bottom-up, engineering build-up approach was determined to be flexible enough
to account for stochasticity, and more accurate than historical data-based methods.
The following conjecture was made to assess cost of VVT activities and the impact
of rework cost.
Conjecture: 4
Using engineering build-up to calculate cumulative cost will give a quanti-
tative estimate that is more accurate than historical data based methods
and accounts for the stochastic nature of rework cycles.
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After techniques for reliability, cost, and schedule assessment were identified, re-
search question 5 was asked the most appropriate use of different input distribu-
tions and uncertainty quantification techniques for risk assessment. Section 2.8.1.1
discussed the commonly used uncertainty categorizations to determine the type of
uncertainty present during VVT. The presence of aleatory uncertainty, by definition,
cannot be eliminated, while VVT activities are designed to reduce the endogenous
epistemic uncertainty that exists during early design. Section 2.8.1.2 reviewed the
necessary components for quantifying uncertainty to determine an approach for this
methodology, starting with the input variable distributions. The triangular distribu-
tion parameters — pessimistic, optimistic, and most likely values — are more intuitive
than the abstract shape parameters required for a Beta or Weibull distribution. For
this reason, the triangular distribution was determined to be a more traceable option
for assessing the input distributions of the cost and schedule for an individual activity.
In quantifying the uncertainty of rework impact, a discrete event simulation was
chosen to allow for the stochastic nature of rework cycle occurrence and impact to
be captured. Section 2.7 discussed the change in rework cycle cost as the system
progresses through the development phase. The DES evaluates the system at discrete
steps in time to determine if rework has occurred and assess the impact. The ability to
account for the stochastic nature of rework cycles, as well as the quantitative output
of reliability, cost, and schedule distributions makes the DES the best choice for this
methodology. The resulting output distributions are then used to calculate the risk
level of a given VVT strategy using a quadratic impact function. This led to the
formulation of conjecture 5 in response to this research question.
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Conjecture: 5
• Using triangular input distributions, the assumptions required will be
more traceable than if beta and Weibull distributions are used.
• If DES is used for simulation, the results will allow for quantitative
comparisons between VVT strategies and account for stochasticity of
rework cycles.
The last research question was posed in Section 2.9 to determine how the probabil-
ity of rework can be determined. Many approaches to estimating design rework cycles
were presented in Section 2.9.2, but few address the rework during VVT. Historical
data-based methods and expert opinion were the most commonly used approaches,
but can be subject to bias by the estimator. The Rocketdyne TUF metric was a more
relevant approach, but is limited to estimating the total number of rework cycles and
neglects their stochasticity. FMEA was identified as a possible technique that is more
traceable than expert opinion and historical data-based methods and can be used to
predict when rework occurs. As a commonly used reliability analysis technique, uti-
lizing FMEA for this purpose requires no additional effort on the part of the designer.
A comprehensive FMEA provides total number of failure modes, failure probabilities,
and severities. Experiment 3 was designed to test the use of FMEA for estimating
the probability and impact of rework cycles. Utilizing Hall’s indicator function to de-
termine when rework cycles occur based on the failure mode probabilities proved to
be an accurate prediction of rework cycles when compared to the actual rework data
from an existing system. The results of this experiment substantiated hypothesis 6,
which is restated below.
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Hypothesis: 6
If subsystem and system level FMEA is performed, then the resulting data
will provide quantitative rework probabilities that are more traceable than
expert opinion and the data will be more readily available than expert
opinion and all historical data based methods.
These research questions, literature review, and experiments were used to develop
the individual components of the RIVVTS methodology. The complete method was
tested on a case study, where the output was compared to actual data from the
RS-68 engine. The purpose of this example was to illustrate that this methodology
accurately captures the occurrence and impact of rework cycles seen during VVT.
The secondary purpose of the example was to validate the development of the cost,
schedule, and reliability assumptions for future applications of this method.
Finally, this method was applied to alternative VVT strategies for a relevant
launch vehicle subsystem, the Space Shuttle Main Engine. The alternative VVT
strategies were evaluated to determine how the impact of rework can be mitigated
through VVT activities. The results give interesting observations regarding the ben-
efit of comprehensive component testing versus early integrated testing. Ultimately,
this final application problem demonstrates the merits of this methodology in evalu-
ating VVT strategies and provides a risk-informed decision making environment to
reduce the impact of rework cycles on the verification, validation, and testing process
of launch vehicle systems and subsystems.
6.2 Contributions
The work in this thesis provides multiple contributions to improve the test planning
process for launch vehicles. These contributions relate to the overall research objective
and to the individual techniques used to address it.
The first contribution is in the field of reliability projection across testing phases.
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A discussion of reliability growth models in Section 2.5.2 identified weaknesses in the
use of discrete models during testing. Many authors suggest that their method can
be used during testing, but the assumption that each test has an equal probability of
uncovering all failure modes is a limiting assumption when applying it to tests with
varying fidelity levels. A hypothesis was made to adapt an existing discrete reliability
growth model to account for test fidelity levels to provide more insight into the effect
individual tests have on reliability. Experiment 1 tested the use of different test
fidelity definitions to model the reliability of an actual system during development
testing, and ultimately substantiated that a functional fidelity level definition could
be used to accurately project reliability growth across test phases. The following
case study in Chapter 4 further validated the use of this adapted reliability growth
model on an actual system. This contribution is an improved method of predicting
reliability growth during testing with varying levels of fidelity while the effects of
individual tests are represented.
The second contribution is in the prediction of unplanned rework occurrence and
impact. In Section 2.9, research question 6 was introduced and options for estimating
the probability of rework cycles were discussed. During this discussion, weaknesses
in the existing methods were identified. FMEA was suggested as a method to over-
come these weakness and improve the traceability of rework estimates. Experiment
2 was designed to test the use of FMEA for estimating the number of rework cycles,
and probability of failure occurrences when combined with Hall’s adapted reliabil-
ity indicator function. Previous attempts to estimate rework failed to account for
the stochasticity of their occurrence and impact. The results of this experiment il-
lustrated the usefulness of this approach. The case study presented in Section 4.6
further demonstrated the ability of this approach to accurately estimate the cumula-
tive rework cycles of the RS-68 engine development program. The results from the
experiment and case study validated the use of FMEA and the adapted indicator
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function as an accurate and traceable approach to predicting rework cycles during
VVT.
The third contribution is provided by the actual RIVVTS methodology. The
research objective was to reduce cost and schedule overruns by modeling the effects
of unplanned rework on the verification, validation, and testing of launch vehicle
systems, and determining how VVT strategies can mitigate those effects. The criteria
for this objective were generated through a discussion on what constitutes a complete
assessment of a VVT strategy and what is the desired output of this methodology.
Ultimately, it was determined that this research must provide a quantitative means
of comparing alternative strategies that assesses the impact of rework cycles for a
risk-informed decision making environment. These derived requirements were based
on identified weaknesses of the industry standard approach in VVT planning, and
therefore, represent improvements on the current state-of-the-art approach.
The RIVVTS methodology provides a much needed link between VVT planning
and the impact of rework cycles. Typically, VVT planning is based one subjective
expert opinion while considering overall cost, schedule, and risk to the program. A
lack of structured assessment and no explicit rework impact projection limits the
ability to quantitatively compare alternative VVT strategies. With the RIVVTS
method, decision makers can now consider the impact of rework cycles throughout the
development testing process when planning VVT activities. The application problem
presented in Chapter 5 demonstrates that this method is well suited for conducting
cost versus benefit trades for alternative strategies, which can help decision makers
during VVT planning.
This method also provides a flexible and traceable approach to assessing a VVT
strategy depending on the current phase of the design process. For early design test
planning, the assumptions can be made at the system level and test definitions can be
grouped according to test phases. This provides the design team with a quantitative
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assessment of rework impact on a given system earlier in the design process. As the
program progresses and enters detailed design, the assumptions can be generated at
the component level and test can be defined individually. This flexibility allows the
method to be applied throughout the development process, and updated as more
information becomes available.
6.3 Future Work
During the development of this research, several additional areas of interest were
identified for future work. These areas concern both the specific components within
the RIVVTS methodology, but also directions to expand upon the foundation this
method has created.
The first area for improvement of the RIVVTS methodology is to expand the
DSM to incorporate parallel testing activities. Testing often occurs simultaneously at
multiple sites. For example, engines testing is assumed to be conducted at a minimum
of two sites. While this reduces the overall schedule, it increases the uncertainty in
reliability and rework estimation. By assuming sequential testing activities, the full
capability of discrete event simulation was not utilized. The benefit of using DES over
Monte Carlo Simulation is the ability represent state changes at discrete times in the
system, making it ideal for navigating two parallel test executions that start and
stop at different time steps. Increasing the capability of the RIVVTS methodology
to include parallel testing would provide a more accurate assessment of reliability in
real-time.
The second area for potential research would be to implement a more complex
reliability growth model. The adapted Hall model represents component testing as
a subset of system reliability. A more complex reliability growth model could enable
reliability projections at the component level. The CONTRAST method discussed
in Section 2.5.2 would be well suited to supplement this research. Already based on
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the Hall model, CONTRAST uses the reliability growth models at the subsystem
level, and then uses FTA to aggregate the lower level reliabilities to the system level.
It was considered for the initial development of this methodology, but the additional
assumptions required to generate the lower level reliability growth curves were deemed
unnecessary. Combining CONTRAST and RIVVTS would provide more insight into
the cost, schedule, and reliability of complex systems during development testing.
The third, and perhaps, simplest area for future work would be to include an
optimization routine to find an optimal VVT strategy based on the rework impact
evaluation provided by RIVVTS. A discrete, multi-objective optimization routine
like the NSGA-II would be ideally suited for this problem. NSGA-II is a popular
non-domination based genetic algorithm that was identified as a potential option for
optimizing this problem during preliminary research. With the model in place, an
optimization based on weighted objectives of minimizing cost, schedule, and reliability
risks would provide another tool for risk-informed decision making.
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APPENDIX A











Steady State Performance Characterization X X
Repeatability X X
Run-time Trends X X
Engine Influence Coefficients X X
Mixture Ratio Excursions X X
Thrust/Mixture Ratio Margin Demonstration X X
Ignition System X X X X
Turbomachinery X X X




Operational Life/Durability X X X X
Single Burn Endurance Test X X
Service Live, Number of Starts X X

















Cold Shock Tests X
Cold Flow Tests X X X
Propellant Conditions
- Pre-start Chilldown X X
- Start Propellant Conditions X X
- Steady State X X
- Shutdown Propellant Conditions X X
Transient Characterization
- Start Transient X X
- Restart X X
- Throttle Transient X X
- Shutdown Transient X X
- Abort Shutdown X X
NPSP Margin and Cavitation X X X
Pogo and Compliance Characterization X X X
Ancillary Subsystems
- Autogenous Pressurization X X
- Valve Actuation X X X X
- Purges X X X X
- Electrical Power and Integration X X X X
Thrust Vector and Gimballing
- Gimbal Limits X X X X
- Roll Control Limits X X
- Ambient Environment X X
- Inspections X X X X
- Heat Flux X X
- Clearance X X
- Interface Compatibility X X
- Thrust Vector Alignment X X
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Component Engine





s Functional Tests X X X X
Eng. Control System Malfunction Logic Check X X X X








Pre-Test Inspections and Checkouts X X X X
Leakage X X X X
Post-Test Inspections X X X X
Drying Purges X X
Line Replaceable Unit Demonstrations X X
Reusability X X X X
Operability X X









Thermal Environment X X X X
Climatic Tests X X X X
Vibration/Shock/Acoustics
- External Vibration X X X
- Self-induced Vibration X X X
Modal Surveys/Testing X X
Vehicle Interface Loads X X





Proof Pressure X X
FOD/DOD Tolerance X X
Structural Model Validation X X
Margin Testing X X
Human Rating X X X X







Gas Liquefaction Control X X X
External Icing Control X X
Mass Properties
- Mass X X X X
- Center of Gravity X X X X
- Moments of Interia X X X X
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